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Chapter 1
Introdution
This thesis ontributes to the existing theoretial and empirial literature on New Key-
nesian Maroeonomis in the eld of news shoks and internal ampliation eets in
onjuntion with and without (optimal) monetary poliy. It is based on ve artiles of
whih three are published and two are urrently under review. The thesis is organized in
two parts. The rst part (hapters 2 to 4) deals with antiipated disturbanes (i.e. news
shoks) and their volatility impliations. The seond part (hapters 5 and 6) deals with
two ampliation mehanisms that amplify the eets of monetary and non-monetary
disturbanes.
Part I  News shoks and their volatility impliations
Several empirial studies emphasize the importane of news shoks for business yle
utuations. These shoks materialize in the future, but their size and maturity time
is antiipated in advane by the agents. Most prominently, Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2012)
1
nd in an estimated real business yle model that about 50 perent of eonomi
utuations an be attributed to antiipated disturbanes. A theoretial branh of the
literature indiates that news shoks destabilize the eonomy, i.e. lead to a higher volatility
than unantiipated shoks of the same form. Fève et al. (2009) demonstrate in a purely
rational expetations model that news shoks inrease the volatility with inreasing length
of antiipation.
In light of these nding, this part begins to deal with the nonfundamentalness problem
that is assoiated with news shoks in hapter 2. The remainder of this part studies the
(de)stabilizing eets of antiipated disturbanes in ase of optimal monetary poliy and
bounded rationality (hapter 3) and in ase of antiipated monetary disturbanes that
are not fully antiipated (hapter 4).
1
The list of referenes for eah artile is attahed at the end of eah hapter right after the orresponding
onlusions.
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Chapter 2  News shoks, nonfundamentalness, and volatility
Rational expetations models with news shoks may generate moving average (MA) repre-
sentations that are nonfundamental, i.e. some roots of the MA determinant lie inside the
unit irle. Suh representations annot be obtained from the inversion of estimated ve-
tor autoregression (VAR). In fat, given an autoovariane struture, there exist innitely
many MA representations ompatible with it, where fundamental representations present
only a thin subset.
2
The nonfundamentalness typially arises from the lag polynomial
that is assoiated with news shoks.
This hapter ontributes to the existing literature in three ways: First, it derives
an analytial solution formula for this speial type of polynomial and disusses its main
properties. Our solution formula may be used to onvert a nonfundamental representation
into a fundamental one by means of a Blashke-type transformation matrix that ips the
roots of the determinant of the moving average proess. Seond, we nd that the roots
do not hange with inreasing length of antiipation. We, therefore, onlude that the
destabilizing eets of news shoks are exlusively due to its antiipation harateristi.
Finally, as a terminologial remark, we relate the lag polynomial assoiated with news
shoks to the lass of ylotomi polynomials. The literature maintains that news shok
polynomial is ylotomi. We argue that this is not the ase.
This hapter is based on the paper entitled News shoks, nonfundamentalness, and
volatility whih is joint work with Hans-Werner Wohltmann and has been published
2013 in Eonomis Letters 119(1), 17-19. The researh question whether the destabilizing
eets of news shoks are related to the problem of nonfundamentalness was initially raised
by a referee to the paper of Winkler and Wohltmann (2012). Prof. Wohltmann further
developed this idea and provided most of the analytial analysis. My ontribution onsists
of linking the lag polynomial to the lass of ylotomi polynomials, the simulations, and
most of the writing.
Chapter 3  Volatility eets of news shoks in (B)RE models with optimal
monetary poliy
This hapter studies the volatility impliations of antiipated ost-push shoks in a New
Keynesian model under optimal unrestrited monetary poliy with forward-looking ra-
tional expetations (RE) and bakward-looking boundedly rational expetations (BRE).
Bounded rationality assumes that agents have ognitive limitations and use simple heuris-
tis (rule of thumbs) to guide their behavior. We analyze how the relative volatility results
of news shoks hange if rational expetations are replaed by boundedly rational expe-
tations.
We nd that the (volatility) eets of news shoks on the eonomy and, thus, their
2
See Lippi and Reihlin (1994).
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importane for business yle utuations depend on the assumption of forward-looking
rational expetations. If the degree of bakward-looking prie setting behavior is su-
iently small (large), antiipated ost-push shoks lead to a higher (lower) volatility in
the output gap and in the entral bank's loss than an unantiipated shok of the same
size. The inversion of the volatility eets of news shoks between rational and boundedly
rational expetations follows from the inverse relation between the prie-setting behavior
and the optimal monetary poliy. By ontrast, if the entral bank does not optimize and
follows a standard Taylor-type rule and the prie setters are purely (forward-) bakward-
looking, the volatility of the eonomy is (inreasing with) independent of the antiipation
horizon. The volatility results for the ination rate are ambiguous.
This hapter is based on the paper entitled Volatility eets of news shoks in (B)RE
models with optimal monetary poliy whih is joint work with Hans-Werner Wohltmann
and has been published 2015 as Eonomis Working Paper 2015-07, Christian-Albrehts-
University of Kiel, Department of Eonomis. The initial idea to study news shok under
bounded rationality was developed by myself and further exploited in ollaboration with
Prof. Wohltmann. My ontribution further onsists of substantial parts of the analytial
analysis, the simulations, and most of the writing.
Chapter 4  Partially antiipated monetary poliy shoks  Are they stabilizing
or destabilizing?
This hapter studies the volatility eets of antiipated monetary disturbanes whih are
not fully antiipated by the publi. So far, the literature has only onsidered two extreme
ases of antiipation. Either the publi has perfet information and fully antiipates the
shok proess (as in hapters 2 and 3) or the publi is ompletely uninformed and does
not antiipate the shok proess at all. This paper introdues an intermediate senario of
partial antiipation, whih overs both extreme senarios as speial ases. Under partial
antiipation, the publi has imperfet information about the magnitude, the start, and/or
the end of the future monetary poliy intervention. We use a dynami Dornbush-type
model framework of a small open eonomy as model framework.
Our main results are as follows: First, partially antiipated monetary poliy shoks
may be stabilizing, i.e. lead to a lower volatility than a fully antiipated monetary poliy
shok of the same form. Seond, we typially obtain a trade o in volatilities suh that
a simultaneous stabilization of ination and output is not possible. If the publi under-
estimates (overestimates) the size of the shok, output (ination) may be stabilized. Our
results imply that the entral bank may have an inentive to withhold information from
the publi about the true entral bank's intentions.
This hapter is based on the paper entitled Partially antiipated monetary poliy
shoks  Are they stabilizing or destabilizing? whih is joint work with Hans-Werner
Wohltmann and has been aepted for publiation in the Journal of Eonomis and
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Statistis. The researh idea to study partially antiipated disturbanes was developed by
myself and further exploited in ollaborations with Prof. Wohltmann who's initial idea
was to study risk premium shoks. My ontribution further onsists of the simulations,
substantial parts of the analytial analysis, and most of the writing.
Part II  Ampliation hannels of monetary and non-monetary
disturbanes
This part of the thesis onsiders two extensions of the standard business yle models.
Both extensions give rise to an internal ampliation eet that may amplify the eets
of exogenous shoks. Chapter 6 introdues a money and redit market into the baseline
New Keynesian model whih gives impliitly rise to a redit hannel that may amplify
monetary disturbanes. Chapter 7 estimates a medium-sale real business yle model
with endogenous rm or produt entry in order to quantify the ampliation mehanism
assoiated with endogenous rm entry.
Chapter 5  Money and redit in the New Keynesian model
This hapter introdues a money and loan market into a stati approximation of the New
Keynesian framework. The demand side of the money and loan market follows from a
money-and-redit-in-the-utility approah, where real balanes and borrowing ontribute
to the household's utility. Contrarily to the baseline New Keynesian model, the entral
bank has no diret ontrol over the bond rate. Instead, the entral bank's instrument
variables are the monetary base, the renaning rate, and the entral bank's ination
target. The introdued money-and-redit-in-the-utility approah impliitly gives rise to a
redit hannel as an additional transmission mehanism of monetary shoks in whih the
(urrent and future) bond and loan rate diretly aet urrent goods demand.
Our main results are as follows: First, the entral bank's inuene on the bond rate
and on a broader money aggregate is redued. Changes in the renaning rate and
in the monetary base lead to less than proportional hanges in the bond rate and in
broad money, respetively. Aompanied by a ontrationary redit supply shok, the
eets of a monetary expansion are further redued and may lead to a nearly omplete
neutralization. Seond, in line with Bernanke and Blinder (1988), the redit hannel
amplies the (output) eets of isolated monetary disturbanes. Third, a rise in ination
(bond and loan rate) expetations derease (inrease) the eetiveness of expansionary
monetary poliy. Hene, if the monetary impulse is aompanied by a suiently large
adjustment in ination expetations in the same diretion, the redit hannel dampens
the output eets. Fourth, in a dynami version of our model, in whih expetations are
formed endogenously, we nd that the redit hannel amplies output responses.
This hapter is based on the artile entitled Money and redit in the New Keynesian
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model whih is joint work with Hans-Werner Wohltmann and has been published 2014
in Review of Eonomis 65(1), 253-280. The initial researh idea to use a money-and-
redit-in-the-utility approah to model the demand side of the money and loan market
and most of the analytial analysis was provided by Prof. Wohltmann. My ontribution
onsists of the simulations (inluding the alibration), most of the writing, and developing
the dynami version of the model.
Chapter 6  Endogenous rm entry in an estimated model of the U.S. business
yle
This hapter studies the empirial importane of endogenous rm entry as ampliation
mehanism for business yle utuations. To this end, we use the rm entry model
by Bilbiie et al. (2012), extend it with several real fritions and estimate the model on
U.S. data with Bayesian methods. In this model, the ampliation mehanism of rm
entry works through a ompetition and a variety eet. The variety eet desribes the
produtivity gains from additional varieties. An inrease in the number of rms inreases
output more than proportional due to inreasing returns to speialization. The so-alled
ompetition eet aptures the inverse relation between the number of produers and prie
mark-ups. An inrease in the number of produers erodes market power. Prie mark-ups
fall whih in turn boosts aggregate demand. To quantify the ampliation mehanism and
to disentangle the ompetition and the variety eet, we speify two ounterfatual model
frameworks, where either the ompetition eet or both the ompetition and the variety
eet are swithed o. We measure the ampliation as perentage volatility dierene
aross the three model variants.
We nd that the ampliation mehanism assoiated with rm entry substantially
amplies utuations in output and onsumption, but dampens utuations in investment.
For output, the total inrease is given by 8.5 perent. The ompetition eet aounts for
most of the ampliation, amplifying output by 7 perent, whereas the inrease through
the variety eet only amounts to 1.5 perent. Both eets are statistially signiant. If
we onsider eah strutural shok in isolation, the results are mixed. On the one hand,
the ompetition and the variety eet amplify the impats of labor produtivity and wage
mark-up shoks on output. This follows from the fat that for these shoks, output and
rm entry are positively orrelated. On the other hand, the ompetition and the variety
eet dampen the output eets of aggregate demand and investment-spei tehnology
shoks, for whih the onditional orrelation between rm entry and output is negative.
This hapter is based on the paper entitled Endogenous rm entry in an estimated
model of the U.S. business yle whih is joint work with Roland Winkler and has been
published 2015 as Eonomis Working Paper 2015-06, Christian-Albrehts-University of
Kiel, Department of Eonomis. The initial researh idea to quantify the importane of
rm entry was developed by Roland Winkler. He also provided most of the theoretial
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model derivation. My ontribution onsists of the estimation and most of the program-
ming and simulations. Both authors ontributed equally to the writing.
Part I
News shoks and their volatility
impliations
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Chapter 2
News shoks, nonfundamentalness, and
volatility
Coauthored by: Hans-Werner Wohltmann
Published in: Eonomis Letters, April 2013, vol. 119(1), pp. 17-19
Abstrat
Rational expetations models with news shoks may generate moving average represen-
tation that are nonfundamental. The nonfundamentalness typially arises from the lag
polynomial assoiated with news shoks. This paper provides an exat solution formula
for this speial type of polynomial and disusses its main properties. In the presene
of news shoks, the solutions may be used to onvert a nonfundamental moving average
representation into a fundamental one and vie versa. From the properties of these solu-
tions, we onlude that the destabilizing eets of news shoks are exlusively due to its
antiipation harateristi.
JEL lassiation: E32, C22
Keywords: News shok, Nonfundamentalness, Cylotomi polynomial
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The full artile an be downloaded via
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eonlet.2013.01.004
Chapter 3
Volatility eets of news shoks in
(B)RE models with optimal monetary
poliy
Coauthored by: Hans-Werner Wohltmann
Published in: Eonomis Working Papers 2015-07, Christian-Albrehts-University of
Kiel, Department of Eonomis
Abstrat
This paper studies the volatility impliations of antiipated ost-push shoks (i.e. news
shoks) in a New Keynesian model under optimal unrestrited monetary poliy with
forward-looking rational expetations (RE) and bakward-looking boundedly rational ex-
petations (BRE). If the degree of bakward-looking prie setting behavior is suiently
small (large), antiipated ost-push shoks lead to a higher (lower) volatility in the out-
put gap and in the entral bank's loss than an unantiipated shok of the same size. The
inversion of the volatility eets of news shoks between rational and boundedly rational
expetations follows from the inverse relation between the prie-setting behavior and the
optimal monetary poliy. By ontrast, if the entral bank does not optimize and follows
a standard Taylor-type rule and the prie setters are purely (forward-) bakward-looking,
the volatility of the eonomy is (inreasing with) independent of the antiipation horizon.
The volatility results for the ination rate are ambiguous.
JEL lassiation: E32, E52
Keywords: Antiipated shoks, Optimal monetary poliy, Bounded rationality, Volatility
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3.1 Introdution
Several empirial studies emphasize the importane of news shoks for business yle
utuations. These shoks materialize in the future, but their size and maturity time
is antiipated in advane by the agents. Most prominently, Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2012) nd in an estimated real business yle model that about 50 perent of eonomi
utuations an be attributed to antiipated disturbanes.
1
A theoretial branh of the literature indiates that news shoks destabilize the eon-
omy, i.e. lead to a higher volatility than unantiipated shoks of the same form. Fève et
al. (2009) demonstrate in a purely forward-looking rational expetations model that news
shoks inrease the volatility with inreasing length of antiipation. With both bakward-
and forward-looking expetations, the volatility results are ambiguous as it is shown by
Winkler and Wohltmann (2012) in an univariate model. However, they nd that the
antiipation of ost shoks  as onsidered here  greatly amplies the volatility of all key
maroeonomi variables in the estimated model of Smets and Wouters (2003).
2
These (empirial and theoretial) ndings rely on the assumption of forward-looking
rational expetations. By ontrast, under purely bakward-looking boundedly rational
expetations, the volatility is independent of the antiipation horizon.
3
Bounded ratio-
nality assumes that agents have ognitive limitations and use simple heuristis (rule of
thumbs) to guide their behavior and are reently under growing investigation.
4
In light of these ndings, our paper ontributes to the existing literature in three
ways: First, we ombine the theory of news shoks and optimal monetary poliy in a
New Keynesian framework. Seond, we study the (de)stabilizing eets of antiipated
ost shoks in a multivariate environment. Third, we analyze how the relative volatility
results of news shoks hange if rational expetations are replaed by boundedly rational
expetations. We introdue bounded rationality by assuming that a fration of prie
setters have stati expetations as in Leitemo (2008). We provide analytial results for
1
Their nding is supported by several VAR-based studies inluding Beaudry and Luke (2010) and Barsky
and Sims (2011). Beaudry and Portier (2006) and Jaimovih and Rebelo (2009) demonstrate that news
shoks may help to explain reessions without relying on tehnologial regress. However, there is no
onsensus about the importane of news shoks. Studies that nd that news shoks only play a minor
role inlude Fujiwara et al. (2011) and Forni et al. (2014). Kahn and Tsoukalas (2012) nd in a strutural
DSGE model that news shoks aount for less than 15 perent of the variane in output growth, but
explain more than 60 perent in hours worked and ination. For an extensive literature review on news
shoks, readers are referred to Barsky and Portier (2013).
2
Further related to this branh of literature is the paper by Ok and Wohltmann (2013), who study the
properties of the lag polynomial assoiated with news shoks.
3
To see this, onsider the model yt = ρyt−1 + εt−q, where εt−q ∼ N(0, σ2) is an i.i.d. news shok
that is antiipated q periods in advane. Assuming stationarity, the variane of this model is given by
V ar(yt) = σ
2/(1− ρ2), i.e. independent of q.
4
De Grauwe (2012) e.g. ombines boundedly rational expetations with the theory of disrete hoie,
whih allows agents to hoose between a set of heuristis. His model is able to reate non-normally
distributed movements in output growth. Lengnik and Wohltmann (2014) use a similar approah in a
New Keynesian model with nanial markets.
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the limit ase of purely forward- and purely bakward-looking prie setting behavior.
So far, optimal monetary poliy has been studied almost exlusively in the presene
of unantiipated disturbanes.
5
One exeption is the study of Winkler and Wohltmann
(2011), who analyze optimal simple interest rules. They nd that the inlusion of forward-
looking elements in an instrument rule is welfare enhaning in the ase of antiipated
shoks.
6
However, they fous on purely forward-looking private expetations and the re-
sulting welfare eets. By ontrast, we study the relation between news shoks, volatility,
optimal unrestrited monetary poliy, and (boundedly) rational expetations.
3.2 News shoks and optimal monetary poliy
We assume that the ination rate is governed by a standard hybrid New Keynesian Phillips
urve of the form
pit = β(1− φpi)Etpit+1 + βφpipit−1 + κxt + εt−q (3.1)
where pit and xt are the ination rate and the output gap measured as perentage devi-
ations from the steady state, respetively. φpi measures the degree to whih prie setters
are boundedly rational and have bakward-looking expetations. For φpi = 0 (φpi = 1),
the prie-setting behavior is purely forward-looking (bakward-looking). εt−q is a white
noise ost-push shok with unit variane whih is antiipated q periods in advane.7 The
shok is unantiipated for q = 0.
For onveniene, we assume that the entral bank aims to minimize the weighted sum
of variane of the ination rate and the output gap. The entral bank's loss is given by
Lossq = λ1V arq(pit) + λ2V arq(xt) (3.2)
As in Leitemo (2008), the optimal targeting rule then inludes forward- and bakward-
looking elements and reads as
pit = − λ2
λ1κ
(xt − xt−1)− λ2
λ1κ
φpixt−1 +
λ2
λ1κ
β2φpiEtxt+1 (3.3)
The entral bank optimization is independent of the form of the IS equation and of the
5
This inludes Leitemo (2008), who nds an inverse relation between the private priing behavior and
the optimal monetary strategy. If the private setor is bakward-looking, monetary poliy should be
forward-looking, and vie versa. This general result also holds for news shoks.
6
Further noteworthy is the paper by Winkler and Wohltmann (2009), who show how to solve rational
expetations models with news shok under optimal monetary poliy.
7
Note that we limit our disussion to ost-push shoks for whih the entral bank faes a trade o between
output and ination stabilization even without instrument target as onsidered here. This type of shok
is also found to be highly relevant for business yle utuations, see e.g. Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2012).
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Figure 3.1: Loss and varianes in the ase of purely forward-looking prie setting
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Note: Parameters are set to β = 0.99, σ = η = 2, κ = (σ + η)(1 − ω)(1 − ωβ)/ω, λ1 = 1, λ2 = 0.5.
Under low (high) prie rigidity, the Calvo parameter ω is set to 0.7 (0.8), implying κ = 0.2 (κ = 0.53).
Assuming ontinuity, the maximum in the ination variane is reahed in q∗ = 0.08 (q∗ = 2.0).
lead time q. Equations (3.1) and (3.3) fully desribe the dynamis of the output gap and
the ination rate.
Before we turn to the general ase of hybrid private prie-setting behavior, we disuss
the limit ase of purely forward-looking prie setting. Note that in both limit ases (φpi = 0
and φpi = 1) the system remains hybrid. This is due to the inverse relation between the
prie-setting behavior and the optimal monetary strategy as desribed in Leitemo (2008).
3.2.1 Purely forward-looking prie setters
For φ = 0, the system an be redued to an univariate hybrid equation of the form
xt = aEtxt+1 + bxt−1 + cεt−q (3.4)
with a = βb, b = λ2/(λ2(1+β)+λ1κ
2), and c = −λ1κ/(λ2(1+β)+λ1κ2). Sine 1 > β > 0,
sgn(a) = sgn(b). This implies that the variane of xt is unambiguously inreasing in q as
it is shown by Winkler and Wohltmann (2012).
The volatility of the ination rate, on the other hand, may also be dereasing in q. Its
variane is given by
V ar(pit) =
2β20
(1 + α)(1 + δ)(1− αδ)
(
λ2
λ1κ
)2 [
1− 1− αδ
α− δ δ
2(q+1) +
(1− α)(1 + δ)δα
α− δ (αδ)
q
]
(3.5)
where |α| < 1 is the stable root of α1,2 =
(
1±√1− 4ab) /(2a), β0 = c/(1 − aα), and
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δ = a/(1− aα).8 An unantiipated shok may generate a higher ination volatility than
a ost-push shok that is antiipated in the innite past:
V arq=0(pit) > V arq→∞(pit) if
λ1κ
2
λ2
>
√
1 + 4β − (1 + β) (λ2 > 0) (3.6)
The reason for the ambiguity in the ination volatility are two opposing eets: On the
one hand, the longer the length of antiipation, the higher is the variane of the output
gap, whih  in isolation  also leads to a higher variane in ination. On the other hand,
the response of the output gap beomes smoother, i.e. xt is more autoorrelated, with
inreasing q. Sine the ination rate depends via the targeting rule on the hange in the
output gap, this redues  in isolation  the variane of ination.
9
Condition (3.6) does
not imply that an antiipated shok gives a lower ination volatility for all antiipation
horizons. That is, the ination variane may not be monotoni in q. The maximum is
reahed in q = max(q∗, 0) where10
q∗ =
1
logα− log δ
{
log
2δ(1− αδ)
(1− α)α(1 + δ) + log
log δ
logαδ
}
(3.7)
Despite the fat that the variane of ination may be dereasing in q, the loss (3.2)
is always inreasing in q. Only under strit ination targeting (λ2 = 0) does the entral
bank perfetly stabilize the ination rate and the loss is zero, independently from q.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the above results for high and low prie rigidity. Under low
(high) prie rigidity, the Phillips urve parameter κ is relatively large (small) suh that
ondition (3.6) is (not) satised.
3.2.2 Hybrid prie-setting behavior
If we allow for bakward-looking prie-setting behavior (i.e. φpi > 0), the results under
purely forward-looking prie setting of the previous subsetion may be reversed. This
reversion an be seen in gures 3.2 and 3.3. Figure 3.2 shows the dierenes in the loss
and in the volatilities of the output gap and the ination rate between an antiipated and
an unantiipated ost shok for dierent degrees of hybridity and antiipation horizons.
If φpi  the degree of bakward-lookingness  is suiently large, all three dierenes are
negative for arbitrary antiipation horizons. Contrarily to the output gap, the volatility
in ination may not be monotoni in q for φpi > 0.
Figure 3.3 ompares the volatilities and the loss of an unantiipated (q = 0) and an
8
Note that the output gap an be written as an ARMA(1,q) proess of the form xt = αxt−1 +∑q
k=0 δ
kβ0εt+k−q. A stable solution requires |α| < 1. For a full derivation of the results under purely
forward-looking prie setting, see appendies 3.A and 3.B.
9
The two opposing eets an be diretly seen by taking the variane of the targeting rule: V ar(pit) =
2λ22/(λ1κ)
2[V ar(xt)− E(xtxt−1)], where both V ar(xt) and E(xtxt−1) are inreasing in q.
10
Note that equation (3.7) assumes that q is ontinuous.
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Figure 3.2: Loss and varianes for dierent degrees of hybridity
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Parameter alibration: β = 0.99, σ = η = 2, ω = 0.75, κ = (σ + η)(1 − ω)(1− ωβ)/ω, λ1 = 1, λ2 = 0.5.
Figure 3.3: Parameter sensitivity
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Note: In left plot we set ω = 0.75 and hange the entral bank's weight of output stabilization λ2
ranging from 0.05 to 0.75. In the right plot we set λ2 = 0.5 and hange the degree of prie rigidity ω
ranging from 0.5 to 0.8. The remaining parameters are alibrated as follows: β = 0.99, σ = η = 2,
κ = (σ + η)(1 − ω)(1− ωβ)/ω, λ1 = 1. Note that ⊕ means that both V ar20(xt) and Loss20 are smaller,
⊗ means that both V ar20(pit) and Loss20 are smaller, and the ombination of all three symbols means
that both varianes and the loss are smaller for q = 20 than for q = 0.
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antiipated (q = 20) shok  additionally to φpi  for dierent degrees of prie rigidity
ω and for dierent weights λ2 the entral bank puts on output stabilization. We nd
that the volatility in the output gap and the loss are less variant to hanges in λ2 and
ω. In ase of purely bakward-looking prie setting, the volatility in output and the loss
are dereasing in q for all parameter onstellations under onsideration. Contrarily, the
volatility results for the ination rate are ambiguous for both limit ases.
11
In summary, if φpi is suiently large, it holds that: (i) The variane of the output
gap and the loss derease monotonially with inreasing lead time q. (ii) The variane of
the ination rate is dereasing (inreasing) in q if the weight λ2 and/or the degree of prie
rigidity ω are suiently large (small). The reason for this inversion of volatility results is
the inverse relation between the private priing behavior and the optimal monetary poliy
strategy as desribed in Leitemo (2008).
3.3 Conluding remarks
This paper studies the volatility impliations of antiipated ost-push shoks in a hy-
brid New Keynesian model with forward- and bakward-looking prie setters and optimal
(unrestrited) monetary poliy response. In partiular, it is analyzed how the relative
volatility results of news shoks under optimal monetary poliy hange if rational expe-
tations are replaed by boundedly rational expetations.
We nd that the destabilizing eets of antiipated ost-push shoks ruially depend
on the type of private expetations. Under purely forward-looking rational expetations,
the volatility in the output gap and the entral bank's loss are unambiguously inreasing
with inreasing antiipation horizon. Contrarily, under bounded rationality, we obtain
the reversed result: If the degree of bakward-looking prie setting behavior is suiently
large, the antiipation of ost-push shoks leads to a stabilization of the output gap and
the entral bank's loss. If  in addition  the entral bank's weight on output stabilization
and/or the degree of prie rigidity is suiently large, we also obtain a stabilization of
the ination rate.
The inversion of the volatility eets of news shoks between rational and boundedly
rational expetations follows from the optimization of the entral bank. This optimization
leads to an inverse relation between the prie-setting behavior and the optimal monetary
poliy. By ontrast, if the entral bank follows an ad ho or optimized standard Taylor-
type rule and the prie setters are purely (forward-) bakward-looking, the volatility of
the eonomy is (inreasing with) independent of the antiipation horizon.
12
Two remarks on the robustness of our results in order: First, without instrument target
11
Analytial results for this limit ase an be found in appendix 3.C.
12
Speially, the Taylor-type rule must not ontain any (bakward-) forward-looking element for this to
hold.
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in the loss funtion of the entral bank, the form of the targeting rule is independent of the
form of the dynami IS equation. Hene, our volatility results also hold for non-separable
utility funtions as in Jaimovih and Rebelo (2009) and Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012).
Seond, we argue that our results also hold for more omplex bakward-looking prie-
setting behavior as in De Grauwe (2012). For reasons of spae, we model boundedly
rational expetations only as stati expetations.
13
13
We also studied the (de)stabilization eets of news shoks in a boundedly rational model with swithing,
in whih the prie setters are able to hoose from a set of bakward-looking expetations heuristis. The
model setup is taken from Lengnik and Wohltmann (2014). Contrarily to the model in De Grauwe
(2012) and Lengnik and Wohltmann (2014), we inlude forward-looking rational expetations through
the optimal monetary strategy. We do not obtain qualitative hanges in omparison to the model without
purely bakward-looking model without swithing. Results are available upon request.
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3.A Appendix: Hybrid univariate model
A hybrid univariate model of the form
yt = aEtyt+1 + byt−1 + cεt−q (3.8)
with εt
i.i.d.∼ N(0, σ2) an be written as MA(∞) of the form
yt =
∞∑
s=0
αs
q∑
k=0
δkβ0εt−s+k−q =
∞∑
s=0
αsht−s with ht =
q∑
k=0
δkβ0εt+k−q (3.9)
where α =
(
1−√1− 4ab) /(2a), β0 = c/(1 − aα), and δ = a/(1 − aα). The variane of
yt an be derived as follows:
V ar(yt) =
∞∑
s=0
∞∑
s˜=0
αsαs˜
q∑
k=0
q∑
k˜=0
β20δ
kδk˜E(εt−s+k−qεt−s˜+k˜−q) (3.10)
= β20
∞∑
s=0
α2s
q∑
k=0
δ2kσ2 + 2β20
∞∑
s=0
q−1∑
j=0
q−1−j∑
k=0
α2s+j+1δ2k+j+1σ2 (3.11)
= β20vtσ
2 + 2β20wtσ
2
(3.12)
vt and wt an be simplied to
vt =
∞∑
s=0
α2s
q∑
k=0
δ2k =
1
1− α2
1− δ2(q+1)
1− δ2 (3.13)
wt =
∞∑
s=0
q−1∑
j=0
q−1−j∑
k=0
α2s+j+1δ2k+j+1 (3.14)
=
αδ
1− δ2
∞∑
s=0
α2s
q−1∑
j=0
(αδ)j − δ
2(q+1)
1− δ2
∞∑
s=0
α2s
q−1∑
j=0
(α
δ
)j+1
(3.15)
=
αδ
1− δ2
1
1− α2
1− (αδ)q
1− αδ −
αδ2(q+1)
1− δ2
1
1− α2
1− (α
δ
)q
δ − α (3.16)
In summary, the variane of yt is given by V ar(yt) = V (q) where
V (q) =
β20
(1− α2)(1− δ2)
{
1− δ2(q+1) + 2 αδ
1− αδ [1− (αδ)
q] + 2
α
α− δ
[
δ2(q+1) − δ2(αδ)q]} σ2
(3.17)
Note that V (q) an also be written as
V (q) =
1
1− α2 [V ar(ht) + 2αCov(xt−1, ht)] (3.18)
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where
V ar(ht) =
β20
1− δ2 (1− δ
2(q+1))σ2 = β20σ
2
q∑
k=0
δ2k (3.19)
Cov(xt−1, ht) =
β20
1− δ2
{
δ
1− αδ [1− (αδ)
q] +
1
α− δ
[
δ2(q+1) − δ2(αδ)q]}σ2 (3.20)
= β20σ
2δ
q−1∑
j=0
(αδ)j
q−1−j∑
k=0
δ2k (3.21)
3.B Appendix: Purely forward-looking prie setting
The model (3.1) and (3.3) in ase of purely forward-looking prie setting reads
pit = βEtpit+1 + κxt + εt−q (3.22)
pit = − λ2
λ1κ
(xt − xt−1) (3.23)
The output gap xt an be written as hybrid univariate model equation of the form (3.8)
with
a = βb (3.24)
b =
λ2
λ2(1 + β) + λ1κ2
(3.25)
c = − λ1κ2
λ2(1 + β) + λ1κ2
(3.26)
Hene, the variane of xt is given by V ar(xt) = V (q), where
δ =
2a
1 +
√
1− 4ab (3.27)
αδ =
1−√1− 4ab
1 +
√
1− 4ab (3.28)
1− 4ab = (1− β)
2 + 2(1 + β)z + z2
(1 + β + z)2
(3.29)
z =
λ1κ
2
λ2
(3.30)
Sine dV arq(ht)/dq > 0 and dCovq(xt−1, ht)/dq > 0, it holds dV arq(xt)/dq > 0.
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The variane of the ination rate an be dedued from the targeting rule (3.23):
V ar(pit) = 2
(
λ2
λ1κ
)2
(V ar(xt)− E(xtxt−1)) (3.31)
=
2
1 + α
(
λ2
λ1κ
)2
[V arq(ht)− (1− α)Covq(xt−1, ht)] (3.32)
=
2
1 + α
(
λ2
λ1κ
)2
β20σ
2
[
q∑
k=0
δ2k − (1− α)δ
q−1∑
j=0
(αδ)j
q−1−j∑
k=0
δ2k
]
(3.33)
To derive the ondition for V arq=0(pit) > V arq→∞(pit), note that
V arq=0(ht) = β
2
0σ
2
(3.34)
Covq=0(xt−1, ht) = 0 (3.35)
V arq→∞(ht) =
β20
1− δ2σ
2
(3.36)
Covq→∞(xt−1, ht) =
β20
1− δ2
δ
1− αδσ
2
(3.37)
Using the denitions (3.24) to (3.26), V arq=0(pit)
!
> V arq→∞(pit) is equivalent to
(1− α)Covq→∞(xt−1, ht) > V arq→∞ht − V arq=0ht ⇔ 1− α
1− αδ > δ ⇔
(3.38)
1− β−1a− 2β−1a2 > [(2 + β−1)a− 1]
√
1− 4β−1a2 ⇔ (3.39)
(β2 − β) + (1 + 2β)λ1δ
2
λ2
+
λ21κ
4
λ22
>
(
β − λ1κ
2
λ2
)√
(1− β)2 + 2(1 + β)λ1κ
2
λ2
+
λ21κ
4
λ22
(3.40)
Let z = λ1κ
2/λ2, then inequality 3.40 an be simplied to
z2 + 2(1 + β)z + β(β − 2) > 0 (3.41)
and holds if
z =
λ1κ
2
λ2
>
√
1 + 4β − (1 + β) (3.42)
Although the variane of the ination rate may derease with inreasing antiipation
horizon q, it an be shown that the loss
Lossq = λ1V arq(pit) + λ2V arq(xt) (3.43)
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is always smaller for q = 0 than for q →∞. It holds:
Lossq→∞ =
{
λ1
2
1 + α
(
λ2
λ1κ
)2
1− δ
1− αδ
1
1− δ2 + λ2
1
1− α2
1
1− δ2
1 + αδ
1− αδ
}
β20σ
2
(3.44)
Lossq=0 =
{
λ1
2
1 + α
(
λ2
λ1κ
)2
+ λ2
1
1− α2
}
β20σ
2
(3.45)
Then Jq→∞
!
> Jq=0 is equivalent to
2λ2
λ1κ
[1− α(1 + δ)] < 2α+ δ(1− αδ)
(1− α)(1− δ) ⇔ 2b[
√
1− 4ab− b] < b+ b(1 + β)
√
1− 4ab
(3.46)
Sine b = 1/[1 + β + z], 1− 4ab = 1− 4β/[1 + β + z]2, (3.46) is equivalent to
0 < 4β(1− β)2 + β(2− β)(1 + β + z) + 4(1 + β + z) (3.47)
This inequality is always satised sine z = λ1κ
2/λ2 > 0.
3.C Appendix: Purely bakward-looking prie setting
The model (3.1) and (3.3) in ase of purely bakward-looking prie setting reads
pit = βpit−1 + κxt + εt−q (3.48)
pit = − λ2
λ1κ
(xt − β2Etxt+1) (3.49)
The ination rate an be written as a hybrid univariate equation of the form
pit = aEtpit+1 + bpit−1 + c(εt−q − β2Etεt−q+1) (3.50)
with c = ϕ/(1 +ϕ+ ϕβ3), b = βc, a = β2c, and ϕ = λ2/(λ1κ
2). The system an again be
written as
pit =
∞∑
s=0
αsht−s (3.51)
where α = (1−√1− 4ab)/2a and
ht =
q∑
k=0
δkβ0εt+k−q − β2
q−1∑
k=0
δkβ0εt+k−q+1 (3.52)
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The variane of the ination rate an be derived as follows:
V ar(pit) = E
(
∞∑
s=0
αs
q∑
k=0
δkβ0εt−s+k−q − β2
∞∑
s=0
αs
q−1∑
k=0
δkβ0εt−s+k−q+1
)2
(3.53)
= V (q)− 2β2Z + β4V (q − 1) (3.54)
where V (·) is given by (3.17) and
Z = E
[(
∞∑
s=0
αs
q∑
k=0
δkβ0εt−s+k−q
)(
∞∑
s=0
αs
q−1∑
k=0
δkβ0εt−s+k−q+1
)]
(3.55)
= E
[(
∞∑
s=0
αsβ0εt−s−q
)(
∞∑
s=0
αs
q−1∑
k=0
δkβ0εt−s+k−q+1
)]
+ δV (q − 1) (3.56)
=
α
1− α2
1− (αδ)q
1− αδ β
2
0σ
2 + δV (q − 1) = α
1− α2β
2
0σ
2
q−1∑
j=0
(αδ)j + δV (q − 1) (3.57)
Then V arq(pit) an be written as
V ar(pit) = V (q)− 2β2 α
1− α2
1− (αδ)q
1− αδ β
2
0σ
2 + (β4 − 2β2δ)V (q − 1) (3.58)
3.D Appendix: Hybrid prie-setting behavior
The model (3.1) and (3.3) in ase of both forward- and bakward-looking prie setting
an be written in matrix form
Φst+1 = Ψst + gεt+1 (3.59)
where st+1 = (η˜
(q)
t+1, x˜t+1, p˜it+1, Etxt+1, Etpit+1)
′
, η˜
(q)
t+1 = (η
(0)
t+1, η
(1)
t+1, . . . , η
(q−1)
t+1 , η
(q)
t+1)
′
with
η
(j)
t = εt−j ∀ j = 0, . . . , q and g = (1, 0, . . . , 0)′, and
Φ =
(
Iq+3 02×(q+3)
0(q+3)×2 Φ22
)
(3.60)
Ψ =
(
Ψ11 0(q+1)×5
04×q Ψ22
)
(3.61)
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with 0n×m as (n×m)-dimensional zero matrix, In as n-dimensional identity matrix, and
Φ22 =
(
λ2β2φpi
λ1κ
0
0 β(1− φpi)
)
(3.62)
Ψ11 =
(
01×q
Iq
)
(3.63)
Ψ22 =

0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 −(1− φpi) λ2λ1κ 0 λ2λ1κ 1
−1 0 −βφpi −κ 1
 (3.64)
Let wt+1 = (η˜
(q)
t+1, x˜t+1, p˜it+1)
′
ontain the bakward-looking variables. The variane-
ovariane matrix Cov(wt) = Σw in vetorized form is given by
vec(Σw) = (I(q+3)2 −M ⊗M)−1vec(gg′)σ2 (3.65)
where M = Z11S
−1
11 T11Z
−1
11 . Aording to Söderlind (1999) Z11, S11, and T11 follow from
the Generalized Shur deomposition Φ = Q
′
SZ
′
and Ψ = Q
′
TZ
′
with
S =
(
S11 S12
0 S22
)
, T =
(
T11 T12
0 T22
)
, Z =
(
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
)
(3.66)
Q and Z are the omplex-onjugates of Q and Z, respetively. The (q + 3 × q + 3)-
dimensional matries S11 and T11 ontain the stable eigenvalues of the system (3.59).
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Abstrat
This paper uses a dynami framework of a small open eonomy to study the volatility
eets of partially antiipated monetary poliy shoks in whih the publi has imperfet
information about the size and/or the timing of the future expansionary poliy interven-
tion. Our two main results are as follows: (i) Partially antiipated monetary poliy shoks
may be stabilizing, i.e. lead to a lower volatility than a fully antiipated monetary poliy
shok of the same form. (ii) However, we typially obtain a trade o in volatilities suh
that a simultaneous stabilization of ination and output is not possible. If the publi
underestimates (overestimates) the size of the shok, output (ination) may be stabilized.
Our results imply that the entral bank may have an inentive to withhold information
from the publi about the true entral bank's intention.
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4.1 Introdution
This paper studies the volatility eets of monetary poliy disturbanes, whih are not
fully antiipated by the publi. So far, the literature has only onsidered two extreme
ases of antiipation. Either the publi has perfet information and fully antiipates the
shok proess or the publi is ompletely uninformed and does not antiipate the shok
proess at all. This paper introdues an intermediate senario of partial antiipation,
whih overs both extreme senarios as speial ases. Under partial antiipation, the
publi has partially orret and partially inorret expetations about the exat evolution
(i.e. about size and timing) of the monetary shok proess. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the rst to study this kind of partially antiipated shoks.
1
The importane of antiipated shoks in general (like pre-announed future monetary
poliy interventions), also known as news shoks, for business yle utuations is on-
rmed by several empirial studies. Most prominently, Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012)
nd in an estimated real business yle model that about 50 perent of eonomi utu-
ations an be attributed to fully (or possibly partially) antiipated disturbanes.
2
Milani
and Treadwell (2012) fous on antiipated monetary poliy. They nd that antiipated
monetary poliy shoks have a larger impat on output utuations than unantiipated
monetary poliy shoks.
3
They onlude that the entral bank's ommuniation an be
an eetive monetary poliy tool.
4
Central banks may not be able or not willing to ommuniate the exat timing and/or
size of a (future) monetary intervention in advane so that the publi needs to form
expetations about it. For example, in July 2012 at the Global Investment Conferene in
London, the President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, signalized further
purhases of government bonds by stating that the ECB is ready to do whatever it
1
The terminology of partial antiipation was already introdued by Fisher (1979). However, he denes
partially antiipated shoks as fully antiipated shoks with redued length of antiipation. Contrarily,
we assume that partially and fully antiipated shoks have the same length of antiipation. The publi
may, however, have wrong expetations about the length of antiipation.
2
A partially antiipated shok an also be viewed as a ombination of a fully antiipated and a non-
antiipated shok, where the non-antiipated shok reets the orretion in expetations. Let εit be a
random innovation that is antiipated in t, but materializes in t+ i (notation of Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2012)). Then, if ε0t (non-antiipated shok) and ε
i
t−i are from the same soure, this is an indiation
of partial antiipation. ε0t > 0 and ε
i
t−i > 0 may not be two distint shoks, but instead may be one
partially antiipated shok where the publi initially underestimates the shok size in t− i and orrets
its expetations in t. The dierene ε0t − εit−i ould be interpreted as expetations bias. Note that the
varianes of {εit−i} an be identied separately for dierent values of i, see Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2012).
3
Further empirial studies inlude Beaudry and Portier (2006), Beaudry and Luke (2010), Barsky and
Sims (2011), Fujiwara et al. (2011), and Khan and Tsoukalas (2012). The main bulk of the literature,
however, emphasizes the role of antiipated tehnology shoks as in Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) or
of antiipated sal poliy shoks as in Leeper et al. (2008) and Mertens and Ravn (2010). The idea of
these shoks playing an important role in driving business yle utuations goes bak to Pigou (1927)
and was revived by Beaudry and Portier (2004).
4
For a survey on entral bank ommuniation, see Blinder et al. (2008).
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takes to preserve the euro to bring down risk premiums on government bonds. However,
Draghi is mute about the exat threshold of risk premiums at whih the ECB is planning
to intervene. This limited information strategy leaves room for publi mispereptions
suh that the monetary intervention may only be partially antiipated.
5
The main aim of this paper is twofold: First, we aim to study the (de)stabilizing eets
of partially antiipated monetary disturbanes on ination and output utuations, where
we dene stabilization as follows: Partial antiipation (de)stabilizes a partiular variable
if the variable's volatility under partial antiipation is (larger) smaller than under fully
orret antiipation of the same shok proess. Seond, we aim to derive the optimal
entral bank's ommuniation strategy. Is it possible to obtain a lower entral bank's
loss by either diretly deeiving the publi or withholding information about the true
monetary poliy intentions?
To this end, we onsider several partial antiipation senarios, in whih the publi
initially has inorret expetations about the size and/or the timing of the monetary
disturbanes. With interest rates at the zero lower bound, entral banks are fored to
use unonventional poliy instruments to stimulate the eonomy. In line with this hange
in poliy, we model monetary poliy interventions as (temporary) inreases in the money
growth rate. To disuss the limited information strategy of the ECB during the European
sovereign debt risis, we onsider inreases in the money growth rate not only in isolation
but also as response to inreasing risk premiums on government bonds, where the publi
may have inorret expetations about the start of the monetary intervention.
6
As model framework, we use a ontinuous-time Dornbush-type
7
model of a small open
eonomy. This framework has been used in several papers to study the dynami impats
of (fully) antiipated shoks. Early studies inlude Turnovsky (1986a,b). More reent
studies inlude Clausen and Wohltmann (2005), who study antiipated and unantiipated
monetary and sal poliy in an asymmetri monetary union and Clausen and Wohltmann
(2013), who study antiipated oil prie shoks in a similar model of a small open monetary
union. Reently, the ontinuous-time formulation also has gained some attention in the
New Keynesian literature. Posh et al. (2011) formulate and solve the New Keynesian
model in ontinuous time.
Our two main results are as follows: (i) Partially antiipated monetary poliy shoks
may stabilize ination and output utuations, i.e. lead to a lower volatility than a fully
antiipated monetary poliy shok of the same form. (ii) However, we typially obtain a
5
As a ontrary example to the ECB's ommuniation poliy, the reent deision of the Swiss National Bank
in January 2015 to disontinue the minimum exhange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro was not announed
at all and ame as a omplete surprise to the market partiipants. As a result, the Swiss Fran sharply
appreiated by roughly 20 perent.
6
Reently, the European Central Bank (ECB) indiated to oppose the deationary risk in the European
Union by expanding the ECB's Outright Monetary Transations (OMT) program. The Federal Reserve,
on the other hand, is starting to ut down its asset-purhasing program sine Deember 2013.
7
The model is a variant of the famous overshooting model introdued by Dornbush (1976).
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trade o in volatilities suh that a simultaneous stabilization of output and ination is
not possible. If the publi underestimates (overestimates) the size of the shok, output
(ination) may be stabilized.
Our results are in line with the literature: The existene of a trade o in volatilities of
ination and output is well known and already desribed in Taylor (1979) and revisited in
Taylor (1994). He nds the trade o in volatilities  in ontrast to the trade o in levels
 to be stable in the long run for the U.S. eonomy. Further related to this paper is the
literature on news shoks whih studies the potential destabilizing eets of ompletely
antiipated shoks. Fève et al. (2009) show in a purely forward-looking disrete-time
framework with rational expetations that antiipated shoks destabilize the eonomy,
i.e. lead to a higher volatility than non-antiipated shoks of the same size. The volatility
inreases with inreasing length of antiipation. This result does not hold unambiguously
for the hybrid ase with bakward-looking elements as it is shown by Winkler and Wohlt-
mann (2012).
8
They nd the same trade o in volatilities of ination and output in the
estimated Euro area model of Smets and Wouters (2003). With inreasing antiipation
horizon, output volatility inreases, but ination volatility dereases. Our paper may help
to explain why this trade o in volatilities ours and why antiipated shoks may lead
to a (de)stabilization of the eonomy.
For the aforementioned results of this paper, we impliitly assume a stable relation
between base and broad money suh that the entral bank an perfetly ontrol the money
stok. However, sine the outburst of the nanial risis in 2008, suh a stable relation
in the Euro area is questionable as e.g. De Grauwe and Ji (2013) demonstrate. We,
therefore, also study partially antiipated hanges in the monetary base that have no
eet on the money stok. We nd that hanges in the monetary base may still have
real eets on the eonomy and may impose ylial adjustment movements even if the
relation between base and broad money is non-existent. This requires, however, that the
publi indeed believes in a stable relation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Setion 4.2 desribes the model
framework. Setion 4.3 introdues our (partial) antiipation senarios and studies the
responses to a temporary inrease in the money growth rate. Setion 4.4 introdues our
volatility measure and disusses the (de)stabilizing eets of partially antiipated hanges
in the monetary growth rate for dierent degrees of expetation biases. Setion 4.5 intro-
dues two ommuniation strategies in whih the entral bank either deeives the publi
or withhold information from the publi to obtain a lower entral bank's loss. As a digres-
sion, setion 4.6 disusses the responses to partially antiipated inreases in the monetary
base in the presene of an unstable relation between base and broad money. Setion
4.7 disusses six modiations inluding a simultaneous inrease in the risk premium on
8
Also related to this literature is the paper by Ok and Wohltmann (2013), who investigate the soures
of these destabilizing eets.
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government bonds and in the money growth rate. The last setion onludes.
4.2 Model framework
As model framework we use a dynami ontinuous-time Dornbush-type model for a small
open eonomy. The eonomy is desribed by the following set of log-linearized equations:
y = (a0 + a1y − a2(i− E(p˙))) + g + (b0 − b1y + b2y∗ − b3τ) (4.1)
τ = p− (p∗ + e) (4.2)
m− p = l0 + l1y − l2i (4.3)
i = i∗ + E(e˙) + s (4.4)
p˙ = pi + δ(y − y) (4.5)
pi = m˙ (4.6)
y = f0 + f1τ (4.7)
All variables, exept for the (nominal and real) interest rate and the ination rate, are
in logarithm. The notation is as follows: y = real output, y = natural output level, i =
nominal interest rate, i − Ep˙ = real interest rate, τ = terms of trade, g = government
spending, p = prie level, e = exhange rate, m = nominal money stok, p˙ = ination
rate, pi = augmentation term of the Phillips urve, s = risk premium shok. Foreign
variables (i∗, y∗, p∗) are denoted by a supersript star. A dot above a variable (p˙, e˙,
m˙) stands for the time derivative (dierentiated from the right) of that variable, a bar
above a variable (y, τ) stands for its long-run value, and E is the expetations operator.
We assume rational expetations. In a deterministi framework this implies Ep˙ = p˙ and
Ee˙ = e˙. Depending on the assumed antiipation senario, expetations on the exogenous
evolution of the money growth may deviate from the true evolution.
9
Further details will
be provided in the subsequent setions.
Equation (4.1) is a standard IS equation, determining the short-run development of
output. The rst term in brakets stands for real private absorption depending on real
inome and the real interest rate. The seond term in brakets stands for the trade balane
depending on domesti and foreign inome and the terms of trade. The terms of trade are
dened in equation (4.2). Equation (4.3) represents the money market equilibrium and is
a traditional LM urve. Equation (4.4) is the unovered interest rate parity (UIP), and
equation (4.5) represents a Phillips-type ination equation. Equation (4.6) speies the
augmentation term in the Phillips urve, whih we set equal to the expeted long-term rate
of ination. Aording to montaristi theory, we assume that ination is solely determined
9
Turnovsky (1977) labels these expetations as strutural where the publi has orret information about
the struture of the model but false information about the underlying exogenous proesses.
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by the money growth rate in the long run.
10
In the short to medium run, ination might
temporarily deviate from its long-term rate. However, ination is, as we will see in the
subsequent setions, rather tied to the money growth rate.
11
For ompleteness, the last
equation desribes the long-run relation between output and the terms of trade. Sine
hanges in the money growth rate do not alter the steady state of output and the terms
of trade, we an neglet this equation until setion 4.7, where we also onsider hanges in
the risk premium on government bonds.
12
The model an be redued to a two-dimensional system of ordinary dierential equa-
tions with the terms of trade τ and the real money stok mr = m− p as state variables.
For the parameter alibration given in table 4.1, the redued model exhibits one stable
and one unstable eigenvalue. The system then desribes a saddle point system. To ensure
stability of the system, we assume that the terms of trade are forward-looking and the
real money stok is bakward-looking suh that the number of unstable eigenvalues equals
the number of forward-looking variables.
13
Table 4.1: Parameter alibration
Parameter Value Denition
a1 0.7 Inome elastiity of private onsumption
a2 0.3 Real interest rate (semi-)elastiity of private absorption
b1 0.2 Inome elastiity of the trade balane
b3 0.1 Terms of trade elastiity of the trade balane
l1 1.0 Inome elastiity of money demand
l2 4.0 Interest rate (semi-)elastiity of money demand
δ 0.2 Slope of the Phillips urve
In the subsequent simulations, we use the alibration given in table 4.1.
14
We fous on
deviations from the initial steady state. Therefore, we do not need to speify a0, b0, and
b2. For the remaining parameters, we broadly follow the textbook alibration given in
Galí (2008) and Walsh (2010) and the estimates from Moons et al. (2007), who estimate
a stylized open-eonomy New Keynesian model for the euro area.
The inome elastiity and the interest rate semi-elastiity of the money demand are
set to l1 = 1 and l2 = 4, respetively, whih are the values proposed by Galí (2008). He
derives the mirofounded money demand equation from a money-in-the-utility approah,
10
See Friedman (1977).
11
As a modiation, we assume in setion 4.7 that the augmentation term is alternatively given by the
expeted ination rate of the onsumer prie index, i.e. pi = p˙c with pc = γp + (1 − γ)(p∗ + e). 1 − γ
measures the degree of openness.
12
For details on the model equation and the underlying assumptions, see Clausen and Wohltmann (2005)
and Clausen and Wohltmann (2013). They study monetary and sal poliy in a ontinuous-time model
of an asymmetri monetary union that is of a similar form as the above model.
13
For details on the model redution and solution for fully antiipated, partially antiipated, and non-
antiipated hanges in the money growth rate and in the risk premium, see appendix 4.B.
14
All omputations have been performed by using MATLAB. The odes are available from the authors
upon request.
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Table 4.2: Evolution of the exogenous inrease in the money growth rate
0 ≤ t < T T ≤ t < t1 t > t1
m˙ = 0 m˙ = c m˙ = 0
whih impliitly gives rise to an inome elastiity of unity. Estimates of l1 reported in
Walsh (2010) suggest values greater than unity, whereas Ball (2001) nds a value of 0.5.
Estimates of l2 reported in Walsh (2010) range from 1 to 10, whih is in line with the
estimate of 5 found by Ball (2001).
15
The inome elastiity of private onsumption is set
to a1 = 0.7, whih we impliitly derived from an inome tax rate of 0.3, a onsumption
output ratio of 0.7, and a onsumption rate of 0.7.16 The inome elastiity of the trade
balane is set to 0.2.
17
Then, the net eet of the real interest rate and of the terms of
trade on goods demand are given by a2/(1 − a1 + b1) = 0.6 and b3/(1 − a1 + b1) = 0.2,
respetively. Both values math the estimates given in Moons et al. (2007). The former
is lose to the values given in Galí (2008) and Walsh (2010) and is also in line with Smets
and Wouters (2003), who nd a mean intertemporal elastiity of substitution of 0.7 with
a 90 perent probability band ranging from 0.52 to 1.05.
18
The slope of the Phillips urve
is set to δ = 0.2 proposed by Galí (2008) and whih is also lose to the estimate given in
Moons et al. (2007).
19
In setion 4.7, we investigate how our results hange for dierent
parameter values for δ, l2, a2, and b3.
4.3 Antiipation senarios and responses to a monetary
shok
This setion introdues our antiipation senarios and disusses the responses to a tem-
porary inrease in the money growth rate in the above model framework.
The realized but not neessarily orretly antiipated shok proess is the same aross
all antiipation senarios. The evolution of the shok proess is desribed in table 4.2. The
inrease in the money growth is implemented at a onstant rate c over the implementation
15
Note that the interest rate is  ontrarily to output  not logarithmized. Given that the steady state
interest rate is relatively small, the interest rate semi-elastiity is typially muh larger than the inome
elastiity of money demand (l2 > l1).
16
More details on the derivation of a1 an be found in appendix 4.A.
17
Note that a1 > b1 is not a neessary ondition for stability. For stability, it is suient that l2 < l1/δ or
a2 < (1 − a1 + b1)/δ hold. Further details are given in appendix 4.B.
18
Taking habit formation into aount, Smets and Wouters (2003) nd that the impat of the real interest
rate on onsumption is redued to 0.3.
19
From mirofoundation, the slope of the Phillips urve an be expressed as δ = (1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
(σ + η).
Assuming a quarterly interest rate of 1 perent (implying a disount fator of β = 0.99), a Calvo parameter
of θ = 0.75, an inverse elastiity of substitution of σ = 1.5, and a Frish elastiity of labor supply of
η = 1.5, we obtain a slope of δ = 0.25. Estimates in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Smets and Wouters
(2007) for θ, σ, and η suggest that δ may vary between 0.05 and 0.5. Dierenes in δ mainly result from
dierenes in the Calvo parameter, whih ranges from 0.7 to 0.9.
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Table 4.3: Set of antiipation senarios
FA NA PA-MAG PA-START PA-EXIT
Magnitude E(c) c 0 6= c c c
Start E(T ) T - T 6= T T
Exit E(t1) t1 - t1 t1 6= t1
Length E(t1 − T ) t1 − T - t1 − T 6= t1 − T 6= t1 − T
Size E(c(t1 − T )) c(t1 − T ) - 6= c(t1 − T ) 6= c(t1 − T ) 6= c(t1 − T )
Breakpoint t∗ - T T min[E(T ), T ] min[E(t1), t1]
period T < t < t1 and is temporary in the sense that m˙ = 0 for t > t1. In t = 0, the
inrease is fully or partially antiipated, or non-antiipated at all by the publi. We,
therefore, refer to the time period 0 < t < T as antiipation period.
In the long run, a temporary inrease in the money growth rate does not alter the
steady state of the real variables.
20
The steady state of the nominal money stok hanges
aording to
dm =
∫
∞
0
m˙(z)dz = c(t1 − T ) (4.8)
whih implies a hange in the steady-state values of the prie level and the nominal
exhange rate of equal size, i.e.
dp
dm
= de
dm
= 1. In the following, we refer to the expression
c(t1− T ) as the size of the shok proess. c is the magnitude, T is the start, and t1 is the
end or exit of the shok proess.
We onsider ve antiipation senarios: one full antiipation senario in whih the
publi orretly antiipates the full monetary poliy intervention (denoted as FA), three
partial antiipation regimes in whih the publi has partially orret and partially inor-
ret expetations (denoted as PA), and one non-antiipation senario in whih the poliy
intervention ompletely omes as a surprise (denoted as NA). Table 4.3 summarizes the
omplete set of antiipation senarios.
21
In the three senarios of partially orretly an-
tiipated shoks, the publi forms inorret expetations either about the magnitude c
(senario PA-MAG), about the starting point T (senario PA-START), or about the exit
point t1 (senario PA-EXIT) of the inrease in the money growth rate. Note that in all
three partial antiipation senarios, the publi has inorret expetations about the size
of the shok.
Sine we aim to study only temporary and not permanent antiipation errors, we
20
This nominal neutrality follows from the long-run stability ondition that the real money stok and the
terms of trade do not hange in the long run. In ase of a permanent inrease in the money growth
rate, the steady state of the real money stok hanges, but the steady state of most other real variables
(inluding output, terms of trade, and the real interest rate) remains unhanged.
21
Note that in senario NA, the publi does not antiipate the inrease in the money growth rate at all and
therefore has no expetations on the start of the implementation. This is highlighted by a minus sign in
table 4.3.
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have to dene how the publi swithes to orret expetations. For simpliity, we assume
that the swith from partially inorret to fully orret expetations ours at one at
some partiular breakpoint t∗.22 Hene, the publi has orret expetations for t > t∗
and may have inorret expetations for t < t∗ about the shok proess. In line with
non-antiipated shoks, we assume that the swith to orret expetations ours when
the publi realizes for the rst time that the expeted evolution of the shok proess
deviates from the true one. In senarios NA and PA-MAG, the publi's expetations
deviate from the true shok proess for the rst time at the start of implementation, i.e.
t∗ = T . In senario PA-START, the publi has inorret expetations about the start
of the monetary intervention. If the publi expets an earlier start, i.e. E(T ) < T , the
publi already swithes in t∗ = E(T ) to fully orret expetations. If the publi expets a
later start, i.e. E(T ) > T , the publi swithes in t∗ = T . In senario PA-EXIT, the publi
orretly expets the start (T ) and the magnitude (c), but has inorret expetations
about the end (t1) of the shok proess. Sine E(t1) > T , the publi does not swith to
orret expetations before T . If the publi expets an earlier end of the shok proess,
i.e. E(t1) < t1, the publi swithes in t
∗ = E(t1), where t
∗ > T . If the publi expets a
later end of the shok proess, i.e. E(t1) > t1, the publi swithes in t
∗ = t1.
In the following, we subsequently study the responses to the above temporary inrease
in the money growth rate under the partial antiipation senarios PA-MAG, PA-START,
and PA-EXIT in omparison to the full antiipation senario FA.
4.3.1 Senario PA-MAG and NA
Figure 4.1 depits the responses to a temporary inrease in the money growth rate under
the full antiipation senario FA and the partial antiipation senario PA-MAG, where
the publi either underestimates (E(c) < c) or overestimates (E(c) > c) the magnitude
of the shok. As a speial ase of PA-MAG, the gure also inludes the non-antiipation
senario NA, where the publi does not expet the inrease at all (E(c) = 0). The rst
(upper-left) plot displays the development of the terms of trade and the real money stok
in the phase plane. The remaining plots show the responses in the time domain. The
seond (upper-right) plot displays the initially expeted evolution of the money growth
based on the information set in t = 0. Note that in the FA senario, the antiipated
evolution of the money growth is equal to the realized money growth. We set c = 3,
T = 2, and t1 = 5.
To start with, the adjustment proess in the antiipation senario FA an be desribed
as follows: In t = 0, the inrease in the money growth rate is announed and orretly
antiipated by the publi. The antiipation of a future expansionary monetary shok
leads to an immediate (real) devaluation of the home urreny (fall in the terms of trade).
22
In setion 4.7, we modify the mehanism with whih the publi swithes to orret expetations and
assume that the publi sequentially adapts its expetations in several steps.
4. Partially antiipated monetary poliy shoks 39
Figure 4.1: Responses to a monetary shok in senario PA-MAG
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Sine pries are assumed to be sluggish and do not hange on impat, this is represented
by a vertial downward adjustment in the phase. The real devaluation ontinues until
the start of the implementation T . Simultaneously, the real money stok ontinuously
delines, whih is equivalent to a ontinuous upward adjustment of pries. The devaluation
of the home urreny leads via the UIP to a rise in the nominal interest rate. The
ination response on impat and during the antiipation phase is relatively small suh
that the real interest rate rises. Despite the ontrationary real interest rate eet, output
unambiguously stays above its steady state value on impat and during the antiipation
phase. This immediately follows from the inverse Phillips urve
y = y − 1
δ
m˙r (4.9)
whih determines output by the hange in the real money stok.
In t = T = 2, the money growth rate inreases as expeted. Ination expetations
shoot up and indue a sharp rise in the ination rate, whih overshoots the rise in the
money growth rate and in the nominal exhange rate. The overshooting ontinues over
the whole implementation phase leading to a further deline in the real money stok
and to a ontinuous real devaluation. Note that the terms of trade are assumed to
reat disontinuously only to new information. In the FA senario, the shok proess is
ompletely known by the publi in t = 0 suh that the terms of trade behave ontinuously
for the remaining ourse of adjustment (t > 0). Due to the fall in the real interest rate,
output shoots up in T , but ontinuously dereases over the implementation phase.
After the implementation phase (t > t1 = 5), we observe reverse adjustments and
all shown variables return to their initial steady state. The real money stok starts to
inrease and onverges from below to its initial steady state. The terms of trade start to
derease and onverge from above to their initial steady state.
Note that the impat and the antiipation reation of ination are relatively small
ompared to the ination reation during the implementation phase. This is mainly due
to our assumption that long-term ination expetations are exlusively driven by hanges
in the money growth rate.
In the following, we denote this FA senario as benhmark senario and ompare the
responses of the remaining three antiipation senarios to this benhmark senario. Sine
we only hange the nature of antiipation and leave the realized shok proess unhanged,
dierenes to the full antiipation ase mainly our on impat and during the antiipation
period. After the ourrene of the shok, dierenes to the benhmark senario are less
visual.
In the antiipation senario PA-MAG, the publi has inorret expetations about the
magnitude c, but is orret about the start and the end of the shok proess. In ase
the publi underestimates the magnitude (E(c) = 1.5 < c = 3), the publi impliitly
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underestimates the size c(t1 − T ) as well. On impat and during the antiipation phase,
the eonomy is driven by expetations. The underestimation of the size of the shok,
therefore, leads to a smaller impat and antiipation reation for all variables in ompar-
ison to the benhmark senario. In t = T = 2, the shok ours with larger magnitude
than (originally) expeted. We, therefore, assume that the publi swithes in t∗ = T to
orret expetations and orretly antiipates the remaining evolution of the shok pro-
ess. Sine the real money stok is assumed to be predetermined, all other variables and,
hene, the system as whole are not able to jump on the solution path of the benhmark
senario.
23
The deline in the real money stok is, however, steeper than in the benh-
mark senario, onverging towards the FA solution path. The terms of trade are, on the
other hand, allowed to reat disontinuously to this new information. To ompensate for
the sluggishness of the real money stok, the terms of trade undershoot its benhmark
value.
24
Likewise, output and ination overshoot and the real interest rate undershoots
their benhmark values. During the implementation phase, the real money stok, output,
ination and the nominal interest rate stay above, and the terms of trade and the real
interest rate stay below the benhmark responses.
If the publi overestimates the magnitude (and the size) of the shok (E(c) = 4.5 >
c = 3) until T = 2, we see reverse adjustments. During the antiipation phase, the system
responds more strongly than in the FA senario. In t∗ = T , the publi swithes to fully
orret expetations. The terms of trade overshoot the benhmark value, but the real
money stok stays below the FA senario.
Senario NA, where the publi does not antiipate the inrease in the money growth at
all, is equivalent to the speial ase E(c) = 0 in senario PA-MAG. Until T , all variables
remain onstant. In t = T , the poliy intervention ompletely omes as a surprise.
Therefore, we neither have an impat nor an antiipation reation.
4.3.2 Senarios PA-START and PA-EXIT
Figure 4.2 depits the responses for senario PA-START. For referene purposes, we again
inlude the benhmark senario FA, where the publi has fully orret expetations. In
senario PA-START, the publi has inorret expetations about the start of implemen-
tation. The end t1 and the magnitude c of the shok proess are, on the other hand,
23
To illustrate this, onsider the LM equation and note that output y and the interest rate i are non-
predetermined, whereas the real money stok mr is predetermined. Let the subsript PA (FA) denote
the solution under partial (full) antiipation. Aording to the LM equation, the dierene in the real
money stok between the PA and FA senario in t∗ is then given by mrPA(t
∗)−mrFA(t∗) = l1[yPA(t∗)−
yFA(t
∗)]− l2[iPA(t∗)− iFA(t∗)]. If the non-predetermined output and the interest rate jump on the FA
solution path in t∗, i.e. yPA(t
∗) = yFA(t
∗) and iPA(t
∗) = iFA(t
∗), this would imply that the real money
stok jumps on the FA solution path as well (i.e. mrPA(t
∗) = mrFA(t
∗)). This, however, would ontradit
that the real money stok is predetermined.
24
Without prie stikiness, the real money stok would be able to reat disontinuously to new information.
The system then would jump in t∗ diretly onto the solution path under full antiipation.
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Figure 4.2: Responses to a monetary shok in senario PA-START
−1.5 −1 −0.5 0
−6
−4
−2
0
2
Real money stock
Te
rm
s 
of
 tr
ad
e
Phase plane
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
1
2
3
4
Expected money growth in t=0
Time
0 2 4 6 8 10
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Output
Time
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
1
2
3
Inflation rate
Time
 
 
E(T)=T (FA)
E(T)<T (PA)
E(T)>T (PA)
orretly antiipated. This implies that the publi overestimates (underestimates) the
size of the shok c(t1 − T ) if the publi expets an earlier (later) start of the monetary
intervention.
25
Consequently, if the publi expets a later start of the monetary poliy shok (E(T ) =
4 > T = 2), the impat and the antiipation reation are smaller than in the FA senario.
In t∗ = T < E(T ), the shok ours earlier than expeted and the publi immediately
swithes to orret expetations. As in senario PA-MAG, the terms of trade reat dison-
tinuously to this hange in expetations, jumping on a lower trajetory. To ompensate
for the sluggishness of pries, the terms of trade undershoot the benhmark response of
senario FA, whih leads to an overshooting of output and ination.
If the publi expets an earlier start of the shok proess (E(T ) = 1 < T = 2),
whih implies a larger expeted shok size, the system overreats until t∗. This time,
however, the swith to orret expetations already ours during the antiipation phase
in t∗ = E(T ) < T , whih is the time the publi originally expeted an inrease in the
25
In setion 4.7, we also onsider the senario PA-ST/EX where we hange E(T ) and E(t1) simultaneously
suh that the length and the size of the shok are orretly antiipated. The responses and the relative
volatilities are very similar to senario PA-START.
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Figure 4.3: Responses to a monetary shok in senario PA-EXIT
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money growth rate, but no hange in the money growth rate ourred. Consequently,
output and ination undershoot the benhmark responses already during the antiipation
phase.
As a last senario, gure 4.3 shows the responses under senario PA-EXIT. In this
senario, the publi has inorret expetations about the end of the monetary intervention.
The start and the magnitude of the shok proess are, on the other hand, orretly
antiipated. This implies that the publi overestimates (underestimates) the size of the
shok c(t1−T ) if it expets a later (an earlier) end of the monetary intervention implying
a stronger (smaller) reation on impat and during the antiipation phase.
The main dierene to the other two partial antiipation senarios is that the swith
to orret expetations now ours during the implementation phase and not during the
antiipation phase. Sine the start and the magnitude are orretly antiipated, the publi
expetations about the shok proess and the true shok proess do not deviate from one
another until t∗ = min(E(t1), t1) > T . Hene, if the publi expets a later end of the shok
proess (E(t1) = 6 > t1 = 5), output and ination stay above the benhmark response
over the whole antiipation and implementation phase. If the publi expets an earlier
end (E(t1) = 4 < t1 = 5), output and ination stay below the benhmark responses until
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t∗ = E(t1) > T .
4.4 Measuring the (de)stabilization eets
In order to study the (de)stabilizing eets of partially antiipated monetary poliy in-
terventions, we use a relative volatility measure, whih relates the volatility under partial
antiipation to the volatility under full antiipation. The relative volatility for x ∈ {y, pi}
in senario S ∈ {PA-MAG, PA-START, PA-EXIT} is dened as
RV (x|S) = V (x|S)
V (x|FA) (4.10)
where V (x|S) and V (x|FA) measure the quadrati deviations of x from its initial steady
state x0 over the time domain D given the expetation assumptions of senario S and FA,
respetively:
26
V (x) =
∫
t∈D
(x(t)− x0)2dt (4.11)
Figure 4.4 shows the relative volatility of output and ination as dened in (4.10)
for all three partial antiipation senarios for dierent degrees of expetation biases. We
ompute the relative volatility for E(c) ranging from -1 to 6 in senario PA-MAG, for
E(T ) ranging from 0.5 to 3.5 in senario PA-START, and for E(t1) ranging from 2.5 to
7 in senario PA-EXIT. With orret expetations (E(c) = c = 3, E(T ) = T = 2, and
E(t1) = t1 = 5), the relative volatility of output and ination interset at unity. Values
greater (smaller) than unity means that the volatility in the partial antiipation senario
is larger (smaller) than in the FA senario. The four olumns of gure 4.4 orrespond to
four dierent phases. The rst olumn shows the overall relative volatility over the whole
adjustment proess (0 < t < ∞). The remaining olumns show the relative volatility in
the three distint phases: (i) the antiipation phase (0 < t < T ), (ii) the implementation
phase (T < t < t1), and (iii) the return phase (t > t1).
Let us rst have a look at the overall relative volatility over the whole adjustment
proess. In senarios PA-MAG and PA-START, we have a trade o between output and
ination stabilization. If the publi underestimates the size of the shok c(t1−T ) (either by
E(c) < c or E(T ) > T ), the volatility in ination is higher and the volatility in output may
be smaller than in the FA senario. If the publi overestimates the size of the shok (either
by E(c) > c or E(T ) < T ), ination is stabilized and output is destabilized. Contrarily,
in senario PA-EXIT, both ination and output may be stabilized simultaneously if the
26
Let the time domain D be dened over the interval [a, b]. Then, we an approximate (4.11) by V (x) ≈
1
n
∑bn
j=1(x(j/n) − x0)2 − 1n
∑an
j=1(x(j/n) − x0)2 for a suiently small step length 1/n. During the
omputation, we set n = 100.
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publi expets an earlier end (implying a smaller expeted shok size).
Next, we onsider the relative volatility during the three subperiods. Two points are
ommon in all three senarios: First, the trade o in volatilities that we obtain based on
the overall adjustment proess in senarios PA-MAG and PA-START is not present if we
onsider the three phases in isolation. In all three subperiods, output and ination are
both either stabilized or destabilized. Seond, during the antiipation and return phase,
the relative volatility in output and ination is even idential.
27
Dierenes in the relative
volatility only our during the implementation phase. This follows from the struture of
the Phillips urve (4.5), where the expeted future ination is pinned down by the money
growth rate. During the antiipation and return phase, the money growth rate is at its
steady state level suh that hanges in the ination rate are proportional to hanges in
output.
28
During the implementation phase (T < t < t1) the money growth is dierent
from its steady state and, therefore, we obtain dierent relative volatilities in ination
and output.
During the antiipation phase (0 < t < T ), the system is driven by expetations and,
hene, in all three senarios, the volatility in ination and output is redued if the publi
underestimates the shok size c(t1 − T ) (either by E(c) < c, E(T ) > T , or E(t1) < t1).
Contrarily, the volatility in output and ination is enhaned during the antiipation phase
if the publi overestimates the shok size.
During the implementation phase (T < t < t1), the underestimation of the shok
size leads to a destabilization of ination and output in senarios PA-MAG and PA-
START. Reall from the previous setion that the non-predetermined variables overreat
for t > t∗ (i.e. do not jump on the FA solution path) to ompensate for the sluggishness
in pries. In senarios PA-MAG and PA-START, a smaller (stronger) reation during the
antiipation phase auses the system to respond more strongly (less strongly) during the
implementation phase.
This trade o between stabilizing the system during the antiipation (and return)
phase and during the implementation phase is not present in senario PA-EXIT. The
main reason is that in this senario the swith to orret expetations ours muh later
during the implementation phase. If the publi underestimates the shok size (E(t1) < t1),
not only the reation on impat and during the antiipation phase is smaller, but also
partly during the implementation period.
29
27
Graphially, the dashed and solid urves ompletely overlap suh that only one solid graph is visual
during the implementation and return phase.
28
Formally, the volatility of ination over the time domain D an be written as
V (pi) =
∫
t∈D
(pi(z)− pi0)2dz =
∫
t∈D
[m˙(z)− m˙0 + δ(y(z)− y0)]2dz
For 0 < t < T and t > t1, m˙(t) = m˙0 suh that V (pi) = δ
2V (y) and RV (pi) = RV (y).
29
If we let the swith already our in t∗ = T , the same trade o ours as in the other two senarios. See
next setion 4.5 for details.
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During the return phase (t < t1), the volatility results are qualitatively the same as
during the antiipation phase, whih follows from the fat that responses are reversed
ompared to the antiipation phase and no new information is revealed suh that the
terms of trade behave ontinuously for t > t1.
The question arises, why do we fae in senarios PA-MAG and PA-START a trade o
between ination and output over the whole adjustment proess, but not in any of the
three subperiods separately. This trade o in overall volatilities results from the ombi-
nation of the following two arguments: First, as desribed above, output and ination
an not be stabilized in all three subperiods simultaneously. A smaller (stronger) reation
during the antiipation phase auses the system to respond more strongly (less strongly)
during the implementation phase. Seond, ination strongly responds to realizations in
the money growth rate during the implementation phase, whereas the antiipation eet
on ination is relatively small. The dierene between the antiipation and the imple-
mentation reation is less pronouned for output. Under fully orret expetations, the
volatility share of the antiipation phase ontributing to overall volatility only amounts
to 0.2 perent for ination and to almost 12 perent for output.
30
Therefore, we nd that
the antiipation eet is dominant for output, whereas the opposite implementation eet
is dominant for ination.
4.5 Two ommuniation strategies
In the last setion, we have shown that the volatility in ination and output under par-
tial information an be redued below the volatility under full antiipation, although not
neessarily simultaneously. This setion disusses the poliy impliation of partially an-
tiipated monetary shoks. We introdue two ommuniation strategies and show how
these strategies may improve the entral bank's loss ompared to the FA senario. The
rst ommuniation strategy presumes that the entral bank has a suiently strong in-
uene on private expetations and is, thereby, able to ontrol the expetations E(c),
E(T ), and E(t1) diretly. Sine this strategy involves to reate biased news about the
future monetary intervention, we refer to this strategy as deeption strategy.
In the seond ommuniation strategy, the entral bank does not reate, but is on-
fronted with biased expetations about its future monetary intervention. The entral bank
now ontrols the breakpoint, at whih the entral bank is revealing the true evolution of
the monetary shok and the publi swithes to fully orret expetations. We denote
this breakpoint as t∗CB to make lear that it is now set exogenously by the entral bank
and to distinguish it from the breakpoint t∗, at whih the publi (independently from the
30
The volatility share of the implementation phase ontributes with 99 perent to overall ination volatility
and with 69 perent to overall output volatility. For more details, see setion 4.7 and table 4.4 in appendix
4.C.
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Figure 4.5: Optimal private expetation bias (deeption strategy)
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entral bank) realizes its expetation biases by itself. This strategy presumes that the
entral bank is able to orretly monitor the private expetation biases. In this strategy
the entral bank does not atively deeive the publi, but (only) withhold information
from the publi. We, therefore, refer to this strategy as withholding strategy.
The entral bank aims to stabilize ination and output. In partiular, we assume that
the entral bank's loss funtion is given by
L0 =
∫
∞
t=0
{
(pi(z)− pi0)2 + α(y(z)− y0)2
}
dz = V (pi) + αV (y) (4.12)
During the simulation, we set α = 0.5. That is, the entral bank's main objetive is
the stabilization of ination (exible ination targeting).
31
To ompare the loss between
partially and fully antiipated inreases in the money growth rate, we ompute the relative
loss, whih is the ratio of the loss under partial antiipation and under full antiipation.
We start with the deeption strategy. Figure 4.5 shows the relative loss for dierent
values of E(c), E(T ), and E(t1) in senarios PA-MAG, PA-START, and PA-EXIT, respe-
tively. Values smaller (greater) than unity mean that the loss under partial antiipation
is lower (higher) than in the FA senario. We further add the (overall) relative volatilities
of output and ination that were already shown in the last setion.
In all three partial antiipation senarios, it is possible to improve the entral bank's
loss in omparison to senario FA. The lowest loss is obtained in senario PA-EXIT if the
publi expets an earlier end (lower size) of the shok proess, i.e. E(t1) < t1 = 5. This
is not surprising sine in senario PA-EXIT the volatility in ination and output an be
redued simultaneously (f. gure 4.4). Contrarily, in senarios PA-MAG and PA-START,
the entral bank faes a trade o between output and ination stabilization, whih may,
however, be more favorable than in the FA senario. Although ination stabilization is
31
See e.g. Svensson (1999).
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Figure 4.6: Optimal time of expetations orretion (withholding strategy)
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assumed to be the primary entral bank's objetive (0 < α < 1), we nd that the entral
bank an improve its loss if the publi expets a smaller shok size (either by E(c) < c = 3
or E(T ) > T = 2) and, thereby, an redue the volatility in output at the ost of a higher
volatility in ination.
Next, we disuss the withholding strategy. Until now, we have assumed that the publi
swithes to fully orret expetations in the very last possible moment in t∗, i.e. when
the publi realizes for the rst time that the expeted evolution of the shok proess
deviates from the true one. We now disuss how the entral bank's loss and the volatility
in ination and output hange if the swith to orret expetations ours earlier than
assumed so far (t∗CB ≤ t∗). Figure 4.6 shows the relative loss and the relative volatility for
output and ination for dierent values of t∗CB for all three senarios. The earliest possible
time to swith is t∗CB = 0, whih is equivalent to the FA senario. The latest possible
time to swith (whih we have used so far) depends on the antiipation senario.
32
In the
top three plots of gure 4.6, the entral bank is onfronted with a publi that initially
32
We have used t∗ = T in senario PA-MAG, t∗ = min(E(T ), T ) in senario PA-START, and t∗ =
min(E(t1), t1) in senario PA-EXIT (f. table 4.3 of setion 4.4).
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underestimates the shok size (either by E(c) < c, E(T ) > T , or E(t1) < t1). In the lower
three plots, the entral bank is onfronted with a publi that initially overestimates the
shok size (either by E(c) > c, E(T ) < T , or E(t1) > t1).
If the entral bank reveals the true shok proess during the antiipation phase (0 <
t∗CB < T ), we have a trade o between output and ination stabilization in all three an-
tiipation senarios inluding senario PA-EXIT. If the publi underestimates the shok
size (either by E(c) < c, E(T ) > T , or E(t1) < t1), output is stabilized and ination is
destabilized. If the publi overestimates the shok size (either by E(c) > c, E(T ) < T ,
or E(t1) > t1), output is destabilized and ination is stabilized. The dierene between
output and ination volatility dereases with dereasing length of withholding the true
shok proess (with dereasing t∗CB). In senario PA-EXIT, the swith to orret expeta-
tions may also our during the implementation phase (T < t∗CB < t1). For a suiently
late swith (t∗CB suiently large), the trade o between output and ination stabilization
vanishes.
Under the loss funtion (4.12), the best ommuniation strategy is as follows: If the
publi overestimates the size of the shok (lower three plots), the FA senario produes
the best outome, i.e. the best entral bank's poliy is to inform the publi as soon as
possible about the true evolution. If, on the other hand, the publi underestimates the
size of the shok (upper three plots), the best entral bank's poliy is to inform the publi
as late as possible. Note that this ommuniation strategy typially stabilizes output, but
destabilizes ination (unless t∗CB > T ) and, therefore, is only optimal if the entral bank's
onern about output stabilization is suiently strong. If e.g. the entral bank's only
objetive is to ahieve ination stability (strit ination targeting), this strategy typially
does not ahieve an optimal outome.
33
This setion has shown that the entral bank may have the inentive to improve the
entral bank's loss by either atively deeiving private expetations (deeption strategy)
or by withholding information about the true evolution of the shok proess (withhold-
ing strategy). However, this setion should not be understood as a poliy advie sine
both strategies may involve drawbaks that have not been mentioned so far, inluding
the following: First, both strategies, partiularly the deeption strategy, may involve rep-
utational osts by reduing the entral bank's redibility in future periods. Seond, the
entral bank has to be able to orretly monitor the expetations bias. Withholding in-
formation about the true shok proess may, therefore, lead to a higher entral bank's
loss if the publi is biased in the opposite diretion.
33
Under strit ination targeting (α = 0), the entral bank's best ommuniation strategy is typially
reversed to the strategy under exible ination targeting: If the publi overestimates the size of the shok
(lower three plots), the best strategy is to inform the publi in t∗CB = T . If the publi overestimates the
size of the shok (upper three plots), the best strategy is to inform the publi as soon as possible (unless
t∗CB > T is possible).
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4.6 Unstable money multiplier
Until now, we have assumed that the entral bank an perfetly ontrol the money growth
rate, whih requires a stable relation between the (adjusted) monetary base and broad
money. This stable relation implies that the asset purhases from entral banks  without
neutralization  lead to inreases in the money stok. Sine the nanial risis in 2008, we
do not observe suh a stable relation between base and broad money in the euro zone.
34
Therefore, we onsider in this setion the ase c = 0, whih implies that the money growth
rate and the money stok do not hange (see table 4.2 in setion 4.3).
Central bank interventions (e.g. asset purhases) that lead to an expansion of the
monetary base then have no eet on the eonomy if the publi orretly antiipates this
unstable relation. Figure 4.7 shows two senarios in whih expansions in the monetary
base have real eets even without a stable money multiplier. In both senarios, we
presume that the publi initially believes in a stable money supply multiplier and expets
in t = 0 that the entral bank interventions will indeed lead to a monetary expansion at
a partiular future time T = 2. In the rst senario, the publi immediately swithes to
fully orret expetations in a single step after its expetations failed for the rst time.
In the seond senario with multiple expetations adjustments, the publi sequentially
updates its expetations and expets a later start (and end) of the inrease in the money
stok before it swithes to fully orret expetations. For referene purposes, we also
inlude the responses to a fully antiipated inrease in base money with stable money
multiplier from gure 4.1 in setion 4.3.
In the following, we disuss the two senarios in more detail. On impat and during the
antiipation phase, the two senarios produe the same responses as under a stable money
multiplier sine the initial expetations on the inrease in the money growth rate are the
same. In T = 2, the publi realizes that  ontrarily to its expetations  no inrease
in the money stok ourred. In the rst senario (single expetations adjustment), the
publi, therefore, immediately swithes in T to fully orret expetations and orretly
expets no hange in the money growth rate (i.e. E(c) = 0 for t > T ). In the phase
plane, we see an immediate vertial jump upwards onto the original saddle path and a
subsequent adjustment from above along the saddle path to the old and new steady state.
Similarly, output and ination jump downward in T and onverge from below to the old
steady state.
In the seond senario (multiple expetations adjustment), the publi believes in T
still in a stable money multiplier and sequentially expets a later start of the inrease
in the money stok. Note that we assume that the publi also sequentially updates its
expetations on the end of the inrease in the money growth rate t1 suh that the expe-
34
See e.g. De Grauwe and Ji (2013), who nds a stable relation prior to 2008 and an unstable relation
thereafter.
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Figure 4.7: Unstable money multiplier (MM) with single and multiple expetations ad-
justments
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tations on the size of the shok remain the same. In T = 2, the publi expets a start
in T1 = 4 > T . In T1, no hange in the money stok ourred and the publi expets a
start in T2 = 6 > T1 and so forth. This sequential updating of expetations leads to a
ylial adjustment path. Whenever the publi updates its expetations (in T, T1, T2, . . . ),
the system jumps on a higher trajetory in the phase plane, whih orresponds with an
immediate output ontration. During two ontrations, output gradually inreases in
antiipation of the expansionary inrease in the money stok. Only after several expeta-
tions adjustments (in t = 8) does the publi realize that no hange in the money stok will
our and swithes to fully orret expetations. Not until then does the system jump on
the initial stable saddle path and onverges from above towards the initial steady state.
To sum up, this setion has shown that hanges in the monetary base may have real
eets on the eonomy and may impose ylial adjustment movements even if a stable
relation between the monetary base and a broader money aggregate is non-existent. This
requires, however, that the publi indeed believes in a stable relation between base and
broad money and expets a future inrease in the money growth rate.
4.7 Modiations
In this setion, we apply six modiations. First, we hange our parameter alibration.
Seond, we modify the length of antiipation relative to the length of the implementation
phase. Third, we onsider a further partial antiipation senario PA-ST/EX whih is an
intermediate senario of PA-START and PA-EXIT. Fourth, we hange the mehanism
with whih the private expetations swith to orret expetations. Fifth, we modify the
augmentation term in the Phillips urve. Finally, we onsider a simultaneous inrease in
the risk premium s and in the money growth rate m˙. Figures and tables to whih we refer
in this setion an be found in the appendies below.
1. Parameter alibration: To hek the robustness of our volatility results, we simu-
late our model for dierent parameter alibrations for senario PA-MAG, where the publi
has inorret expetations about the magnitude c of the inrease in the money growth
rate. We onsider the following alternative parameter speiations: We use l2 = {1, 10}
for the interest rate semi-elastiity of the money demand, δ = {0.1, 0.5} for the slope of
the Phillips urve, a2 = {0.1, 0.6} for the interest rate semi-elastiity of private absorp-
tion, and b3 = {0.03, 0.6} for the terms of trade elastiity of the trade balane.35 Figures
4.8 and 4.9 show the relative volatility of output and ination. Figures 4.10 and 4.11
show the orresponding responses to a fully antiipated inrease in the money growth
35
In partiular, we onsider nine dierent parameter sets. In eight of these nine sets, we only hange one
parameter at a time and keep the remaining parameters at their baseline values. In the ninth set, we
hange all four parameters simultaneously.
4. Partially antiipated monetary poliy shoks 54
rate. Table 4.4 gives the volatility share of the three subperiods on overall ination and
output volatility in the full antiipation senario.
The volatility results for the alternative parameter speiations are as follows: First,
we do not nd any qualitative hange in the relative volatility during the three subperi-
ods. During the antiipation phase, the dierenes are so small that they are not visual.
Seond, for all parameter speiations, we nd that an isolated stabilization of output
and ination is possible while a simultaneous stabilization is not possible. Indeed, we
obtain the same trade o in overall volatility as in the baseline alibration. This trade o
vanishes only when the antiipation eet of output is suiently small, i.e. the volatility
share of the antiipation phase has to be at least below 1.3 perent.
36
Third, the anti-
ipation eet of ination remains very small for all parameter sets under onsideration.
Therefore, we obtain no qualitative hange in the overall ination volatility.
2. Antiipation length: In this modiation, we hange the length of the antiipation
phase relative to the length of the implementation phase in senario PA-MAG. Until now,
we have assumed that the antiipation and implementation period are of similar length,
where we set the antiipation length to T = 2 and the implementation length to t1−T = 3.
We now onsider two dierent length of antiipation. In gure 4.12 and gure 4.13, we set
the relative length of antiipation to 1/10th of the length of implementation phase (i.e.
T = 0.3 and t1 = 3.3). In gure 4.14 and gure 4.15, we set the relative length antiipation
to 10 times the length of the implementation phase (i.e. T = 30 and t1 = 33). We nd
that the volatility dierenes inrease with inreasing length of antiipation. Our volatility
results, however, do not hange qualitatively. For T = 0.3 and T = 30, we obtain the
same trade o in volatilities as for T = 2.
3. Senario PA-ST/EX: In this modiation, we onsider the partial antiipation
senario PA-ST/EX, whih is a ombination of senarios PA-START and PA-EXIT. So
far, in eah of the three partial antiipation senarios, the publi has impliitly inorret
expetations about the size of the shok. In senario PA-ST/EX, the publi has inorret
expetations about the start and the end of the monetary shok, but is orret about
the length and the size. That is, the expetations bias on the start and the end of the
shok has to be the same.
37
Figure 4.16 depits the responses to a temporary inrease
in the money growth rate and gure 4.17 shows the relative volatility in this senario.
Both, the responses and the relative volatility are very similar to senario PA-START.
36
For a volatility share of 1.3 perent, the trade o in volatilities still remains. Only at the border of the
parameter spae (e.g. if we simultaneously set l2 = 1, δ = 0.5, b3 = 0.03, and a2 = 0.6) do we nd that
the antiipation eet of output is small enough (below 0.1 perent) so that output and ination may be
stabilized simultaneously.
37
The same assumption is made in the previous setion in the senario with multiple expetations adjust-
ments.
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Consequently, not only the expeted size of the shok, but also the expeted timing of
the shok matters.
4. Sequential orretion of expetations: So far, we have assumed that the swith
to orret expetations ours immediately at one partiular point in time t∗. We now
assume that the publi sequentially adapts its expetations over time in several steps.
With eah step the publi gains more information about the true evolution of the shok
proess. For simpliity, we assume that the information gain is equally distributed over
time. Figure 4.18 shows the response of the three antiipation senarios (PA-MAG with
E(c) < c, PA-START with E(T ) < T , and PA-EXIT with E(t1) < t1) for three dierent
degrees of frequeny, i.e. number of expetations adjustments: (i) With frequeny one,
whih is equivalent to the one-step adjustment of setion 4.3, (ii) with frequeny two, and
(iii) with a frequeny of 200, whih gives a quasi-ontinuous expetations adjustment. To
save spae, we only show the responses in the phase plane.
The more frequent the publi adjusts its expetations, the smaller is the disontinuous
adjustment in the non-predetermined variables for t < t∗ and the smoother is the adjust-
ment path during the antiipation phase. In the limit ase of a ontinuous adjustment
of expetations, the non-predetermined variables behave ontinuously after the impat
during the antiipation phase (0 < t < T ).
For all three senarios, we ompute the relative volatility using ontinuous expeta-
tions adjustments instead of the single adjustment frequeny of setion 4.3. Figure 4.19
summarizes our results. We nd no notable dierenes to the relative volatility analysis
from setion 4.4. In setion 4.5, we have seen that our volatility results ruially depend
on whether the swith to orret expetations ours during the antiipation or during the
implementation phase. However, this modiation has shown that the pae with whih
the swith ours is somewhat irrelevant.
5. Ination expetations based on onsumer prie index: Until now, we have
assumed that the augmentation term in the Phillips urve is given by the trend rate of
ination pi = m˙. Figures 4.20 to 4.23 show the responses and the relative volatilities
if the formation of ination expetations in the Phillips urve is based on the (short-
run) onsumer prie index pc for senarios PA-MAG, PA-START, and PA-EXIT. The
augmentation term then reads as
pi = p˙c = γp˙+ (1− γ)(p˙∗ + e˙) (4.13)
where 1− γ measures the degree of openness and γ is set equal to 0.6.
We do not observe a qualitative hange in the relative volatility during the three
subperiods. Furthermore, an isolated redution in the overall volatility of output and
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ination is possible. Again, a simultaneous stabilization of output and ination is not
possible, even in senario PA-EXIT. However, this trade o in volatilities is reversed
ompared to our baseline model: If the publi underestimates (overestimates) the size of
the shok, output (ination) may be destabilized, i.e. not stabilized as in our baseline
model.
The reason for this reversed trade o in volatilities is as follows: First, ination re-
sponds now muh more strongly during the antiipation phase than in our baseline model.
Ination expetations in the Phillips urve are not anhored anymore to the exogenous
money growth, whih does not hange until T . Instead, ination expetations that are
based on CPI ination already hange during the antiipation phase. The last row of table
4.4 shows that more than 50 perent of overall ination volatility is aumulated during
the antiipation phase in ase pi = p˙c (in ontrast to 0.2 perent in our baseline model).
Therefore, the relative volatility during the antiipation phase ontributes muh more to
the overall volatility and dominates the volatility eets during the implementation phase.
Seond, the volatility share of the antiipation phase also inreases for output, i.e.
output reats more strongly during the antiipation phase. However, the relative output
volatility during the implementation phase is now muh more sensitive to antiipation
errors than in our baseline model. Therefore, the implementation eet is now dominant
for output and overall output volatility may only be stabilized if it is stabilized during
the implementation phase.
6. Risk premium shok: In the sixth and last modiation, we apply our volatility
analysis to the reent developments during the European sovereign debt risis, where
several (southern) European ountries are suering from inreasing risk premiums on
government bonds. To oppose these risk premiums, the President of the ECB, Mario
Draghi, signalized in July 2012 further purhases of government bonds at the Global
Investment Conferene in London. He is, however, mute about the exat threshold s of
risk premiums at whih the ECB is willing to intervene. This leaves room for private
mispereptions suh that the publi may only partially antiipate the size and the timing
of the announed monetary intervention. We aim to study the onsequenes of this limited
information strategy with respet to the volatility of ination and output.
To this end, we onsider a simultaneous inrease in the risk premium and in the money
growth rate. The true, but not neessarily orretly antiipated evolution of the inrease
in the risk premium and in the money growth rate is summarized in table 4.5: In t = t0,
the risk premium starts to gradually inrease. In t = T , the risk premium reahes the
threshold s at whih the monetary authority starts to purhase government bonds at
a onstant rate c. Without neutralization and stable money supply multiplier, this is
equivalent to a temporary inrease in the money growth rate and a permanent inrease in
the money stok. We assume that this monetary intervention leads quasi-endogenously
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to a gradual deline in the risk premium until it reahes its initial level in t = t1.
In t = 0, the publi starts to form expetations about both the risk premium and
the monetary poliy intervention. The publi orretly antiipates and observes the in-
rease in the risk premium, but may have inorret expetations about the start T of
the monetary intervention and, therefore, on the start of the deline in the risk premium.
Contrarily to an isolated monetary shok in senario PA-START, the publi overesti-
mates (underestimates) the size of the risk premium shok and the monetary intervention
if the publi expets a later (an earlier) monetary intervention. Table 4.6 summarizes the
expetation biases under partial antiipation.
The responses under full and partial antiipation are shown in gure 4.24. Figures 4.25
and 4.26 summarize our volatility results: If the publi expets an earlier intervention of
the entral bank to bring down the risk premiums on government bonds, the volatility in
output and ination may be redued. Under exible ination targeting, the best entral
bank's ommuniation poliy then is to withhold information about the true shok proess
as long as possible. If, on the other hand, the publi expets a later monetary intervention,
output is and ination may be destabilized. Under exible ination targeting, the fully
orret antiipation senario then typially gives the lowest entral bank's loss. Hene,
the best poliy is to inform the publi as soon as possible about the true intentions of the
entral bank.
38
4.8 Conlusion
In this paper, we use a ontinuous-time Dornbush-type model of a small open eonomy
to study the (de)stabilizing eets of fully antiipated, fully non-antiipated, and partially
antiipated inreases in the money growth rate. Under partial antiipation, the publi
has either imperfet information about the magnitude, the start, and/or the end of the
future monetary poliy intervention, and, therefore, has impliitly imperfet information
about the size of the shok.
Our main results are as follows: (i) Partially antiipated monetary poliy shoks may
stabilize ination and output utuations, i.e. lead to a lower volatility than a fully an-
tiipated monetary poliy shok of the same form. (ii) However, we typially obtain a
trade o in volatilities of output and ination over the whole adjustment proess suh
38
If the size of the monetary intervention is suiently small, ination and output may be simultaneously
stabilized. The reason is that the antiipation and implementation reation of the ination rate in
response to an isolated inrease in the risk premium is of similar magnitude. If the monetary intervention
is suiently large ompared to the inrease in the risk premium, we obtain a trade o between ination
and output stabilization. During the simulation, we set s = 3, c = 1, t0 = 2, T = 5, and t1 = 8, implying
that the hange in the money stok is given by dm = 3. Note that the interest rate and the risk premium
shok are not logarithmized. Assuming a interest rate steady state of i0 = 0.01 implies that the risk
premium shok is 100 times larger than the monetary shok in terms of perentage deviations from the
steady state.
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that a simultaneous stabilization of output and ination is not possible. If the publi
underestimates (overestimates) the size of the shok, output (ination) may be stabilized.
(iii) This trade o in volatilities does typially not exist during the three subperiods
(antiipation phase, implementation phase, and return phase) separately. If the pub-
li underestimates (overestimates) the size of the shok, both output and ination are
stabilized (destabilized) during the antiipation phase and are destabilized (stabilized)
during the implementation phase. (iv) The volatility gain/loss from partial antiipation
is (muh) larger for output than for ination. Under exible ination targeting, the best
entral bank's ommuniation strategy, therefore, is typially to stabilize output utu-
ations. If the publi underestimates the size of the shok, the entral bank then has an
inentive to withhold information from the publi about the true entral bank's future
poliy intentions.
The aforementioned results an be explained as follows: First, during the antiipation
phase the eonomy is driven by expetations. If the publi overestimates (underestimates)
the shok size, both output and ination respond more strongly (less strongly) than
under fully orret expetations. Under prie stikiness, the eonomy is not able to
jump on the solution path of fully orret expetations. To ompensate for this prie
stikiness, the system (inluding output and ination) overreats when the true shok
proess is revealed and typially leads to smaller (larger) reation of output and ination
during the implementation phase. This leads to the opposite volatility pattern during the
antiipation and the implementation phase as desribed in result (iii). Seond, we nd
that the antiipation response of ination is relatively small ompared to the antiipation
response of output. Therefore, the volatility share of the antiipation ontributing to
overall volatility is smaller for ination than for output. In ombination with result (iii),
this gives rise to an overall trade o in output and ination volatility.
We nd two exeptions in whih results (ii) and (iii) do not or only partially hold:
First, when the publi underestimates the shok for a suiently long time (i.e. the ex-
petations are biased also during the implementation of the shok), overall output and
ination may be stabilized in all three subperiods simultaneously. Therefore, a simulta-
neous stabilization of output and ination over the whole adjustment proess is possible
and the overall trade o in volatilities vanishes. Seond, if the antiipation eet of in-
ation (output) is suiently large (small), result (ii) may be reversed. That is, ination
(output) may be stabilized if the publi underestimates (overestimates) the shok.
We further study partially antiipated monetary interventions in the presene of an
unstable money multiplier. We nd that hanges in the monetary base may have real
eets on the eonomy and may impose ylial adjustment movements even if the relation
between the monetary base and a broader money aggregate is non-existent. This requires,
however, that the publi indeed believes in a stable relation between base and broad money
and expets a future inrease in the money growth rate.
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4.A Appendix: Calibration
The inome elastiity a1 of private onsumption takes the tax rate into aount. Let us
assume that onsumption follows C = γ0 + γ1(1 − t)Y , where γ0 > 0, 0 < γ1 < 1, and t
is the tax rate. In growth rates, the onsumption equation reads
dC
C
= γ1(1− t)Y
C
dY
Y
⇔ dC/C
dY/Y
=
γ1(1− t)
C/Y
= a1 (4.14)
We assume that the onsumption share on output (C/Y ) is 0.7, the tax rate (t) is 0.3,
and the marginal propensity of onsumption is set to γ1 = 0.7. These values imply that
a1 = 0.7.
4.B Appendix: Model solution
In this setion, we redue the model two a two-dimensional system of dierential equations,
apply the Jordan deomposition, and solve the model under fully and partially antiipated
inreases in the money growth rate and in the risk premium.
Model redution
Using the terms of trade τ and the real money stok mr = m − p as state variables, we
an simplify the model to a two-dimensional system:
y = a0 + a1y − a2(i−E(p˙)) + g + b0 − b1y + b2y∗ − b3τ (4.15)
⇔ λy = (a0 + b0 + g + b2y∗)− a2r − b3τ (4.16)
where r = i− p˙ and λ = 1− a1 + b1.
p˙ = pi + δ(y − y) ⇔ y = y − 1
δ
m˙r (4.17)
with y = f0 + f1τ . Sine τ = p− (p∗ + e) and p˙∗ = 0 (implying τ˙ = p˙− e˙),
i = i∗ + E(e˙) + s ⇒ r = i∗ + Ee˙− p˙+ s = i∗ + Eτ˙ − p˙+ s (4.18)
Replaing y and r in the IS equation gives:
λ
(
f0 + f1τ − 1
δ
m˙r
)
= (a0 + b0 + g + b2y
∗)− a2(i∗ + Eτ˙ − p˙+ s)− b3τ (4.19)
⇔ λ(f0 + f1τ)− (a0 + b0 + g + b2y∗) + a2(i∗ + s) + b3τ = a2τ˙ + λ
δ
m˙r (4.20)
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Replaing y and i in the LM equation mr = l0 + l1y − l2i gives:
mr = l0 + l1
(
f0 + f1τ − 1
δ
m˙r
)
− l2(i∗ + E(e˙) + s− p˙+ p˙− m˙+ m˙) (4.21)
mr − l0 − l1(f0 + f1τ ) + l2(i∗ + s) + l2m˙ = l2τ˙ +
(
l2 − l1
δ
)
m˙r (4.22)
In matrix form (
a2 λ/δ
l2 l2 − l1/δ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
(
τ˙
m˙r
)
=
(
b3 0
0 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(
τ
mr
)
+
(
c1
c2
)
(4.23)
where
c1 = λf0 + λf1τ − a0 − g − b2y∗ + a2(i∗ + s− p˙∗) (4.24)
c2 = −l0 − l1f0 − l1f1τ + l2(i∗ + s− p˙∗) + l2m˙ (4.25)
and ∆ = detA = a2(l2 − l1/δ) − l2λ/δ. ∆ < 0 if δ is suiently small suh that either
l2 < l1/δ or a2 < λ/δ. In the steady, implying τ˙ = m˙
r = 0, we have
τ =
1
b3 + λf1
[−λf0 + a0 − b0 + g + b2y∗ − a2(i∗ + s− p˙∗)] (4.26)
mr = l0 + l1f0 + l1f1τ − l2(i∗ + s− p˙∗)− l2m˙ (4.27)
Let x0 denote the initial steady state of x ∈ {τ,mr, y, i, r, e, p,m}. Sine the risk premium
s and the money growth m˙ are the only exogenous variables that we onsider to hange
over time, dierenes between the urrent and the initial steady state are given by(
τ − τ 0
mr −mr0
)
= −
(
a2
b3+λf1
s(
l2 +
l1f1a2
b3+λf1
)
s+ l2m˙
)
= −
(
a2
b3+λf1
0(
l2 +
l1f1a2
b3+λf1
)
l2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−D
(
s
m˙
)
(4.28)
assuming for simpliity s0 = m˙0 = 0. System (4.23) then an be written as(
τ˙
m˙r
)
= A−1B
(
τ − τ 0
mr −mr0
)
+ A−1BD
(
s
m˙
)
(4.29)
where
A−1B =
1
∆
(
l2 − l1/δ −λ/δ
−l2 a2
)(
b3 0
0 1
)
=
1
∆
(
(l2 − l1/δ)b3 −λ/δ
−l2b3 a2
)
(4.30)
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The above two dimensional system an be solved with the Jordan deomposition method
as we will show in the subsequent setion. Given a solution for τ − τ 0 and mr −mr0, the
solutions of the remaining variables an be omputed as follows:
• Output:
y − y0 = y − y0 −
1
δ
m˙r (4.31)
where
y − y0 = f1(τ − τ 0) = −
f1a2
b3 + λf1
s (4.32)
• Real interest rate:
The UIP and the denition of the terms of trade in dierentiated form give
r − r0 = i− p˙− r0 = r∗ − τ˙ + s− r0 = −τ˙ + s (with r0 = r∗ = 0) (4.33)
• Ination rate:
p˙− p˙0 = p˙ = m˙− m˙r (with p˙0 = 0) (4.34)
• Nominal interest rate
i− i0 = (r − r0) + (p˙− p˙0) (4.35)
Jordan deomposition
By applying the Jordan deomposition, we an deompose the system into two indepen-
dent subsystems. The Jordan deomposition of A−1B in (4.29) gives
A−1B = H
(
r1 0
0 r2
)
H−1 (4.36)
where
H =
(
h11 h12
1 1
)
(4.37)
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is the matrix of eigenvetors, and r1 and r2 are the orresponding eigenvalues. Let us
dene the auxiliary variables (
x
v
)
= H−1
(
τ − τ 0
mr −mr0
)
(4.38)
implying
τ(t)− τ 0 = h11x(t) + h12v(t) (4.39)
mr(t)−mr0 = x(t) + v(t) (4.40)
Then we an rewrite the system (4.29) as two independent dierential equations (premul-
tiply with H−1): (
x˙
v˙
)
=
(
r1 0
0 r2
)(
x
v
)
+
(
f11 f12
f21 f22
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
F
(
s
m˙
)
(4.41)
where F = H−1A−1BD.
General solution
The general solution of the dierential equations (4.41) are
x(t) = er1tK1 +
∫ t
0
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz (4.42)
v(t) = er2tK2 +
∫ t
0
er2(t−z)d2(z)dz (4.43)
with
d1(z) = f11s(z) + f12m˙(z) (4.44)
d2(z) = f21s(z) + f22m˙(z) (4.45)
The evolution of the money growth is of the following form:
m˙(t) =

m˙0 = 0 0 < t < t0
m˙0 = 0 t0 < t < T
m˙1 = c T < t < t1
m˙2 = 0 t > t1
(4.46)
If the inrease in the money growth rate is temporary, then m˙2 = 0.
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The evolution of the risk premium is of the following form:
s(t) =

s0 = 0 0 < t < t0
s0 + β0(t− t0) t0 < t < T
s− β1(t− T ) T < t < t1
s1 = s− β1(t1 − T ) t > t1
(4.47)
where s = s0 + β0(T − t0). Note that the risk premium shok is permanent for β1 = 0. In
order to mute the risk premium shok during the simulation where we onsider isolated
inreases in the money growth, we set β0 = β1 = 0. Note that for β0 = β1 and T − t0 =
t1 − T , the risk premium shok is symmetri and temporary (i.e. s1 = s0 = 0).
Solution under FA senario
First, we derive the solution in the ase of fully orret expetations (FA senario). If the
above shok proess is known to the publi, the solution path for the auxiliary variables
reads as
x(t) =

er1tK11 +
∫ t
0
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz 0 < t < t0
er1tK12 +
∫ t
t0
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz t0 < t < T
er1tK13 +
∫ t
T
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz T < t < t1
er1tK14 +
∫ t
t1
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz t > t1
(4.48)
and
v(t) =

er2tK21 +
∫ t
0
er2(t−z)d2(z)dz 0 < t < t0
er2tK22 +
∫ t
t0
er2(t−z)d2(z)dz t0 < t < T
er2tK23 +
∫ t
T
er2(t−z)d2(z)dz T < t < t1
er2tK24 +
∫ t
t1
er2(t−z)d2(z)dz t > t1
(4.49)
where
d1(z) =

f11s0 0 < z < t0
f11[s0 + β0(z − t0)] t0 < z < T
f11[s− β1(z − T )] + f12m˙1 T < z < t1
f11s1 + f12m˙2 z > t1
(4.50)
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and
d2(z) =

f21s0 0 < z < t0
f21[s0 + β0(z − t0)] t0 < z < T
f21[s− β1(z − T )] + f22m˙1 T < z < t1
f21s1 + f22m˙2 z > t1
(4.51)
Solving the integrals for the solution of xt
Solving the integrals in (4.48) gives:
• For 0 < t < t0: ∫ t
0
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz = −f11s0
r1
[
1− er1t] (4.52)
• For t0 < z < T :∫ t
t0
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz = f11(s0 − β0t0)
∫ t
t0
er1(t−z)dz + f11β0
∫ t
t0
er1(t−z)zdz (4.53)
with ∫ t
t0
er1(t−z)dz =
1
r1
[
er1(t−t0) − 1] (4.54)
and∫ t
t0
er1(t−z)zdz
!
=
∫ t
t0
u(z)v′(z)dz = u(t)v(t)− u(t0)v(t0)−
∫ t
t0
u′(z)v(z)dz (4.55)
where u(z) = z, u′(z) = 1, v′(z) = er1(t−z) and v(z) = − 1
r1
er1(t−z). Hene
∫ t
t0
er1(t−z)zdz = −t 1
r1
+ t0
1
r1
er1(t−t0) −
∫ t
t0
− 1
r1
er1(t−z)dz (4.56)
= −t 1
r1
+ t0
1
r1
er1(t−t0) −
[
1
r21
− 1
r21
er1(t−t0)
]
(4.57)
=
1
r1
[
t0e
r1(t−t0) − t]+ 1
r21
[
er1(t−t0) − 1] (4.58)
suh that ∫ t
t0
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz =
f11
r1
(
s0 − β0t0 + β0
r1
)[
er1(t−t0) − 1]
+
f11β0
r1
[
t0e
r1(t−t0) − t] (4.59)
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• For T < t < t1: Analogously,∫ t
T
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz =
∫ t
T
er1(t−z){f11[s− β1(z − T )] + f12m˙1}dz (4.60)
= [f11s+ f11β1T + f12m˙1]
∫ t
T
er1(t−z)dz
− f11β1
∫ t
T
er1(t−z)zdz (4.61)
where ∫ t
T
er1(t−z)dz =
1
r1
[
er1(t−T ) − 1] (4.62)
and ∫ t
T
er1(t−z)zdz =
1
r1
[
Ter1(t−T ) − t]+ 1
r21
[
er1(t−T ) − 1] (4.63)
suh that∫ t
T
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz =
f ∗1
r1
[
er1(t−T ) − 1]− f11β1
r1
[
Ter1(t−T ) − t]
− f11β1
r21
[
er1(t−T ) − 1] (4.64)
=
(
f ∗1
r1
− f11β1
r21
)[
er1(t−T ) − 1]− f11β1
r1
[
Ter1(t−T ) − t] (4.65)
with f ∗1 = f11s+ f11β1T + f12m˙1 and s = s0 + β0(T − t0).
• For t > t1: ∫ t
t1
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz =
f11s1 + f12m˙2
r1
[
er1(t−t1) − 1] (4.66)
with s1 = s− β1(t1 − T ).
Solving the integrals for the solution of vt
Analogously, the solution of the integrals in (4.49) is given by
• For 0 < t < t0: ∫ t
0
er2(t−z)d2(z)dz = −f21s0
r2
[
1− er2t] (4.67)
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• For t0 < t < T :∫ t
t0
er2(t−z)d2(z)dz =
f21
r2
(
s0 − β0t0 + β0
r2
)[
er2(t−t0) − 1]+ f21β0
r2
[
t0e
r2(t−t0) − t]
(4.68)
• For T < t < t1:∫ t
T
er2(t−z)d2(z)dz =
(
f ∗2
r2
− f21β1
r22
)[
er2(t−T ) − 1]− f21β1
r2
[
Ter2(t−T ) − t] (4.69)
with f ∗2 = f21s+ f21β1T + f22m˙1 and s = s0 + β0(T − t0)
• For t > t1: ∫ t
t1
er2(t−z)d2(z)dz =
f21s1 + f22m˙2
r2
[
er2(t−t1) − 1] (4.70)
with s1 = s− β1(t1 − T ).
Determining the onstants for the solution of xt
In order to obtain a unique and stable solution, we assume that the real money stok mr
is ontinuous over the whole adjustment proess, and the terms of trade τ are ontinuous
for t > 0, but may behave disontinuously in t = 0. Denote
q(t−) = lim
ε→0
q(t− ε) (4.71)
q(t+) = lim
ε→0
q(t + ε) (4.72)
with ε > 0 for q ∈ {x, v}. From our ontinuity assumptions on mr and τ , we an speify
the onstant K11, K12, and K13 as follows:
x(t0−) != x(t0+) (4.73)
⇔ K11 = K12 − f11s0
r1
[
1− e−r1t0] (4.74)
x(T−) != x(T+) (4.75)
⇔ K12 = K13 − f11
r1
(
s0 − β0t0 + β0
r1
)[
e−r1t0 − e−r1T ]
− f11β0
r1
[
t0e
−r1t0 − Te−r1T ] (4.76)
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x(t1−) != x(t1+) (4.77)
⇔ K13 = K14 −
(
f ∗1
r1
− f11β1
r21
)[
e−r1T − e−r1t1]+ f11β1
r1
[
Te−r1T − t1e−r1t1
]
(4.78)
K14 follows from the stability ondition of x. For t > t1:
x(t) = er1tK14 +
∫ t
t1
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz (4.79)
= er1t
[
K14 +
f11s1 + f12m˙2
r1
e−r1t1
]
− f11s1 + f12m˙2
r1
(4.80)
Sine r1 > 0, onvergene of x(t) for t→∞ requires
K14 = −f11s1 + f12m˙2
r1
e−r1t1 (4.81)
Determining the onstants for the solution of vt
Analogously, we an determine the onstant K21, K22, K23, and K24. Continuity of m
r(t)
in t = 0 implies
mr(0+)−mr0 = x(0) + v(0) != 0 (4.82)
Sine x(0) = K11 and v(0) = K21, we have K21 = −K11.
v(t0−) != v(t0+) (4.83)
er2t0K21 +
∫ t0
0
er2(t0−z)dz = er2t0K22 (4.84)
er2t0K21 − f21s0
r2
[
1− er2t0] = er2t0K22 (4.85)
K22 = K21 − f21s0
r2
(e−r2t0 − 1) (4.86)
v(T−) != v(T+) (4.87)
er2TK22 +
∫ T
t0
er2(T−z)d2(z)dz = e
r2TK23 (4.88)
K23 = K22 +
f21
r2
(
s0 − β0t0 + β0
r2
)[
e−r2t0 − e−r2T ]
+
f21β0
r2
[
t0e
−r2t0 − Te−r2T ] (4.89)
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v(t1−) != v(t1+) (4.90)
er2t1K23 +
∫ t1
T
er2(t1−z)d2(z)dz = e
r2t1K24 (4.91)
K24 = K23 +
(
f ∗2
r2
− f21β1
r22
)[
e−r2T − e−r2t1]
− f21β1
r2
[
Te−r2T − t1e−r2t1
]
(4.92)
Note that onstants K11, . . . , K14 and K21, . . . , K24 need to be solved reursively, starting
with K14.
Solution under senarios NA and PA
In the antiipation senarios NA and PA, the publi has inorret expetations on the
parameters of the shok proess. In partiular, we assume that the publi only may have
inorret expetations on T , t1, s1, m˙1, m˙2, and β1. We denote expeted values that may
deviate from the orresponding true parameter by a supersript ant. At the breakpoint
t∗, the publi swithes to fully orret expetations. That is, the publi has orret
expetations about all shok parameters for t > t∗ and may have inorret expetations
for t < t∗. In the following, we assume that t0 < t
∗ < T .39
Solution of xt
The solution for xt under inorret expetations, then reads
x(t) =

er1tKPA11 +
∫ t
0
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz 0 < t < t0
er1tKPA12 +
∫ t
t0
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz t0 < t < t
∗
er1tK˜PA12 +
∫ t
t∗
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz t
∗ < t < T
er1tK˜PA13 +
∫ t
T
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz T < t < t1
er1tK˜PA14 +
∫ t
t1
er1(t−z)d1(z)dz t > t1
(4.93)
For t < t∗, the solution of xt is exlusively based on (inorret) private expetations.
Hene, the onstants KPA11 and K
PA
12 are of the same form as the onstants K11 and K12
under fully orret expetations. The only dierene is that the onstants are based on
the antiipated values βant1 , s
ant
1 , and t
ant
1 , instead of the true values β1, s1, and t1. This
39
Note that in the disussed senario PA-EXIT, the swith to orret expetations ours during the
implementation of the monetary shok (T < t∗ < t1). An expliit solution for senario PA-EXIT is not
shown here, but ould be derived analogously.
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is highlighted by a supersript PA. The onstants an be omputed reursively;
KPA11 = K
PA
12 −
f11s0
r1
[
1− e−r1t0] (4.94)
KPA12 = K
PA
13 −
f11
r1
(
s0 − β0t0 + β0
r1
)[
e−r1t0 − e−r1Tants
]
− f11β0
r1
[
t0e
−r1t0 − T ants e−r1T
]
(4.95)
KPA13 = K
PA
14 −
(
f ∗,ant1
r1
− f11β
ant
1
r21
)[
e−r1T
ant
s − e−r1tant1
]
+
f11β
ant
1
r1
[
T ants e
−r1Tants − tant1 e−r1t
ant
1
]
(4.96)
KPA14 = −
f11s
ant
1 + f12m˙
ant
2
r1
e−r1t
ant
1
(4.97)
with
f ∗,ant1 = f11s
ant + f11β1T
ant
s + f12m˙
ant
1 (4.98)
sant = s0 + β0(T
ant − t0) (4.99)
The remaining onstants K˜PA12 , K˜
PA
13 , and K˜
PA
14 follow from the ontinuity of x(t) in T
and t1 and from the stability ondition.
K˜PA12 = K˜
PA
13 −
f11
r1
(
s0 − β0t0 + β0
r1
)[
e−r1t
∗ − e−r1T ]
− f11β0
r1
[
t∗e−r1t
∗ − Te−r1T ] (4.100)
K˜PA13 = K˜
PA
14 −
(
f ∗1
r1
− f11β1
r21
)[
e−r1T − e−r1t1]+ f11β1
r1
[
Te−r1T − t1e−r1t1
]
(4.101)
K˜PA14 = −
f11s1 + f12m˙2
r1
e−r1t1 (4.102)
Note, that we assume that the terms of trade also behave disontinuously to the hange
in expetations in t = t∗, i.e. τ(t∗−) 6= τ(t∗+). This also holds if t∗ oinides with t0 or
T .
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Solution of vt
Analogously, the solution of vt in the antiipation senarios FA and NA is given by
v(t) =

er2tKPA21 +
∫ t
0
er2(t−z)d2(z)dz 0 < t < t0
er2tKPA22 +
∫ t
t0
er2(t−z)d2(z)dz t0 < t < t
∗
er2tK˜PA22 +
∫ t
t∗
er2(t−z)d2(z)dz t
∗ < t < T
er2tK˜PA23 +
∫ t
T
er2(t−z)d2(z)dz T < t < t1
er2tK˜PA24 +
∫ t
t1
er2(t−z)d2(z)dz t > t1
(4.103)
Again, KPA21 and K
PA
22 are of the same form as in the FA senario, but they depend on
dierent expetation values through its dependene on KPA11 :
KPA21 = −KPA11 (4.104)
KPA22 = K
PA
21 −
f21s0
r2
(e−r2t0 − 1) (4.105)
The remaining onstants follow from the ontinuity of mr in t∗, T and t1:
mr(t∗−) = mr(t∗+) (4.106)
x(t∗−) + v(t∗−) = x(t∗+) + v(t∗+) (4.107)
x(t∗−) + v(t∗−) = er1t∗K˜12 + er2t∗K˜22 (4.108)
K˜PA22 = e
−r2t∗(x(t∗−) + v(t∗−)− er1t∗K˜PA12 ) (4.109)
where x(t∗−) and v(t∗−) are the last values of the antiipated solution path.
K˜PA23 = K˜
PA
22 +
f21
r2
(
s0 − β0t0 + β0
r2
)[
e−r2t
∗ − e−r2T ]+ f21β0
r2
[
t∗e−r2t
∗ − Te−r2T ]
(4.110)
K˜PA24 = K˜
PA
23 +
(
f ∗2
r2
− f21β1
r22
)[
e−r2T − e−r2t1]− f21β1
r2
[
Te−r2T − t1e−r2t1
]
(4.111)
Note that in the NA senario, the publi has the following expetations: βant0 = β
ant
1 =
m˙ant1 = m˙
ant
2 = 0.
4.C Appendix: Modiations
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Table 4.4: Absolute volatilities in senario FA for dierent parameter and model speia-
tions
Modiation Overall Ant. phase Impl. phase Return phase
Baseline
Output 14.91 1.73 (11.6 %) 10.35 (69.4 %) 2.84 (19.0 %)
Ination 34.04 0.07 (0.2 %) 33.86 (99.5 %) 0.11 (0.3 %)
l2 = 1
Output 5.03 0.21 (4.1 %) 3.69 (73.3 %) 1.13 (22.6 %)
Ination 31.08 0.01 (0.0 %) 31.02 (99.8 %) 0.05 (0.1 %)
l2 = 10
Output 21.86 3.52 (16.1 %) 14.87 (68.0 %) 3.48 (15.9 %)
Ination 35.60 0.14 (0.4 %) 35.32 (99.2 %) 0.14 (0.4 %)
δ = 0.1
Output 15.48 2.02 (13.1 %) 11.63 (75.1 %) 1.82 (11.8 %)
Ination 30.61 0.02 (0.1 %) 30.57 (99.9 %) 0.02 (0.1 %)
δ = 0.5
Output 15.19 1.41 (9.3 %) 8.59 (56.6 %) 5.19 (34.2 %)
Ination 44.71 0.35 (0.8 %) 43.06 (96.3 %) 1.30 (2.9 %)
b3 = 0.03
Output 9.68 0.13 (1.3 %) 8.50 (87.8 %) 1.05 (10.8 %)
Ination 33.41 0.01 (0.0 %) 33.36 (99.9 %) 0.04 (0.1 %)
b3 = 0.6
Output 89.71 33.67 (37.5 %) 30.64 (34.1 %) 25.41 (28.3 %)
Ination 38.70 1.35 (3.5 %) 36.33 (93.9 %) 1.02 (2.6 %)
a2 = 0.1
Output 7.09 2.63 (37.2 %) 3.19 (45.0 %) 1.26 (17.8 %)
Ination 30.57 0.11 (0.3 %) 30.42 (99.5 %) 0.05 (0.2 %)
a2 = 0.6
Output 36.16 0.92 (2.6 %) 28.49 (78.8 %) 6.74 (18.7 %)
Ination 39.36 0.04 (0.1 %) 39.05 (99.2 %) 0.27 (0.7 %)
l2 = 1, b3 = 0.03, Output 8.82 0.00 (0.0 %) 5.70 (64.7 %) 3.12 (35.3 %)
δ = 0.5, a2 = 0.6 Ination 40.92 0.00 (0.0 %) 40.14 (98.1 %) 0.78 (1.9 %)
pi = p˙c
Output 14.18 6.20 (43.7 %) 4.60 (32.4 %) 3.39 (23.9 %)
Ination 11.48 6.01 (52.3 %) 5.22 (45.5 %) 0.25 (2.2 %)
Note: Perentage gures in brakets give the volatility share of eah phase ontributing to overall volatility. Due to rounding
gures may not add up to 100 perent.
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Figure 4.10: Responses to a fully antiipated monetary shok (senario FA) for dierent
values of l2 and δ
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Figure 4.11: Responses to a fully antiipated monetary shok (senario FA) for dierent
values of b3 and a2
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Figure 4.12: Responses to a monetary shok in senario PA-MAG with short antiipation
horizon (T = 0.3)
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Figure 4.13: Relative volatility for senario PA-MAG with short antiipation horizon
(T = 0.3)
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Figure 4.14: Responses to a monetary shok in senario PA-MAG with long antiipation
horizon (T = 30)
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Figure 4.15: Relative volatility for senario PA-MAG with long antiipation horizon (T =
30)
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Figure 4.16: Responses to a monetary shok in senario PA-ST/EX
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Figure 4.17: Relative volatility in senario PA-ST/EX
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Figure 4.18: Responses to a monetary shok under various frequenies of expetations
adjustments
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Figure 4.20: Responses to a monetary shok in senario PA-MAG with ination expeta-
tions of the form pi = p˙c
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Figure 4.21: Responses to a monetary shok in senario PA-START with ination expe-
tations of the form pi = p˙c
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Figure 4.22: Responses to a monetary shok in senario PA-EXIT with ination expe-
tations of the form pi = p˙c
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Table 4.5: Evolution of the risk premium and monetary poliy shok
0 ≤ t < t0 t0 ≤ t < T T ≤ t < t1 t > t1
Money growth m˙ = 0 m˙ = 0 m˙ = c m˙ = 0
Risk premium s = 0 s = β0(t− t0) s = s− β1(t− T ) s = 0
Table 4.6: Expetation (biases) on the risk premium shok and on the monetary response
Senario FA Senario PA
Risk premium shok:
Start E(t0) t0 = 2 t0
End E(t1) t1 = 8 6= t1
Pae of the inrease E(β0) β0 = 1 β0
Pae of the deline E(β1) β1 = 1 β1
Size/Threshold E(s) s = 3 6= s
Monetary response:
Magnitude E(c) c = 1 c
Start E(T ) T = 5 6= T
End E(t1) t1 = 8 6= t1
Length E(t1 − T ) t1 − T = 3 6= t1 − T
Size E(c(t1 − T )) c(t1 − T ) = 3 6= c(t1 − T )
Breakpoint t∗ - min(T,E(T ))
4. Partially antiipated monetary poliy shoks 92
Figure 4.24: Responses to a simultaneous inrease in the risk premium and the money
growth rate
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Figure 4.25: Relative volatility (simultaneous inrease in the risk premium and the money
growth rate)
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Figure 4.26: Optimal withholding strategy (simultaneous inrease in the risk premium
and the money growth rate)
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Chapter 5
Money and redit in the New
Keynesian model
Coauthored by: Hans-Werner Wohltmann
Published in: Review of Eonomis, 2014, vol. 65(3), pp. 253-280
Abstrat
This paper integrates a money and redit market into a stati approximation of the base-
line New Keynesian model based on a money-and-redit-in-the-utility approah, in whih
real balanes and borrowing ontribute to the household's utility. In this framework, the
entral bank has no diret ontrol over the interest rate on bonds. Instead, the entral
bank's instrument variables are the monetary base and the renaning rate, i.e. the rate
at whih the entral bank provides loans to the banking setor. Our approah gives rise
to a redit hannel, in whih urrent and expeted future interest rates on the bond and
loan market diretly aet urrent goods demand. The redit hannel amplies the out-
put eets of isolated monetary disturbanes. Taking hanges in private (ination and
interest rate) expetations into aount, we nd that  ontrarily to Bernanke and Blinder
(1988)  the redit hannel may also dampen the output eets of monetary disturbanes.
The expansionary eets of a monetary expansion may be substantially diminished if the
monetary disturbane is aompanied by a ontrationary redit shok. In a dynami
version of our model, in whih expetations are formed endogenously, we nd that the
redit hannel amplies output responses.
JEL lassiation: A20, E51, E52
Keywords: Money, Loan, Money-and-redit-in-the-utility, Credit hannel, New Keynesian
model, Monetary poliy
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The full artile an be downloaded via
http://ideas.repe.org/a/lus/reveo/v65y2014i3p253-280.html
Chapter 6
Endogenous rm entry in an estimated
model of the U.S. business yle
Coauthored by: Roland Winkler
Published in: Eonomis Working Papers 2015-06, Christian-Albrehts-University of
Kiel, Department of Eonomis
Abstrat
A reent theoretial literature highlights the role of endogenous rm entry as an inter-
nal ampliation mehanism of business yle utuations. The ampliation mehanism
works through the ompetition and the variety eet. This paper tests the signiane
of this ampliation mehanism, quanties its importane, and disentangles the ompe-
tition and the variety eet. To this end, we estimate a medium-sale real business yle
model with rm entry for the U.S. eonomy. The ompetition and the variety eet are
estimated to be statistially signiant. Together, they amplify the volatility of output
by 8.5 perent relative to a model in whih both eets are swithed o. The ompetition
eet aounts for most ampliation, whereas the variety eet only plays a minor role.
JEL lassiation: E20, E32
Keywords: Bayesian estimation; Business yles, Competition eet, Entry, Mark-ups,
Variety eet
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6.1 Introdution
Standard dynami stohasti general equilibrium (DSGE) models used for foreasting
and poliy analysis have a xed range of produts and rms and neglet the eet of
rm entry on business yle utuations.
1
Empirial evidene on rm and produt entry,
however, suggests otherwise. First, the number of rms varies substantially over the
business yle and is strongly proylial. Seond, the opening of establishments explains
around 20 perent of quarterly job gains. Third, produt reation (at new and existing
rms) aounts for almost 50 perent of output in a 5 year interval.
2
In light of these ndings, a reent theoretial branh of the literature has started
to study the role of endogenous rm (or produt) entry in business yle utuations.
3
This literature identies endogenous entry as an important ampliation mehanism for
business yle utuations. This ampliation mehanism works through two hannels.
The variety eet desribes the produtivity gains from additional varieties. An inrease
in the number of rms, equivalent to an inrease in the number of varieties, inreases
output more than proportional due to inreasing returns to speialization.
4
The so-alled
ompetition eet aptures the inverse relation between the number of produers and
prie mark-ups. An inrease in the number of produers erodes market power. Prie
mark-ups fall whih in turn boosts aggregate demand.
This paper aims to test the signiane of this ampliation mehanism, to quantify its
importane, and to disentangle the ompetition and the variety eet in a medium-sale
business yle model. To this end, we use the rm entry model by Bilbiie et al. (2012),
extend it with several real fritions, and estimate the model on U.S. data with Bayesian
methods. We investigate the apaity of the model in tting the data, study how rm
entry aets the estimates of strutural model parameters, and explore the ampliation
mehanism embedded in the rm entry model for transitory supply and demand shoks.
The model is haraterized by sunk entry osts and a translog nal goods prodution
tehnology as proposed by Feenstra (2003).
5
The number of rms is endogenously de-
termined by a free entry ondition that equates expeted future prots with entry osts.
Under the translog tehnology both the ompetition and the variety eet are present. The
ompetition eet is demand-side driven and stems from the fat that the substitutability
between dierent varieties, and hene the prie elastiity of demand, is inreasing in the
1
See e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007) and Christiano et al. (2005).
2
The empirial evidene is based on US data. The proyliality of rm entry is demonstrated by Chatter-
jee and Cooper (1993), Devereux et al. (1996), or Etro and Colagio (2010). Davis et al. (1998) investigate
the role of rm turnover for job ows. Bernard et al. (2010) ompute the ontribution of produt reation
for aggregate output.
3
For a detailed overview on the existing literature, see setion 5 in Bilbiie et al. (2012).
4
Note that this eet is equivalent to the well-known love of variety eet, where households 'love' varieties
and gain utility from an inreasing set of onsumption goods.
5
Note that Bilbiie et al. (2012) aggregate produts through the onsumers' intratemporal optimization
and therefore refer to a translog expenditure funtion instead. However, both onepts are equivalent.
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number of varieties.
We nd the ompetition eet and the variety eet to be statistially signiant. To
quantify the strength of the ampliation mehanism and to disentangle the ompetition
and the variety eet, we speify two ounterfatual model frameworks with a onstant
elastiity of substitution (CES) prodution tehnology, where either the ompetition eet
or both eets are swithed o. We measure the ampliation as the perentage volatility
dierene in GDP, onsumption, and investment aross the three model variants. By
onduting ounterfatual simulations, we nd that the ompetition and the variety eet
substantially amplify utuations in output and onsumption, but dampen utuations
in investment. For output, the total inrease in volatility is given by 8.5 perent. The
ompetition eet aounts for most of the ampliation, amplifying output by 7 perent,
whereas the inrease through the variety eet only amounts to 1.5 perent. If we onsider
eah strutural shok in isolation, the results are mixed. On the one hand, the ompetition
and the variety eet amplify the impats of labor produtivity and wage mark-up shoks
on output. This follows from the fat that for these shoks, output and rm entry are
positively orrelated. On the other hand, the ompetition and the variety eet dampen
the output eets of aggregate demand and investment-spei tehnology shoks, for
whih the onditional orrelation between rm entry and output is negative.
The evidene on the yliality of mark-ups does not speak with a single voie. A large
body of literature nds evidene for ounterylial mark-ups, for example, Bils (1987) and
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), while there is ompeting evidene of proyliality, see
Nekarda and Ramey (2013). Counterylial responses of mark-ups to tehnology shoks
and monetary poliy shoks have reently been doumented by Colagio and Etro (2010)
and Lewis and Poilly (2012). However, mark-ups are not diretly unobservable. The
literature uses relations from strutural models to onstrut a measure of mark-ups from
observable variables. In our framework, a fully model-onsistent onstrution of a mark-up
series is not possible. We therefore exlude a mark-up series from our baseline estimation
and treat the mark-up as an unobserved state in our estimation proedure.
6
The implied
yliality of prie mark-ups, using our estimates, is shok-dependent. Produtivity and
wage mark-up shoks entail a ounterylial response of mark-ups. In response to shoks
to aggregate demand and to investment-spei tehnology, mark-ups behave proylial.
This artile is among the rst attempts to bring a business yle model with rm
entry to the data. Lewis and Poilly (2012) study the role of rm entry for the monetary
transmission mehanism by minimizing the distane between the impulse responses to a
monetary poliy shok generated by a stiky prie entry model and those obtained from
a VAR. Lewis and Stevens (2015) estimate  as we do  a business yle with rm entry
using Bayesian methods. However, they onsider a monetary DSGE model and fous
6
We show in robustness exerise, that all our results go through when we inlude a mark-up proxy in the
estimation.
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mainly on the role of rm entry for ination dynamis. Our primary fous is on output
dynamis and on the ampliation mehanism embedded in the endogenous entry model.
7
Closely related to our paper is the work of Jaimovih and Floetotto (2008). Based on
a alibrated and  apart from rm entry  standard real business yle model, they show
that ampliation eet assoiated with rm entry amplies the impats of tehnology
shoks on output by 64 to 158 perent, depending on the exat speiation of their
model. This paper onrms the qualitative results in Jaimovih and Floetotto (2008) but
nds the quantitative impat of rm entry to be less dominant. Our paper extends their
work in a number of ways. First, we arry out a full-edged estimation of a medium-
sale real business yle model, that already aounts for a large fration of eonomi
utuations. This approah enables us to extrat the net ampliation eet assoiated
with rm entry. Moreover, we provide an estimate of the strength of the ampliation
mehanism. Seond, we onsider several shoks and demonstrate that the role of rm
entry in aggregate utuations depends on the nature of the shok. Third, in the model
of Jaimovih and Floetotto (2008), the variety eet is turned o, and the sole fous lies
on the ompetition eet. The latter is supply-side driven and stems from the strategi
interation between oligopolisti rms.
8
However, Lewis and Poilly (2012) nd that a
model with strategi interations annot generate an empirially relevant ompetition
eet. Therefore, we onsider a demand-side driven ompetition eet based on a translog
prodution tehnology.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Setion 6.2 presents the model.
Setion 6.3 shows analytially the eets that the ompetition and the variety eets
have on the model's dynamis. Setion 6.4 desribes the data and the estimation proe-
dure. Setion 6.5 disusses the estimation results. Setion 6.6 quanties the ampliation
mehanism. Setion 6.7 tests the robustness of our results. Setion 6.8 onludes.
6.2 The model
This setion outlines our business yle model for the U.S. eonomy. The ore is a medium-
sale real business yle model whih is haraterized by monopolisti ompetition on
produt and labor markets, habit formation in onsumption, investment adjustment osts,
variable apital utilization, and non-separable preferenes as proposed by Jaimovih and
7
We onsider a real model. While the transmission hannels through whih rm entry aets the model
dynamis (the ompetition and the variety eet) would also be at work in a stiky-prie framework,
the quantitative results may hange. We leave a quantitative evaluation within a stiky-prie model for
future work.
8
Other studies that onsider a supply-side driven ompetition eet in business yle models are, for
example, Colagio and Etro (2010) and Etro and Colagio (2010). In ontrast to Jaimovih and Floetotto
(2008), however, these studies do not provide a quantitative evaluation of the ampliation mehanism.
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Rebelo (2009).
9
To this, we add the entry model proposed by Bilbiie et al. (2012) whih
features a variety eet and a demand-side driven ompetition eet stemming from a
translog prodution tehnology of nal goods produers.
The model eonomy onsists of a government, a xed mass of nal goods produ-
ers, labor bundlers, households, and a time-varying and endogenously determined mass
of intermediate goods produers. Households onsume, invest in physial apital and in
start-ups (or new rms), hold government bonds and equity of intermediate goods pro-
duers, and supply dierentiated labor types to a labor bundler under monopolistially
ompetitive onditions. Competitive labor bundlers aggregate the dierentiated labor
types into a homogeneous labor input. A time-varying mass of monopolisti rms em-
ploy labor and apital to produe dierentiated intermediate goods. The reation of a
new produt variety  equivalent to the establishment of a new rm  requires labor in-
put. The entry of rms into the intermediate goods market is endogenously determined
by a free entry ondition that equates expeted future prots with entry osts. Final
goods produers bundle the intermediate goods to a homogenous nal good used for pri-
vate and government onsumption and for investment in physial apital. We speify a
translog prodution funtion as in Feenstra (2003) to desribe how intermediate goods
are ombined to produe nal goods. This speiation gives rise to ounterylial prie
mark-ups and inreasing returns to speialization (or love of variety). In the following,
we disuss the model in more detail.
6.2.1 Final goods produers
There is a mass Nt of monopolistially ompetitive rms, eah produing a dierent
variety of an intermediate good, indexed by i ∈ [0, Nt]. Final goods produers buy
the dierentiated intermediate goods or varieties yi,t at a prie pi,t, bundle them to a
homogenous nal good Y Ct , and sell it to the households and to the government under
perfetly ompetitive onditions at a prie Pt. A nal goods produer maximizes its prots
Y Ct Pt −
∫ Nt
0
pi,tyi,tdi subjet to a nal goods prodution funtion that is speied using
the translog ost funtion as proposed by Feenstra (2003). The rst-order ondition for
prot maximization yields the demand funtion for variety i, given by yi,t =
∂Pt
∂pi,t
Y Ct .
In a symmetri equilibrium, all rms make idential hoies: yi,t = yt, pi,t = pt and
ρi,t = ρt, where ρi,t ≡ pi,t/Pt is the relative prie of variety i. The demand funtion for
a single variety is then given by yt = (ρtNt)
−1Y Ct and the prie index an be written
as Pt = exp
(
(N˜ −Nt)/(2σ˜N˜Nt)
)
pt, where N˜ is the mass of potential entrants. The
prie elastiity of demand (or elastiity of substitution between dierent varieties), εt, is
inreasing in the number of varieties: εt = 1+ σ˜Nt with σ˜ > 0.
10
The degree of inreasing
9
The struture of our ore model is based on Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012). They estimate the model
to assess the ontribution of news shoks to business yle utuations.
10
See appendix 6.A for the derivation of the prie index Pt and the prie elastiity εt. For onveniene,
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returns to speialization (the variety eet), is aptured by the elastiity of the relative
prie with respet to the number of rms, whih is given by ωt =
∂ρt
∂Nt
Nt
ρt
= (2σ˜Nt)
−1
.
6.2.2 Intermediate goods produers
Eah intermediate good is produed by a monopolist i ∈ [0, Nt] that uses the amount li,t
of labor, the amount ksi,t of apital servies, and the onstant returns to sale tehnology
yi,t = (ztli,t)
α(ksi,t)
1−α
(6.1)
to produe its output yi,t. zt is a labor produtivity shifter, whih follows the exogenous
AR(1) proess log zt = (1 − ρz) log z + ρz log zt−1 + εzt , where z is the steady state of zt,
and εzt is i.i.d.N(0, σ
2
εz). α ∈ (0, 1) denotes the share of labor in prodution. The rm
takes the real fator pries wt and r
k
t as given. Firm i hooses pries pi,t and fator inputs
to maximize real prots di,t =
pi,t
Pt
yi,t−wtli,t− rkt ksi,t subjet to the prodution tehnology
and the demand for its variety.
At the optimum, the rm sets its real prie as a mark-up, µpt , over real marginal osts,
mct:
pi,t
Pt
= µptmct , (6.2)
where µpt =
εt
εt−1
. Inserting εt = 1+ σ˜Nt yields µ
p
t = 1+
1
σ˜Nt
, implying that the mark-up is
dereasing in the number of goods. The ompetition eet is aptured by the (negative)
elastiity of the mark-up with respet to the number of goods (or rms), whih is given
by ξt = − ∂µ
p
t
∂Nt
Nt
µpt
= (1 + σ˜Nt)
−1
.
The demands of rm i for hours and apital are given by
wt = αmct
yi,t
li,t
, (6.3)
rkt = (1− α)mct
yi,t
ksi,t
. (6.4)
In a symmetri equilibrium, the aggregate prodution of intermediated goods is given
by Ntyt = (ztL
C
t )
α(Kst )
1−α
, where LCt = Ntlt and K
s
t = Ntk
s
t . Total prots an be
expressed as Ntdt = (1− 1/µpt ) Y Ct .
6.2.3 Labor bundlers
The eonomy is made up by a ontinuum of households, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Eah
household is a monopolisti supplier of a dierentiated labor type Lj,t. Analogously to nal
we denote Nt in the following as the number of rms/varieties. Note, however, that Nt ∈ R is stritly
speaking the mass of rms.
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goods produers, labor bundlers ombine the dierentiated labor types to a homogenous
labor input Lt, aording to Lt =
(∫ 1
0
L
1/µwt
j,t dj
)µwt
. The wage mark-up µwt is assumed to
follow the ARMA(1,1) proess log µwt = (1−ρµ) logµw+ρµ log µwt−1+εµt +νεµt−1, where µw
is the steady state of µwt , and ε
µ
t is i.i.d.N(0, σ
2
εµ).
11
Prot maximization by the perfetly
ompetitive labor bundlers yields the labor demand funtion
Lj,t =
(
wj,t
wt
)
−µwt /(µ
w
t −1)
Lt , (6.5)
where wt =
(∫ 1
0
w
−1/(µwt −1)
j,t dj
)
−(µwt −1)
is the real wage paid for the homogenous labor
input, and wj,t is the (real) prie of labor type j.
6.2.4 Households
Eah household j maximizes the following lifetime utility funtion proposed by Jaimovih
and Rebelo (2009):
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtχt log
(
Cj,t − bCj,t−1 − ψLηj,tSj,t
)
, (6.6)
where Cj,t and Lj,t denote onsumption and hours worked, respetively. β ∈ (0, 1) is the
disount fator, ψ > 0 is a sale parameter, and b ∈ [0, 1)measures the degree of (internal)
habit formation. χt > 0 is a preferene shok and follows logχt = logχ + ε
χ
t , where χ is
the steady state of χt, and ε
χ
t is i.i.d.N(0, σ
2
εχ). St is a habit-adjusted weighted average
of urrent and past onsumption, whih evolves over time aording to
Sj,t = (Cj,t − bCj,t−1)γS1−γj,t−1 , (6.7)
where γ ∈ (0, 1] governs the wealth elastiity of labor supply and θ = η − 1 is the Frish
elastiity of labor supply in the limiting ase γ = b = 0.
The household's period-by-period budget onstraint (in units of nal goods) is given
by
Cj,t + Ij,t +
Bj,t
Rt
+ vtxj,t +
fE,t
zt
wtNE,j,t + Tt = wj,tLj,t + r
k
tK
s
t
+Bj,t−1 + (1− δ)(vt + dt)
[
xj,t−1 +
(
1− κE
2
(
NE,j,t−1
NE,j,t−2
− 1
)2)
NE,j,t−1
]
. (6.8)
The household purhases the amount Cj,t of nal goods, pays lump-sum taxes Tt, buys
risk-less government bonds Bj,t at a prie 1/Rt, and buys equity of rms operating in the
11
The moving average term allows the wage mark-up shok to apture high frequeny movements in the
wage series, see Smets and Wouters (2007).
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intermediate goods market xj,t at a prie vt. Eah bond pays one unit of the nal good
one period later. Eah unit of equity bought at period t− 1 pays a (real) prot equal to
(1− δ)dt and is worth (1− δ)vt, where δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the exogenous exit rate of rms.
The household invests into new rms NE,j,t. Setting up a new rm (or inventing a
new produt) requires fE,t/zt units of the omposite labor input, where fE,t represents an
entry ost shok that follows the exogenous AR(1) proess log fE,t = (1 − ρfE) log fE +
ρfE log fE,t−1 + ε
fE
t , where fE is the steady state of fE,t, and ε
fE
t is i.i.d.N(0, σ
2
εfE
). Con-
sequently, household j spends fE,t/zt · wtNE,j,t on investment in new rms. We assume
that it takes one period before newly established rms beome operational.
12
During this
period, new rms are hit by the exogenous exit shok δ. In addition, we follow Lewis
(2009) and model an endogenous failure rate that is an inreasing funtion of the hange
in rm entry. The payo in period t from investing in new rms in period t − 1 is thus
given by (1 − δ)(vt + dt)
(
1− κE
2
(
NE,j,t−1
NE,j,t−2
− 1
)2)
NE,j,t−1. The parameter κE serves as
the ounterpart of the investment adjustment ost parameter κI , introdued below, at the
rm entry margin.
Finally, the household invests the amount Ij,t into physial apital Kj,t, whih is as-
sumed to be owned by households. Capital evolves aording to the following law of
motion
Kj,t = (1− δK(uj,t))Kj,t−1 + uIt
[
1− κI
2
(
Ij,t
Ij,t−1
− 1
)2]
Ij,t , (6.9)
where
κI
2
(Ij,t/Ij,t−1 − 1)2 represents investment adjustment osts, and uIt > 0 is an
investment-spei tehnology shok that follows the exogenous AR(1) proess log uIt =
(1−ρI) log uI+ρI log uIt−1+εIt , where uI is the steady state of uIt , and εIt is i.i.d.N(0, σ2εI ).
The household hooses the apital utilization rate uj,t, whih transforms physial apital
into apital servies Ksj,t aording to K
s
j,t = uj,tKj,t−1. We assume that an inreasing
utilization of apital implies a higher depreiation rate δK(uj,t), speied as
δK(uj,t) = δ0 + δ1(uj,t − 1) + δ2
2
(uj,t − 1)2 , (6.10)
where δ0 is the apital depreation rate in a deterministi steady state in whih apital
utilization is set to unity. The elastiity of apital utilization with respet to the rental
rate of apital is given by δ1/δ2. Capital servies K
s
j,t are rented to intermediate goods
rms at a rental rate rkt .
Household j hooses {Cj,t, wj,t, Sj,t, Ij,t, NE,j,t, uj,t, Kj,t, xj,t, Bj,t}∞t=0 taking as given {wt,
rkt , Rt, vt, dt, Lt, Tt, zt, fE,t, u
I
t , χt, µ
w
t }∞t=0 and the initial onditions B−1, K−1, C−1,
I−1, NE−1, S−1 so as to maximize (6.6) subjet to (6.7), (6.8), (6.9), (6.10), and (6.5).
12
Empirially, rm entry lags GDP. See, e.g. Devereux et al. (1996).
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Sine all households will hoose in equilibrium the same wage and quantities, we an now
assume symmetry and drop the index j. Let λCt , λ
C
t Qt, λ
S
t denote Lagrange multipliers
for the budget onstraint, the apital aumulation equation, and the denition of St,
respetively. The rst-order onditions read as follows:
λCt = βRt Et
{
λCt+1
}
, (6.11)
λCt Qt = β Et
{
λCt+1
(
rKt+1ut+1 +Qt+1(1− δK(ut+1))
)}
, (6.12)
λCt vt = (1− δ)β Et
{
λCt+1
(
vt+1 + dt+1
)}
, (6.13)
λCt =
(
χtVt − γλSt
St
Ct − bCt−1
)
− βbEt
{
χt+1Vt+1 − γλSt+1
St+1
Ct+1 − bCt
}
, (6.14)
λSt = χtVtψL
η
t + β(1− γ) Et
{
λSt+1
St+1
St
}
, (6.15)
1 = Qtu
I
t
(
1− κI
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
− κI
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
It
It−1
)
+ β Et
{
λCt+1
λCt
Qt+1u
I
t+1κ
(
It+1
It
− 1
)(
It+1
It
)2}
, (6.16)
wt
zt
fE,t = vt
(
1− κE
2
(
NE,t
NE,t−1
− 1
)2
− κE
(
NE,t
NE,t−1
− 1
)
NE,t
NE,t−1
)
+ β Et
{
λCt+1
λCt
vt+1κE
(
NE,t+1
NE,t
− 1
)(
NE,t+1
NE,t
)2}
, (6.17)
rkt = Qt(δ1 + δ2(ut − 1)) , (6.18)
λCt wt = µ
w
t χtVtψηL
η−1
t St , (6.19)
where Vt = (Ct − bCt−1 − ψLηtSt)−1.
6.2.5 Aggregate aounting and data onsisteny
The aggregate resoure onstraint
Y Ct +
wt
zt
fE,tNE,t = wtLt +Ntdt + r
k
t utKt−1 (6.20)
an be obtained by ombining the aggregate budget onstraint of households (using xt =
Nt) with the government budget onstraint Gt+Bt−1 = Tt+
Bt
Rt
. Government onsumption
Gt is desribed by the exogenous AR(1) proess logGt = (1−ρg) logG+ ρg logGt−1+ εGt ,
where G is the steady state of Gt, and ε
G
t is i.i.d.N(0, σ
2
εG).
The goods market learing ondition requires aggregate output of nal goods Y Ct to
be equal to private and government onsumption plus investment in physial apital, i.e.
Y Ct = Ct + Gt + It. Total investment TIt is the sum of investment in physial apital
and investment in new rms, i.e. TIt = It+
wt
zt
fE,tNE,t. The gross domesti produt Yt is
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equal to Y Ct plus investment in new rms
wt
zt
fE,tNE,t.
The law of motion of the total mass of rms is given by
Nt = (1− δ)Nt−1 + (1− δ)
[
1− κE
2
(
NE,t−1
NE,t−2
− 1
)2]
NE,t−1 . (6.21)
Every period, a fration of inumbent rms exits the market, where the exit rate δ is
assumed to be onstant and exogenous. In ontrast, the exit rate of newly established rms
onsists of the exogenous omponent δ and the endogenous omponent κE
2
(
NE,t−1
NE,t−2
− 1
)2
.
As pointed out by Ghironi and Melitz (2005), empirial measures for the prie index
are loser to the produt prie pt than to the prie index Pt for the following two reasons:
First, these empirial measures do not update their produt spae frequently enough to
fully aount for hanges in the number of available produts. Seond, the onstrution of
these measures is likely not of the funtional form present in the translog model. In order
to obtain data-onsistent real model variables, we thus divide the real model variables by
the relative prie ρt = pt/Pt. Data-onsistent real variables are denoted by a supersript
r.
6.2.6 Two alternative model speiations
The above introdued model framework builds on a translog prodution funtion as in
Feenstra (2003). We denote this model framework as translog model. In the translog
model, the ompetition eet ξ and the variety eet ω, evaluated at the deterministi
steady state, an be expressed in terms of the steady-state prie mark-up: ξ = 1− 1
µp
and
ω = 1
2
(µp − 1).13
In the following, we introdue two alternative model speiations that use a on-
stant elastiity of substitution (CES) prodution funtion for nal goods as in Benassy
(1996) whih is haraterized by onstant prie mark-ups (and therefore does not feature
a ompetition eet, ξ = 0) and that allows to freely parameterize the variety eet.14 In
the rst CES speiation, the variety eet is set equal to the value under the translog
speiation, i.e. ω = 1
2
(µp − 1). We denote this the CES-TrVE model. In the seond
CES speiation, the variety eet is set equal to zero, i.e. ω = 0. We denote this the
CES-NoVE model. Table 6.1 summarizes the ompetition and the variety eet in all
three model variants, in eah ase evaluated at the deterministi steady state. In all other
respets, the models are idential.
In the following, we estimate the ompetition and the variety eet. To this end,
we log-linearize the translog model around its deterministi steady state and bring the
13
Reall that, in the steady state of the translog model, ξ = 11+σ˜N , ω =
1
2σ˜N , and the prie mark-up is
given by µp = 1 + 1
σ˜N
.
14
See appendix 6.A for the model equations and derivations of the nal goods prodution setor under the
CES speiations.
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Table 6.1: Charateristis of model variants
Model
Competition eet Variety eet
ξ = −∂µp/µp
∂N/N
ω = ∂ρ/ρ
∂N/N
Translog ξ = 1− 1
µp
ω = 1
2
(µp − 1)
CES-TrVE ξ = 0 ω = 1
2
(µp − 1)
CES-NoVE ξ = 0 ω = 0
linearized model to the data.
15
The two (log-linearized) CES model variants will later
enable us to quantify the importane of the ompetition and the variety eet in amplify-
ing business yle utuations and to disentangle ompetition and variety eet with the
help of ounterfatual simulations.
6.3 Inspeting the ampliation mehanism in a sim-
plied model
Before moving to the estimation of our model and the quantiation of the ompetition
and the variety eet in terms of amplifying business yle utuations, it is instrutive
to examine the analytis and the intuition of the ampliation mehanism in our model.
To this end, we onsider a simplied version of our baseline model whih allows us to
provide analytial results. For illustration purposes, we limit our analytial analysis to
labor produtivity shoks. All remaining shoks are swithed o, i.e., χt = fE,t = u
I
t = 1,
Gt = 0, µ
w
t = µ
w
.
The simplied model assumes instantaneous entry, full depreiation of rms eah pe-
riod (δ = 1) and the absene of entry adjustment osts (κE = 0). This implies that the
number of entrants is idential to the number of rms, NE,t = Nt, and that the value
of a rm equals rm's prots, vt = dt. We abstrat from apital, apital investment
and a varying degree of apital utilization. Setting α = 1, the aggregate prodution of
intermediate goods simplies to Ntyt = ztL
c
t . Inserting the demand funtion for a single
variety yt = (ρtNt)
−1Y ct , yields the aggregate prodution funtion Y
c
t = ztρtL
c
t . If we
further abstrat from government spending (Gt = 0), aggregate demand Y
c
t oinides
with private onsumption, Y ct = Ct. The aggregate resoure onstraint then simplies
to Ct = wtLt, where we have used the free entry ondition wt/zt = vt together with
vt = dt and Nt = NE,t. GDP is the sum of labor and prot inome, Yt = wtLt + dtNt.
The simplied model further assumes no habit formation in onsumption (b = 0) and the
limiting ase of GHH preferenes, γ = 0, whih implies a labor supply equation of the
form wt = µ
wψηLη−1t . We proeed by log-linearizing the equilibrium onditions of the
simplied model. A hatted variable denotes perentage deviations from the steady state.
15
The log-linearized model equations are summarized in appendix 6.A.
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Table 6.2: Linearized model equations in simplied model variant
wˆt = (η − 1)Lˆt Labor supply
wˆt = zˆt + ρˆt − µˆt Labor demand
µˆpt = −ξNˆt Competition eet
ρˆt = ωNˆt Variety eet
Cˆt = wˆt + Lˆt Aggregate resoure onstraint
dˆt = wˆt − zˆt Aggregate free entry ondition
dˆt + Nˆt =
1
µp−1
µˆpt + Cˆt Aggregate prots
Yˆt =
µp
2µp−1
(
wˆt + Lˆt
)
+ µ
p
−1
2µp−1
(dˆt + Nˆt) GDP
Table 6.2 summarizes the model equations that jointly determine Cˆt, Yˆt, wˆt, Lˆt, Nˆt, ρˆt,
µˆpt , and dˆt, given zˆt.
We now provide an analysis of the eets the ompetition and the variety on the
dynamis of employment, onsumption and output after a rise in labor produtivity zˆt.
Combining labor supply with labor demand to substitute out the real wage, replaing
µˆpt from the denition of the ompetition eet and ρˆt from the denition of the variety
eets yields the following equation for aggregate employment:
Lˆt =
1
η − 1 (ξ + ω) Nˆt +
1
η − 1 zˆt . (6.22)
For a given z and sine η > 1, a rise in the number of rms shifts up the labor demand
shedule and raises aggregate employment if the ompetition eet and/or the variety
eet are present (ξ > 0 and/or ω > 0).
By inserting labor supply into the aggregate resoure onstraint and by replaing
employment Lˆt with equation (6.22), we obtain onsumption as a funtion of the numbers
of the rms and shoks to produtivity: Cˆt = (ξ + ω) η/(η − 1)Nˆt + η/(η − 1)zˆt. The
data-onsistent ounterpart Cˆrt = Cˆt − ρˆt is given by
Cˆrt =
1
η − 1 (ξ + ηω) Nˆt +
η
η − 1 zˆt . (6.23)
Combining the denition of GDP with the aggregate resoure onstraint and the equa-
tion for aggregate prots, replaing µˆpt from the denition of the ompetition eet, and
inserting the equation for Cˆt from above yields Yˆt = ωη/(η−1)Nˆt+(2η(µp−1)+1)/((η−
1)(2µp − 1))ξNˆt + η/(η − 1)zˆt, or in data-onsistent terms
Yˆ rt =
1
η − 1 · ω · Nˆt +
2η(µp − 1) + 1
(η − 1)(2µp − 1) · ξ · Nˆt +
η
η − 1 zˆt , (6.24)
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where (2η(µp − 1) + 1)/((η − 1)(2µp − 1)) > 0 sine µp ≥ 1.
The ampliation mehanism is evident from equations (6.22), (6.23), and (6.24). To
see this, onsider a positive innovation to labor produtivity, i.e. zˆt > 0, and suppose
that the number of rms inreases after a rise in produtivity, i.e. ∂Nˆt/∂zˆt > 0. If
this happens, the eets of a rise in labor produtivity on employment, onsumption and
output are amplied in the presene of the ompetition and/or the variety eet, i.e. if
ξ > 0 and/or ω > 0. The stronger the ompetition and/or the variety eet, the more does
eonomi ativity rise after a positive innovation to produtivity. The rationale is that
in the presene of the variety eet, an inrease in the number of rms inreases output
more than proportional due to inreasing returns to speialization. In the presene of the
ompetition eet, an inrease in the number of produers erodes market power. Prie
mark-ups fall whih in turn boosts aggregate demand.
Notie, though, that the response of the number of rms to a labor produtivity
shok is ambiguous. If the number of rms drops, the eets of the produtivity shok
are dampened. Whether the number of rms rises or drops in response to a tehnology
improvement is obviously an empirial question that we will address in the next setion
using our estimated baseline model. Moreover, our estimates will reveal whether ξ and
ω are signiantly dierent from zero and will allow us to quantify the strength of the
ompetition and the variety eet in amplifying or attenuating shoks to the eonomy.
6.4 Data and estimation proedure
This setion desribes the data set and the estimation proedure we use to estimate the
translog model. Following An and Shorfheide (2007) and Smets and Wouters (2007), we
estimate a subset of the model parameters using Bayesian tehniques. For the estimation,
we use seven time series of U.S. quarterly data: the growth rates of real per apita GDP,
onsumption, and investment, the logarithm of per apita hours worked, the growth rates
of two measures of real wages, and the growth rate of per apita new rms.
As empirial measure for rm entry, we use the data series of new business inorpora-
tions (NBI) from the Survey of Current Businesses published by the Bureau of Eonomi
Analysis.
16
We dene onsumption as onsumption expenditures on non-durables and
servies and investment as the sum of onsumption expenditures on durables, xed pri-
vate investments, and hanges in private inventories. Following Justiniano et al. (2013)
and Galí et al. (2012), we use two empirial wage measures: hourly ompensation in the
non-farm business setor and average hourly earnings of prodution and non-supervisory
16
Alternatively, one an use the data series net business formation (NBF) published in the same survey as
measure for net rm entry. We deided to use the NBI measure for two reasons: First, data on NBF is
only available until 1995:Q3, whereas NBI is published until 1998:Q3. Seond, we do not model rm exit
endogenously. We, therefore, believe that NBI is a loser measure for rm entry than NBF for net rm
entry.
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employees. Both measures are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistis. A full de-
sription of the data soures and the onstrution of the data series an be found in
appendix 6.B. The data sample starts in 1964:Q1 and ends in 2012:Q2. Due to limited
data availability, the new rm series ends in 1998:Q3.
17
The measurement equations for GDP, onsumption, investment, hours worked, and
entry then read as follows:
18

dl(GDPt)
dl(CONSt)
dl(INVt)
l(HOURSt)
dl(ENTRYt)
 =

∆Yˆ rt
∆Cˆrt
∆Tˆ I
r
t
Lˆt
∆NˆE,t
× 100
The funtions l and dl stand for 100 times the demeaned logarithm and the demeaned
log-dierene, respetively. A hat denotes log-deviations from the steady state and ∆ is
the time-dierene operator.
To inlude the information of both wage measures, we set up the following measure-
ment equation: (
dlWAGE1t
dlWAGE2t
)
=
(
1
λ
)
∆wˆrt +
(
εw1,met
εw2,met
)
,
where λ denotes the loading oeient for the seond wage series. Sine both loadings are
not separately identied, we set the rst loading oeient to unity. εw1,met and ε
w2,me
t are
two measurement errors, whih are i.i.d.N(0, σ2εw1,me) and i.i.d.N(0, σ
2
εw2,me), respetively.
∆wˆrt an be interpreted as latent fator, whih aptures the ommon movement in both
wage series. The two error terms apture the idiosynrati utuations in the wage series.
19
The appliation of seven data series requires at least seven exogenous disturbanes. In
total, the model is governed by eight disturbanes, inluding innovations to government
onsumption εgt , to labor produtivity ε
z
t , to investment-spei tehnology ε
I
t , to entry
osts εfEt , to preferenes ε
χ
t , and to the wage mark-up ε
µw
t , plus the two measurement
errors εw1,met and ε
w2,me
t .
A subset of parameters is alibrated as summarized in table 6.3. The disount rate β
is set to 0.99, implying an annual steady-state interest rate of approximately 4 perent.
17
Note that the missing observations of the new rm series are treated as an unobserved state during the
Kalman lter routine. We show in a robustness exerise in setion 6.7 that our estimation results do not
hange substantially if we limit our data sample to 1998:Q3.
18
Note that we use the data-onsistent measures of real variables to map the data with the model, see also
setion 6.2.5.
19
The onept to apture the ommon movement of multiple time series in a few latent variables originally
omes from the fator analysis. For a general disussion of estimating DSGE models in a date-rih
environment, see Boivin and Giannoni (2006).
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Table 6.3: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Denition
β 0.99 Disount fator
δ0 0.025 Steady-state apital depreiation rate
δ 0.025 Steady-state rm exit rate
u 1 Steady-state apaity utilization rate
µw 1.2 Steady-state wage mark-up
G/Y 0.18 Steady-state ratio of government onsumption to GDP
L 0.25 Steady-state of hours worked
N˜ 109 Potential mass of rms
The steady-state value for the utilization rate u is set to unity, implying the steady-state
value of the depreiation rate δK to be equal to δ0. For the latter, we hoose a standard
value of 0.025. Following Chugh and Ghironi (2012), the potential mass of rms in the
eonomy N˜ is assumed to be 109. The exogenous rm exit rate δ is set to 0.025, as
in Bilbiie et al. (2012). The steady-state values G/Y and L are set to 0.18 and 0.25,
respetively. Following Galí et al. (2012), we set the steady-state wage mark-up µw at 20
perent.
The remaining parameters are estimated. Table 6.4 summarizes the prior distribu-
tions. Our hoie of distributions is in line with the literature and mainly results from
dierent distributional supports. The probability mass of the inverse gamma distribution
is distributed over the interval (0,∞), the gamma distribution over the interval [0,∞),
the beta distribution over the interval [0, 1], and the normal distribution over the interval
(−∞,∞).
The standard deviation of the innovations are assumed to follow an inverse gamma
distribution with mean 0.02 and standard deviation 1. For the autoorrelation parameters
of the exogenous shok proesses, we hoose a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and stan-
dard deviation 0.2. The moving average oeient of the wage mark-up shok is assumed
to follow a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation 0.2.
The prior distributions for the strutural parameters related to rm entry are given as
follows. For the steady-state prie mark-up µp, we use a trunated gamma distribution,
where we only allow for values greater than 1.01. It has mean 1.3 and standard deviation
0.2. The 90 perent probability interval of this distribution then ranges from 1.04 to 1.68.
For the entry adjustment ost parameter κE, we use the same prior distribution as for
the investment adjustment ost parameter, i.e. a gamma distribution with mean 4.0 and
standard deviation 1.0. For the prior distribution of the remaining strutural parameters,
we broadly follow the existing literature.
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6.5 Estimation results
In this setion, we rst present the parameter estimates. Next, we disuss the model's
preditions regarding volatility, autoorrelations, and ross-orrelations of the time series
inluded as observables. Then we disuss the ontribution of eah of the strutural shoks
to the foreast error variane of the endogenous variables at business yle frequeny.
Finally, we analyze the model-implied impulse responses to the strutural shoks.
6.5.1 Parameter estimates
Table 6.4 displays the estimated parameters as means of the posterior distribution and
the 90 perent probability intervals obtained by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
To start with, we fous on the parameters related to the entry mehanism. The gross
prie mark-up µp is estimated to be signiantly dierent from one. The point estimate
implies a steady-state mark-up of 26 perent with a probability band ranging from 16
perent to 36 perent. The point estimate of µp is lose to the value of 1.22 reported
in Lewis and Stevens (2015). However, it is signiantly smaller than the value of 1.66
reported in Lewis and Poilly (2012). Regarding the ompetition and the variety eet,
the point estimate of µp implies that a one perent inrease in the mass of rms lowers
the prie mark-up by 0.21 perent (the ompetition eet ξ) and raises the relative prie
by 0.13 perent (the variety eet ω). Competition and variety eet are statistially
signiantly dierent from zero with ondene bands for ξ and ω ranging from 1.14 to
1.26 and 0.08 to 0.18, respetively.
Entry adjustment osts κE are estimated to be 1.5 with a probability interval ranging
from 1.09 to 1.99. This is signiantly lower than the 3.82 point estimate for the invest-
ment adjustment ost parameter κI . As disussed below, the model overestimates both
the volatility of rm entry and its rst-order autoorrelation. Higher entry adjustment
osts would help to bring the model loser to the empirial standard deviation of rm
entry but only at the ost of an even higher autoorrelation.
Turning to the other strutural parameters, θ, whih determines the labor supply
elastiity, is estimated at 3.64 with a relatively wide probability interval ranging from
1.92 to 5.80. The point estimate of the wealth elastiity of labor supply γ is 0.79 with a
probability interval ranging from 0.63 to 0.93, implying that preferenes are lose to those
in King et al. (1988). This is in ontrast to the results of Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012),
who estimate a near-zero wealth elastiity of labor supply in a theoretial environment
that abstrats from endogenous rm entry and in whih shoks feature an antiipated
omponent. The labor share in prodution α is estimated at 0.85 with a probability
interval ranging from 0.81 to 0.90. Notie that this estimate is not omparable to the
estimates of standard DSGE models without rm entry sine in our model, in whih
labor is utilized in the manufaturing setor and in the reation of new produts, α is not
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Table 6.4: Results from the Bayesian estimation inluding prior distribution and proba-
bility intervals
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Parameter Type Mean Std Mean [ 5% , 95% ℄
Strutural parameters
Labor share in prodution α Beta 0.7 0.2 0.85 [ 0.81 , 0.90 ℄
Labor utility θ Gamma 2.0 1.0 3.64 [ 1.92 , 5.80 ℄
Wealth elast. labor supply γ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.79 [ 0.63 , 0.93 ℄
Consumption habit b Beta 0.5 0.2 0.76 [ 0.71 , 0.80 ℄
Investment adj. ost κI Gamma 4.0 1.0 3.82 [ 2.59 , 5.28 ℄
Inv. elast. of apital util.
δ2
δ1
Igamma 1.0 1.0 0.55 [ 0.33 , 0.89 ℄
Prie mark-up µp Gamma 1.3 0.2 1.26 [ 1.16 , 1.36 ℄
Entry adj. ost κE Gamma 4.0 1.0 1.50 [ 1.09 , 1.99 ℄
Autoorrelation of shok proesses
Labor produtivity ρz Beta 0.5 0.2 0.96 [ 0.94 , 0.98 ℄
Wage mark-up ρµ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.97 [ 0.95 , 0.98 ℄
Invest. spe. teh. ρI Beta 0.5 0.2 0.24 [ 0.12 , 0.38 ℄
Gov. spending ρG Beta 0.5 0.2 0.92 [ 0.88 , 0.94 ℄
Entry ost ρfE Beta 0.5 0.2 0.95 [ 0.91 , 0.98 ℄
Standard deviation of innovations
Labor prod. σεz Igamma 2.0 1 0.80 [ 0.70 , 0.90 ℄
Wage mark-up σεµ Igamma 2.0 1 4.30 [ 3.00 , 5.95 ℄
Invest. spe. teh. σεI Igamma 2.0 1 3.99 [ 2.39 , 6.54 ℄
Preferene σεχ Igamma 2.0 1 1.46 [ 1.07 , 1.91 ℄
Gov. spending σεG Igamma 2.0 1 1.87 [ 1.71 , 2.03 ℄
Entry ost σεfE Igamma 2.0 1 2.43 [ 1.96 , 2.97 ℄
Moving average parameter and loading oeient
Wage mark-up shok ν Normal 0.0 0.2 0.41 [ 0.26 , 0.56 ℄
Loading oeient λ Normal 1.0 2.0 0.13 [ 0.06 , 0.19 ℄
Note: Using a Random Walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm, we generate 2 hains of 2 Mio. parameter draws eah.
For eah hain, we disard the rst 1 Mio. draws and use the remaining draws to ompute the posterior mean and
perentiles.
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equal to the labor share in GDP. For the latter, our point estimate implies a standard
value of 72 perent.
Regarding the exogenous shok proesses, we nd that shoks to labor produtivity,
to wage mark-ups, to government spending, and to entry osts are estimated to be highly
persistent with AR(1) oeients all above 0.9. In ontrast, the persistene parameter
of the investment-spei tehnology shok is relatively low with a value of 0.24, imply-
ing that the investment-spei tehnology shok explains less foreast-error variane at
higher foreast-horizons.
In the following, we ompute the model's preditions about the seond moments,
variane deomposition, impulse responses, and ampliation measures at the posterior
mean reported in table 6.4. To ompute the orresponding probability bands, we use
the last 50,000 parameter draws of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm and ompute the
respetive moments for eah draw.
6.5.2 Seond moments and variane deomposition
In order to assess the performane of the model in tting the data, we ompare the model-
implied seond moments to the orresponding empirial moments of the data. Table 6.5
reports standard deviations, relative standard deviations, rst-order autoorrelations, and
ontemporaneous orrelations with the growth rate of GDP. The model-implied moments
are derived from simulated data, where the measurement errors are turned o during the
simulation.
The empirial moments of GDP, onsumption, total investment, and hours worked
are mathed quite well. Conerning rm entry growth, the estimated model aptures the
observed proyliality of rm entry. However, the model overstates its volatility and its
serial orrelation. This is attributable to the fat that we model an endogenous failure rate
of rms as an inreasing funtion of the hange in rm entry. This mehanism is introdued
to dampen the volatility of rm entry. However, it also generates substantial persistene
in rm entry. As mentioned above, this trade-o between volatility and autoorrelation
explains the small point estimate of the entry adjustment ost parameter κE , ompared
to the apital adjustment ost parameter κI .
20
Table 6.6 shows the mean foreast-error variane deomposition of GDP, onsumption,
total investment, hours worked, wages, and rm entry at business yle frequenies ranging
from 6 to 32 quarters. Most variations are explained by labor produtivity and wage
mark-up shoks. Together they aount for more than 75 perent of the variations in
GDP, onsumption, total investment, hours worked, and wages. The investment-spei
tehnology shok explains 21 perent of the variations in total investment. The rm entry
20
A re-estimated model using an AR(2) proess for the entry ost shok performs better in tting the
persistene of rm entry growth. However, the overestimation of the entry growth volatility is even
stronger under this speiation.
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Table 6.5: Seond moments
Std (σX ) 1st-order autoorr.
Model Model
X Data Mean [ 5% , 95% ℄ Data Mean [ 5% , 95% ℄
GDP growth ∆Yˆ r 0.86 0.85 [ 0.80 , 0.89 ℄ 0.31 0.31 [ 0.27 , 0.37 ℄
Consumption growth ∆Cˆr 0.55 0.59 [ 0.54 , 0.63 ℄ 0.42 0.39 [ 0.32 , 0.46 ℄
Investment growth ∆T̂ I
r
3.27 3.43 [ 3.11 , 3.56 ℄ 0.31 0.26 [ 0.21 , 0.35 ℄
Hours worked Lˆ 5.05 4.16 [ 3.40 , 5.59 ℄ 0.98 0.98 [ 0.97 , 0.99 ℄
Wage growth (1st series)
∆wˆr
0.61
0.69 [ 0.64 , 0.75 ℄
0.06
0.11 [ 0.07 , 0.15 ℄
Wage growth (2nd series) 0.36 0.56
Firm Entry growth ∆NˆE 3.10 4.30 [ 3.84 , 4.85 ℄ -0.02 0.53 [ 0.47 , 0.60 ℄
Rel. std. (σX/σ∆Yˆ r ) Contemp. corr(X,∆Yˆ
r)
Model Model
X Data Mean [ 5% , 95% ℄ Data Mean [ 5% , 95% ℄
Consumption growth ∆Cˆr 0.63 0.69 [ 0.64 , 0.75 ℄ 0.59 0.53 [ 0.49 , 0.61 ℄
Investment growth ∆T̂ I
r
3.80 4.01 [ 3.73 , 4.15 ℄ 0.86 0.84 [ 0.81 , 0.86 ℄
Hours worked Lˆ 5.87 4.87 [ 4.04 , 6.57 ℄ 0.14 0.11 [ 0.08 , 0.13 ℄
Wage growth (1st series)
∆wˆr
0.71
0.82 [ 0.76 , 0.89 ℄
0.03
0.51 [ 0.44 , 0.56 ℄
Wage growth (2nd series) 0.42 0.31
Firm Entry growth ∆NˆE 3.43 5.03 [ 4.53 , 5.82 ℄ 0.20 0.27 [ 0.23 , 0.38 ℄
Note: Mean values are omputed by simulating the model at the posterior mean reported in table 6.4. To ompute the
orresponding perentiles, we only use the last 50,000 parameter draws (25,000 of eah hain). For eah parameter draw, we
simulate the model and ompute the seond moments.
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Table 6.6: Variane deomposition at business yle frequeny
Labor Wage Invest. spe. Preferene Government Entry
produtivity mark-up tehnology spending ost
GDP Y r
31.4 62.8 4.7 0.1 0.6 0.4
[ 23.7 , 40.2℄ [ 53.6 , 71.3℄ [ 2.7 , 6.8℄ [ 0.0 , 0.1℄ [ 0.4 , 0.8 ℄ [ 0.2 , 1.0 ℄
Consumption Cr
28.5 60.4 2.8 1.8 2.4 4.1
[ 19.0 , 40.7 ℄ [ 47.3 , 72.5 ℄ [ 1.3 , 4.5 ℄ [ 1.0 , 2.7 ℄ [ 1.2 , 4.5 ℄ [ 1.5 , 6.3℄
Total invest. TIr
25.9 48.6 15.6 0.6 1.5 7.8
[ 20.6 , 32.7 ℄ [ 42.3 , 56.4 ℄ [ 10.2 , 20.8 ℄ [ 0.4 , 1.0 ℄ [ 1.0 , 2.1 ℄ [ 3.9 , 12.2℄
Hours L
0.5 97.4 0.7 0.0 0.3 1.0
[ 0.3 , 0.8 ℄ [ 95.3 , 98.6 ℄ [ 0.4 , 1.2 ℄ [ 0.0 , 0.0 ℄ [ 0.2 , 0.7 ℄ [ 0.4 , 2.2℄
Wages wr
88.1 2.1 2.3 0.2 0.2 7.2
[ 83.4 , 92.4 ℄ [ 1.4 , 3.2 ℄ [ 1.0 , 3.9 ℄ [ 0.1 , 0.3 ℄ [ 0.1 , 0.2 ℄ [ 3.8 , 11.2℄
Firm Entry NE
10.4 18.9 4.9 0.4 0.6 64.9
[ 7.5 , 14.4 ℄ [ 13.6 , 25.9 ℄ [ 2.6 , 7.5 ℄ [ 0.2 , 0.7 ℄ [ 0.3 , 0.9 ℄ [ 54.1 , 74.1℄
Note: Main gures are omputed at the posterior mean reported in table 6.4. Figures in brakets give the orresponding
fth and ninety fth perentiles. To ompute these perentiles, we use the last 50,000 parameter draws (25,000 of eah
hain). For eah parameter draw, we simulate the model and ompute the variane deomposition. To obtain the variane
deompositions at business yle frequeny, we ompute variane deomposition for the foreast horizons 6 to 32 and take
the mean. Shares may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
ost shok aounts for most variations in rm entry. The government spending and the
preferene shok are only of minor importane for the variables under onsideration.
The importane of wage mark-up and labor produtivity shoks in driving business
yle utuations is onsistent with the ndings in Smets and Wouters (2007) but stands in
ontrast to Justiniano et al. (2010), who nd that most of the variations in GDP is due to
shoks to investment-spei tehnology. The disrepany between Smets and Wouters
(2007) and Justiniano et al. (2010) stems from dierent denitions of investment and
onsumption. The latter dene purhases of onsumer durables and hanges in inventories
as part of investment, whereas the former dene purhases of onsumer durables as part
of onsumption and exlude hanges in inventories from investment. Interestingly, we
nd that investment-spei tehnology shoks are minor ontributors to business yle
utuations although we adopt the same denition of onsumption and investment as
Justiniano et al. (2010).
21
We argue that the dierene in the importane of the investment-spei tehnology
shok is (at least partly) due to the endogenous rm entry mehanism whih is absent in
the above mentioned papers. In our framework, shoks to the eieny with whih nal
goods an be transformed into physial apital  in ontrast to wage mark-up and labor
produtivity shoks  are not able to repliate the positive omovement between rm
entry and other key variables in the data. On the ontrary, an expansionary investment-
21
We also re-estimate the model using data on onsumption and investment as dened in Smets and
Wouters (2007). In line with Justiniano et al. (2010), we nd that the importane of the investment-
spei tehnology shok in fat beomes smaller under this speiation, explaining only 1.5 perent of
the variations in GDP. Details on the estimation are available upon request.
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spei tehnology shok indues a drop in investments into new rms, as disussed below.
This explains why the investment-spei tehnology shok is estimated to be of minor
importane.
22
6.5.3 Impulse responses
In this setion, we analyze the model-implied impulse responses to the various strutural
shoks. The aim of this setion is to illustrate the ampliationmehanism and to visualize
the impat of the ompetition and the variety eet on the model dynamis. To this end,
we present the impulse responses for three models, the estimated translog model and two
ounterfatuals: the CES-TrVE model with the ompetition eet swithed o and the
CES-NoVE model with ompetition and variety eet swithed o. For both CES models,
we keep the parameter estimates from the translog model.
Figure 6.1 to 6.6 show the impulse responses of GDP, onsumption, total investment,
entry osts, the prie mark-up, rm entry, prots per rm, average output of an individual
rm, real wages, and the real interest rate to the six strutural shoks. All real variables
are shown using the data-onsistent deator pt. Impulse responses are measured as per-
entage deviations from steady states. The shaded areas are the 90 perent probability
bands whih reet parameter unertainty in the translog model.
To start with, gure 6.1 plots the responses to a positive labor-augmenting tehnology
shok zt. This boosts GDP, onsumption, as well as both omponents of total investment,
investment in physial apital (not shown here) and in rm entry. Firm entry is fueled by
rising prot opportunities of monopolisti rms due to the inrease in aggregate demand as
well as by the drop in entry osts. The latter dereases sine the inrease in zt outweighs
the rise in real wages. Hene, the mass of rms (or produts) starts to inrease. In
the presene of the ompetition eet, this makes produts loser substitutes and thus
deteriorates market power in the monopolisti setor. This leads to a derease in prie
mark-ups, whih boosts aggregate demand and indues individual rms to inrease their
prodution. The inrease in aggregate demand is enfored by the drop in the welfare-
relevant prie index if the variety eet is present.
The magniation eet is evident in the impulse response funtions. The ompetition
eet and to a muh lesser extent the variety eet magnify the eets of produtivity
shoks on GDP and, in partiular, on onsumption. Total investment, however, is damp-
ened. Sine investment in physial apital is also amplied, this an only be explained
by a dampening of rm entry. The latter is aused by the rise in entry osts over the
medium run due to rising real wages and by the fall in prie mark-ups, whih, in isolation,
22
To further explore this argument, we re-estimate a version of our model in whih rm entry is swithed
o (we ahieve this by xing the parameter governing the rm entry adjustment osts at κE = 1000 and
exlude rm entry data from our set of observables). In fat, we nd that this leads to an inrease in the
importane of investment-spei tehnology shoks, explaining 9.3 perent of the variations in GDP.
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Figure 6.1: Impulse responses to a labor produtivity shok
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deteriorates prot opportunities of monopolisti rms. Note that the probability band
does not give impliations about the signiane of the ampliation mehanism. If the
ounterfatual CES responses lie inside the probability region, this does not imply that
the ampliation mehanism is insigniant. In order to give impliations about the sig-
niane of the ampliation mehanism, one needs to take into aount the parameter
unertainty in all three model frameworks. This is done in the setion 6.6.
Figure 6.2 shows the responses to an inrease in wage mark-ups µwt . The inrease
in wage mark-ups leads to a deline of GDP, onsumption, and total investment. The
drop in GDP and onsumption is amplied when the ompetition and the variety eet
are at work. The reason is that rm entry is depressed by the inrease in entry osts
and the drop in rm prots triggered by the initial inrease in real wages. Sine the
mass of rms delines, the produt spae beomes less rowded and the elastiity of
substitution delines. Consequently, the prie mark-up rises, whih auses aggregate
demand and individual rm's prodution to fall. In addition to the ompetition eet,
the rise in the welfare-relevant prie index (the variety eet) puts downward pressure on
aggregate demand, although this eet seems to be quantitatively small. As in the ase of
labor produtivity shoks, there is a dampening of the response of total investment when
ompetition and variety eet are present.
To sum up, it is mainly the ompetition eet that amplies, via ounterylial prie
mark-ups, the impat of labor-augmenting tehnology and wage mark-up shoks on GDP
and onsumption. However, ounterylial prie mark-ups dampen the responses of rm
entry, whih translates into a dampening of total investment.
The results are dierent when we onsider shoks to investment-spei tehnology,
to preferenes, and to government spending. The reason is that the estimated onditional
orrelation between GDP and rm entry (or the number of rms) is negative for those
shoks. Hene, ompetition and variety eet dampen the rise in GDP following positive
shoks to investment-spei tehnology, preferenes, and government spending.
Figure 6.3 shows the responses to the investment-spei tehnology shok uIt . The
inrease in the eieny with whih nal goods an be transformed into physial apital
produes a boom in apital investment and a hike in GDP. Consumption falls on impat
but turns positive during the ourse of adjustment. Real wages and thus entry osts
inrease. The value of a rm vt dereases due to the inrease in the real interest rate,
whih outweighs the inrease in individual rm's prots. Consequently, rm entry falls
induing an inreases in prie mark-ups. The proylial response of rm's market power
abates the impats of investment-spei tehnology shoks on GDP and onsumption.
The response of total investment is almost idential aross the models.
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show the responses to a preferene shok χt that indues households
to onsume more and to a rise in government spending Gt, respetively. Both shoks raise
aggregate demand and the real interest rate. The latter lowers rm values, whih indues,
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Figure 6.2: Impulse responses to a wage mark-up shok
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Figure 6.3: Impulse responses to an investment-spei tehnology shok
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Figure 6.4: Impulse responses to a preferene shok
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in onjuntion with the rise in entry osts, a deline in rm entry. Consequently, under
translog preferenes prie mark-ups and the welfare-relevant prie index rise, whih both
dampens the impats of these aggregate demand disturbanes on GDP.
Following a time-impatiene shok, the responses of GDP, investment, and onsump-
tion are, however, not very dierent aross the models. This is beause the mark-up is
only marginally aeted by this type of shok. In ontrast, the ompetition and the vari-
ety eet visibly amplify the rowding-out of private onsumption after a sal expansion,
as an be seen from gure 6.5. Private onsumption falls due to the negative wealth eet
of higher taxes and the rise in real interest rates. Investment is again only marginally
aeted by these mehanisms.
Finally, gure 6.6 shows that an exogenous inrease in entry osts fE,t generates a
strong deline in rm entry. Households that invest less in new rms raise onsumption
and apital investment, at least on impat. The derease in the number of produts leads
to an inrease in the market power of rms when the ompetition eet is present. The
inrease in prie mark-ups indues a fall in apital investment and onsumption (in the
medium run). GDP, after a temporary rise on impat, delines substantially. In the
absene of the ompetition eet, the deline in GDP is only short-lived and followed by
a hump-shaped rise. This an be explained by the signiant inrease of onsumption,
whih is otherwise depressed by the sharp inrease in prie mark-ups. As in the ase of
shoks to investment-spei tehnology, to preferenes, and to government spending, the
inrease in rm's market power lowers GDP. In the ase of these disturbanes the inrease
in GDP is dampened. In the ase of entry ost shoks, though, the ompetition eet
hanges the GDP response qualitatively.
Overall, the presene of the ompetition and the variety eet substantially amplify
(dampen) the impat of labor produtivity and wage mark-up (investment-spei teh-
nology) shoks on GDP and onsumption. In the ase of shoks to government spending
and preferenes, the impat of these mehanisms is only marginal. Inspeting the impulse
responses suggests also marginal eets for total investment. In the ase of labor produ-
tivity and wage mark-up shoks, the responses of total investment are slightly dampened.
For the other disturbanes, the impats are negligible. The next setion aims to quantify
the ampliation mehanism by omparing simulated volatilities aross the three model
frameworks.
6.6 Quantifying the internal ampliation mehanisms
In this setion, we quantify the ampliation mehanism embedded in the entry model and
assess the ontribution of the ompetition and the variety eet. Following Jaimovih and
Floetotto (2008), we onsider overall and shok-spei ampliation measures, inluding
shoks to labor produtivity, to wage mark-ups, to investment-spei tehnology, to
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Figure 6.5: Impulse responses to a government spending shok
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Figure 6.6: Impulse responses to an entry ost shok
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preferenes, and to government spending. Reall from the previous setion that shoks
to entry osts generate qualitative dierent responses aross the models. We therefore
exlude this shok from our ampliation analysis. Inluding this shok would only slightly
hange the overall ampliation results.
In order to quantify the ampliation mehanism, we proeed in two steps. In the
rst step, we simulate the three model frameworks (translog model, CES-TrVE model,
CES-NoVE model) and ompute shok-spei and overall volatility measures. As in
the analysis of the impulse responses, we keep the parameter estimates from the translog
model when simulating the CES models.
23
Based on the simulated volatility measures, we
ompute, in the seond step, three ampliation metris. The total ampliation through
both the ompetition and the variety eet are measured as the volatility dierene, in
perentage terms, between the translog model and the CES-NoVE model. The ontribu-
tion of the ompetition eet (CE) is measured by the volatility dierene, in perentage
terms, between the translog model and the CES-TrVE model. Analogously, the ontri-
bution of the variety eet (VE) is omputed as the volatility dierene, in perentage
terms, between the CES-TrVE model and the CES-NoVE model. Note that the ontri-
butions of the ompetition and of the variety eet do not neessarily add up to the total
ampliation sine they are omputed on dierent bases. Table 6.7 shows our results.
The volatility and ampliation measures are omputed at the posterior mean reported
in table 6.4. Numbers in brakets give the orresponding fth and ninety fth perentiles.
To start with, we fous on GDP. The results are displayed in the upper panel of table
6.7. The shok-spei and overall volatility measures are shown in olumns one to three.
Shok-spei volatilities are obtained by assuming that at eah time only one of the
above mentioned shoks is ative. We then ompute, for all three model frameworks and
for all ve shoks under onsideration, the standard deviation of GDP relative to the
standard deviation of the underlying shok proess.
24
The overall volatility is measured
by the absolute standard deviations of GDP when all ve onsidered strutural shoks are
ative. Columns four to six show the ampliation ratios measured in perentage points.
The last olumn reports the ontemporaneous orrelation between the number of rms
and GDP.
When all ve shoks are ative, the volatility of GDP under translog preferenes
is substantially higher than under the two CES models. In total, GDP is amplied
by 8.5 perent with a 90 perent probability band ranging from 6.1 to 10.1 perent.
The ompetition eet aounts for most ampliation aross all shoks. Overall, the
ompetition eet inreases the volatility of GDP by 6.8 perent with a probability band
ranging from 4.5 to 8.4 perent. The inrease through the variety eet, on the other hand,
23
This ensures that we extrat the model-spei ampliation eet that exlusively results from the
dierent model setups. In a robustness exerise in setion 6.7, we estimate both CES models separately
and obtain similar ampliation results using the estimated CES models.
24
As in the previous setion, GDP is deated by the relative prie ρt.
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Table 6.7: Standard deviations, relative volatilities and ampliation indiators
Volatility Ampliation Corr
Translog CES-TrVE CES-NoVE Total CE VE (X,N)
Std of GDP relative to . . . shok X = Y r
labor prod.
1.0006 0.9332 0.9171 9.1% 7.2% 1.8% 0.92
[0.9550, 1.0309℄ [0.8956, 0.9616℄ [0.8815, 0.9452℄ [6.5%, 10.8%℄ [4.8%, 9.0%℄ [1.1%, 2.1%℄
wage mark-up
0.1811 0.1690 0.1661 9.0% 7.2% 1.8% 0.93
[0.1287, 0.2620℄ [0.1201, 0.2456℄ [0.1180, 0.2418℄ [6.3%, 10.8%℄ [4.7%, 9.0%℄ [1.1%, 2.1%℄
inv. spe. teh.
0.2166 0.2281 0.2317 -6.5% -5.0% -1.6% -0.55
[0.1341, 0.3413℄ [0.1420, 0.3547℄ [0.1438, 0.3605℄ [-7.9%, -4.2%℄ [-6.5%, -2.9%℄ [-1.8%, -1.0%℄
preferene
0.0749 0.0735 0.0736 1.8% 2.0% -0.2% 0.14
[0.0582, 0.0923℄ [0.0568, 0.0911℄ [0.0568, 0.0914℄ [0.0%, 3.9%℄ [0.6%, 3.5%℄ [-0.8%, 0.5%℄
gov. spending
0.0627 0.0639 0.0643 -2.5% -2.0% -0.6% -0.16
[0.0516, 0.0757℄ [0.0530, 0.0769℄ [0.0533, 0.0772℄ [-5.1%, -0.2%℄ [-4.3%, -0.1%℄ [-1.0%, 0.0%℄
Absolute std of GDP
All ve shoks
0.0521 0.0488 0.0480 8.5% 6.8% 1.6% 0.56
[0.0438, 0.0682℄ [0.0410, 0.0644℄ [0.0404, 0.0635℄ [6.1%, 10.1%℄ [4.5%, 8.4%℄ [1.0%, 2.0%℄
Std of onsumption relative to . . . shok X = Cr
labor prod.
1.0705 0.9287 0.8846 21.0% 15.3% 5.0% 0.97
[0.9284, 1.2317℄ [0.8041, 1.0797℄ [0.7667, 1.0288℄ [14.0%, 26.4%℄ [10.1%, 19.4%℄ [3.5%, 6.1%℄
wage mark-up
0.1995 0.1741 0.1659 20.2% 14.6% 4.9% 0.97
[0.1416, 0.2909℄ [0.1221, 0.2584℄ [0.1160, 0.2478℄ [12.7%, 27.1%℄ [9.0%, 20.0%℄ [3.4%, 6.1%℄
inv. spe. teh.
0.2797 0.2954 0.3034 -7.8% -5.3% -2.7% -0.49
[0.1680, 0.4293℄ [0.1801, 0.4471℄ [0.1852, 0.4583℄ [-10.8%, -5.2%℄ [-7.9%, -3.1%℄ [-3.4%, -1.9%℄
preferene
0.2915 0.2962 0.2948 -1.1% -1.6% 0.5% -0.15
[0.2626, 0.3215℄ [0.2670, 0.3266℄ [0.2651, 0.3255℄ [-1.8%, -0.5%℄ [-2.2%, -1.0%℄ [0.3%, 0.7%℄
gov. spending
0.1461 0.1327 0.1297 12.7% 10.1% 2.3% 0.95
[0.1213, 0.1741℄ [0.1090, 0.1615℄ [0.1063, 0.1584℄ [7.2%, 17.6%℄ [5.7%, 14.2%℄ [1.4%, 3.1%℄
Absolute std of onsumption
All ve shoks
0.0577 0.0507 0.0486 18.7% 13.7% 4.4% 0.55
[0.0466, 0.0802℄ [0.0406, 0.0721℄ [0.0389, 0.0693℄ [12.3%, 23.3%℄ [8.8%, 17.3%℄ [3.2%, 5.4%℄
Std of total investment relative to . . . shok X = TIr
labor prod.
2.2082 2.3363 2.2656 -2.5% -5.5% 3.1% 0.67
[1.7058, 2.5469℄ [1.8696, 2.6440℄ [1.8251, 2.5616℄ [-7.5%, 1.0%℄ [-9.5%, -2.5%℄ [2.0%, 3.9%℄
wage mark-up
0.3743 0.3982 0.3865 -3.1% -6.0% 3.0% 0.68
[0.2556, 0.5564℄ [0.2728, 0.5918℄ [0.2650, 0.5731℄ [-6.7%, -0.3%℄ [-8.8%, -3.6%℄ [2.1%, 3.8%℄
inv. spe. teh.
1.2574 1.2366 1.2448 1.0% 1.7% -0.7% -0.12
[0.7753, 2.0362℄ [0.7620, 2.0099℄ [0.7654, 2.0247℄ [-0.1%, 2.2%℄ [0.7%, 2.7%℄ [-1.0%, -0.3%℄
preferene
0.5985 0.6094 0.6004 -0.3% -1.8% 1.5% 0.34
[0.5303, 0.6943℄ [0.5389, 0.7079℄ [0.5297, 0.6987℄ [-1.5%, 1.1%℄ [-2.7%, -0.6%℄ [1.1%, 1.9%℄
gov. spending
0.3138 0.3231 0.3155 -0.5% -2.9% 2.4% 0.52
[0.2423, 0.3679℄ [0.2518, 0.3759℄ [0.2463, 0.3676℄ [-3.1%, 1.7%℄ [-5.0%, -0.9%℄ [1.8%, 2.9%℄
Absolute std of total investment
All ve shoks
0.1203 0.1261 0.1231 -2.3% -4.6% 2.5% 0.44
[0.1079, 0.1375℄ [0.1134, 0.1436℄ [0.1109, 0.1401℄ [-5.3%, 0.0%℄ [-7.0%, -2.7%℄ [1.7%, 3.1%℄
Note: Volatilities and ampliation measures are omputed by simulating the model at the posterior mean reported in table 6.4. Figures
in brakets give the orresponding fth and ninety fth perentiles. To ompute these perentiles, we use the last 50,000 parameter
draws (25,000 of eah hain). For eah parameter draw, we simulate the models and ompute the volatility and ampliation measures.
The ontemporaneous orrelation in the last olumn is based on simulated data from the translog model at the posterior mean.
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only amounts to 1.6 perent with a probability band ranging from 1.0 to 2.0 perent.
Turning to the shok-spei ampliation ratios, we obtain the following results.
Produtivity shoks are amplied by 9.1 perent, wage mark-up shoks by 9.0 perent, and
shoks to preferenes by 1.8 perent. Contrarily, shoks to investment-spei tehnology
are dampened by 6.5 perent, government spending shoks by 2.5 perent. For all shoks,
exept for shoks to preferenes, the ompetition and the variety eet work in the same
diretion. Sine the prie mark-up µpt dereases with the number of rms and the relative
prie ρt inreases with the number of rms, the following rule applies: If GDP and the
number of rms are suiently positively orrelated, both eets amplify GDP. If, on the
other hand, the orrelation is negative, both eets dampen GDP.
25
The shok-spei
ampliation is mainly driven by the ompetition eet, as for total ampliation. Exept
for shoks to preferenes, we nd that all ampliation measures are signiantly dierent
from zero at the 5 perent level.
Next, we investigate the omponents of GDP. The results for onsumption and invest-
ment are shown in the middle and lower panel of table 6.7, respetively. For onsumption,
the ampliation results are qualitatively the same as for GDP, exept for shoks to pref-
erenes and government spending. However, the volatility dierenes aross the models
are muh more pronouned. Over all shoks, the volatility in onsumption is amplied by
18.7 perent in total. For the two most important shoks to onsumption, i.e. labor pro-
dutivity and wage mark-ups, the total volatility inrease is given by 21.0 perent and 20.2
perent, respetively. Contrarily to GDP, onsumption is positively orrelated with the
number of rms in the presene of a government spending shok, amplifying the rowd-
ing out in onsumption. For onsumption, all ampliation measures are signiantly
dierent from zero at the 5 perent level.
For total investment, the ompetition eet has two opposing eets. Reall that
total investment is dened as the sum of investment in physial apital and investments
in new rms. On the one hand, a lower prie mark-up boosts GDP and therefore inreases
investment in physial apital for existing rms. On the other hand, a lower prie mark-up
redues the inentive to invest into new rms. We nd that the latter eet dominates suh
that an inrease in the number of rms redues total investment through the ompetition
eet and outweighs the positive variety eet. Over all shoks, the volatility in total
investment is dampened by -2.3 perent. However, we do not nd this result to be
signiantly dierent from zero at the 5 perent level.
25
Note that the variety eet on data-onsistent variables, as onsidered here, is smaller than for welfare-
onsistent variables sine ∂Yˆ rt /∂ρˆt = ∂Yˆt/∂ρˆt− 1 and ∂Yˆt/∂ρˆt > 0. Exept for shoks to preferenes, the
eet through Yt dominates the eet whih stems from deating.
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6.7 Robustness
In this setion, we disuss several robustness heks for our estimation and ampliation
results. First, we re-estimate the translog model using a limited data sample until 1998.
Seond, we re-estimate the translog model using additional data on mark-ups and on
prots. Finally, we estimate the two CES models and use these estimated models to
quantify the ampliation mehanism. Details on the results of our robustness exerises
an be found in appendix 6.C.
Subsample estimation. In the rst exerise, we hek whether the missing observa-
tions of rm entry in our data sample onsiderably aet our estimation and ampliation
results. We therefore re-estimate the model with translog preferenes using only the lim-
ited sample period until 1998:Q2, whih is the latest data point available for the new rm
series. Hene, all missing observations are exluded from the data sample. Everything
else remains the same.
Most parameter values are not signiantly dierent from the parameter estimates of
the full sample estimation. Two dierenes are worth mentioning. First, the estimate of
the labor share in prodution is given by 0.91, whih is even higher than the estimate of
0.85 in the full sample estimation. However, in both estimations the values orrespond
roughly to the same labor share in GDP of about 70 perent. Seond, the steady-state
prie mark-up is estimated at 1.43, whih is substantially higher than the full sample
estimate of 1.26. This implies a stronger ompetition and variety eet in this sample
period. The estimate of µp implies a point estimate for the ompetition eet ξ equal
to 0.3 with a ondene band ranging from 0.24 to 0.35. The implied variety eet ω is
estimated at 0.22 with a ondene band from 0.16 to 0.28. Due to the larger estimates for
the ompetition and the variety eet, the ampliation measures are also substantially
higher when ompared to the baseline estimation. The overall ampliation of GDP,
onsumption, and total investment through the ompetition and the variety eet are now
given by 10.3, 24.4, and -4.5 perent, respetively. These numbers are also signiantly
dierent from zero at the 5 perent level.
Estimation using mark-up and prot data. Our analysis so far has shown that
the ompetition eet, i.e. the eet of a hange in the number of rms on mark-ups, is
statistially signiant and eonomially relevant. Therefore, one might argue that it is
important to inorporate a measure of mark-ups in the estimation of the model. In our
baseline estimation, we do not use a mark-up measure beause mark-ups of pries over
marginal osts are unobserved and the onstrution of a fully model-onsistent mark-up
measure is impossible. To see this, note that the model's denition of the prie mark-up is
given by µpt = αY
c
t /(wtL
c
t). Y
c
t is the aggregate output of nal goods onsumption, whih
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does not inlude investments into new rms. Lct is the orresponding labor input. Both Y
c
t
and Lct are not observable and are dierent from the gross domesti produt Yt and overall
labor Lt.
26
Nevertheless, it is important to hek whether our results are robust to the
inlusion of a mark-up proxy. As a proxy, we use the growth rate of the inverse labor share
Yt/(wtLt) . We onstrut the labor share using data on GDP, hours worked and hourly
ompensation in the non-farm business setor. To aount for the dierenes between
the proxy and the model-onsistent denition of the mark-up, we inlude the error term
εµ,met in the measurement equation, where ε
µ,me
t is assumed to be i.i.d.N(0, σ
2
εd,me). This
also ensures that the model is not subjet to stohasti singularity. The measurement
equation then reads as
27
dl(MARKUPt) = 100∆µˆ
p
t + ε
µ,me
t (6.25)
The dynamis of rm entry are also strongly linked to rms' prots. Therefore, we
also add the growth rate of real per apita orporate prots after taxes to our set of
observables.
28
We map this measure to overall prots whih are dened by the number
of rms Nt times the (real) average prots per rm d
r
t . Note, though, that prots in
the model are eonomis prots, while in the data prots are aounting prots. One
of the main dierenes is that aounting prots still ontain osts of apital sine parts
of the apital stok are equity-naned. Contrarily in the model, apital osts are fully
subtrated out. To aount for the dierene between prots in the data and in the
model, we inlude the measurement error εd,met in the measurement equation, where ε
d,me
t
is assumed to be i.i.d.N(0, σ2
εd,me
). The measurement equation for prots then reads as
dl(PROFITSt) = 100(∆dˆ
r
t +∆Nˆt) + ε
d,me
t (6.26)
Re-estimating the baseline model with data on mark-ups and prots, respetively, we
do not nd any signiant dierenes in the parameters estimates and the ampliation
measures, ompared to the baseline estimation. The estimated models are able to apture
the proyliality of prots and the ounteryliality of mark-ups in the data. However,
most of the variations in the mark-up and prot data are aptured by the measurement
errors.
29
We argue that this is at least partly due to the model-inonsistent onstrution
of the mark-up data and the desribed dierenes in the onept of prots between data
and model.
26
An alternative proxy for prie mark-ups an be onstruted from data on prots using the relation
Ntdt = (1 − 1/µpt )Y Ct . However, this relation also ontains the unobservable variable Y ct . Moreover, it
requires to use prot data whih, as we argue below, suers from a measurement problem as well.
27
Reall that the funtion dl stands for 100 times the demeaned log-dierenes operator.
28
More details on the soure of the prot data and the onstrution of the data series an be found in
tables 6.8 and 6.9 of appendix 6.B.
29
This onrms the prot volatility puzzle, i.e. the inability of standard business yle models to aount
for the volatility of prots. See, e.g. Lewis and Stevens (2015) or Colagio and Etro (2010).
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Estimation of CES models. In the previous setion, we have used the same estimated
parameter set in all three model frameworks in order to isolate the model-spei om-
petition and variety eet that exlusively result from the dierent model setups. In this
last exerise, we estimate the two CES models using the same data set as in our baseline
estimation of the translog model. The onstant prie mark-up is xed to the estimated
steady-state value under the translog speiation. In a seond step, we ompute the
ampliation measures using the two estimated CES models and the estimated translog
model.
The parameter estimates of the CES models are not signiantly dierent from the
parameter estimates of the translog model. All estimates lie within the 90 perent prob-
ability interval of the translog estimation. Using the estimated CES models, we therefore
obtain similar ampliation measures. For the two most important shoks to GDP, i.e.
labor produtivity and wage mark-ups, the total ampliation amounts to 8.7 perent and
13.2 perent, respetively. Note that we do not give overall ampliation measures and
probability bands. Sine we estimate dierent shoks proesses aross models, dierenes
in the absolute standard deviations do not show the strength of the ampliation meha-
nism but rather reet the ability of the models to apture the volatility in the data. On
the ontrary, shok-spei ampliation measures are omputed in relative terms and
thus ontrol for the dierent estimates of the shok proesses. The omputation of the
orresponding probability bands would require to know the joint posterior distribution
under the translog and the CES models.
6.8 Conlusion
This paper studies the empirial importane of endogenous rm entry as ampliation
mehanism for business yle utuations. To this end, we use the rm entry model
by Bilbiie et al. (2012), extend it with several real fritions and estimate the model on
U.S. data with Bayesian methods. In this model, the ampliation mehanism of rm
entry works through a ompetition and a variety eet. Both eets are estimated to be
statistially signiant.
To quantify the strength of this ampliation mehanism and to disentangle the om-
petition and the variety eet, we also speify two model frameworks, where either the
ompetition or both eets are swithed o. We measure the ampliation as the per-
entage volatility dierene in GDP, onsumption, and investment aross the three model
variants.
Our results support the ndings of Jaimovih and Floetotto (2008) that endogenous
rm entry is an important ampliation mehanism for business yle utuations. How-
ever, in a medium-sale environment  as onsidered here  the quantitative impat of rm
entry is less dominant. Over all shoks, the ompetition and the variety eet substan-
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tially amplify GDP by 8.5 perent. The impats of the ompetition and the variety eet
are shok-dependent. For labor produtivity and wage mark-up shoks the ompetition
and the variety eet amplify the impats on GDP, but dampen the impats of shoks to
aggregate demand and to investment-spei tehnology. The ompetition eet aounts
for most ampliation, whereas the variety eet only plays a minor role.
In the theoretial framework eah rm produes one dierentiated produt, i.e. we
have an identity between the number of rms and produts. In our empirial exerise we
exlusively fous on rm entry dynamis by using data on new business inorporations.
However, this approah neglets the eet of produt reation at existing rms. Bernard et
al. (2010) and Broda and Weinstein (2010) highlight the empirial importane of produt
reation in business yle utuations. We leave it to future researh to identify the entry
mehanism with data on produt reation.
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6.A Appendix: Model
The prie index and the prie elastiity of demand. This setion derives the prie
index Pt and the prie elastiity of demand εt for an individual intermediate good in the
translog model. The nal goods produers demand intermediate goods yi,t at prie pi,t
and bundle these intermediate goods to nal goods Y Ct . Under perfet ompetition and
zero prots, total revenues equal total osts. The ost funtion of a nal good produer
then equals PtY
C
t , where Pt is the prie and the ost of one nal good. In the translog
model, lnPt is given by the following translog funtion as proposed by Feenstra (2003):
lnPt = α0 +
1
2
N˜ −Nt
σ˜NtN˜
+
1
Nt
∫ Nt
0
ln pi,tdi
+
1
2
σ˜
Nt
∫ Nt
0
∫ Nt
0
ln pi,t ln pj,tdidj − σ˜
2
∫ Nt
0
(ln pi,t)
2di (6.27)
In the following α0 is normalized to zero.
Under symmetri intermediate goods produers, implying pi,t = pj,t = pt, the translog
funtion (6.27) simplies to
lnPt =
1
2
N˜ −Nt
σ˜NtN˜
+ ln pt (6.28)
and the relative prie reads as
ρt =
pt
Pt
= exp
(
−1
2
N˜ −Nt
σ˜NtN˜
)
(6.29)
For the derivation of the prie elastiity of demand for an individual good, we use the
ost share si,t of the ith prodution fator, whih is dened as
si,t =
pi,tyi,t
PtY Ct
(6.30)
Taking logs of (6.30) and dierentiating with respet to ln pi,t gives
∂ ln si,t
∂ ln pi,t
= 1 +
∂ ln yi,t
∂ ln pi,t
(6.31)
suh that we an write the prie elastiity as
εi,t = −∂yi,t
∂pi,t
pi,t
yi,t
= −∂ ln yi,t
∂ ln pi,t
= 1− ∂ ln si,t
∂ ln pi,t
= 1− ∂si,t
∂ ln pi,t
1
si,t
(6.32)
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Aording to Shepard's lemma, the demand for the ith prodution fator is given by
yi,t =
∂PtY
C
t
∂pi,t
= Y Ct
Pt
pi,t
∂ lnPt
∂ ln pi,t
(6.33)
Replaing yi,t in (6.30) and dierentiating (6.27) with respet to ln pi,t, the ost share an
be written as
si,t =
∂ lnPt
∂ ln pi,t
=
1
Nt
+
1
2
σ˜
Nt
∫ Nt
0
ln pi,tdi+
1
2
σ˜
Nt
∫ Nt
0
ln pi,tdi− 1
2
σ˜ ln pi,t (6.34)
=
1
Nt
+
σ˜
Nt
∫ Nt
0
ln pi,tdi− σ˜ ln pi,t (6.35)
Dierentiating (6.35) with respet to ln pi,t gives
∂si,t
∂ ln pi,t
=
σ˜
Nt
− σ˜ (6.36)
suh that
εi,t = 1−
(
σ˜
Nt
− σ˜
)
1
si,t
(6.37)
whih redues for large Nt to
εi,t = 1 + σ˜
1
si,t
(6.38)
Under symmetri pries, the ost share in (6.35) redues to
st =
1
Nt
(6.39)
and the prie elastiity is given by
εt = 1 + σ˜Nt (6.40)
The nal goods prodution setor under a CES prodution tehnology. This
setion presents the equations for the nal goods prodution setor under a onstant elas-
tiity of substitution (CES) prodution funtion as in Benassy (1996). In this ase, inter-
mediate goods are ombined using the prodution funtion Y Ct = N
ζ− 1
ε−1
t
(∫ Nt
0
y
ε−1
ε
i,t di
) ε
ε−1
,
where ε > 1 is the (onstant) elastiity of substitution between the intermediate inputs,
and the parameter ζ ≥ 0 aptures the degree of inreasing returns to speialization.
The rst-order ondition for prot maximization yields the demand funtion for variety
i, whih is given by yi,t = ρ
−ε
i,t N
ζ(ε−1)−1
t Y
C
t , where Pt = N
1
ε−1
−ζ
t
(∫ Nt
0
p1−εi,t di
) 1
1−ε
. In a
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symmetri equilibrium, the prie index an be written as Pt = N
−ζ
t pt, implying ρt = N
ζ
t .
Thus, the degree of returns to speialization ω is equal to ζ . The two dierent CES-
Benassy model variant dier in how we parameterize the variety eet ζ . In the CES-
TrVE model, the variety eet is set equal to the value under the translog speiation,
i.e. ω = ζ = 1
2
(µp − 1). In the CES-NoVE model, ω = ζ = 0.
The log-linear model. This setion presents the log-linearized model equations. A
variable without time index denotes its steady-state value. A hat above a variable denotes
the perentage deviation from its steady state.
• Consumption Euler equation:
λˆCt = Et λˆ
C
t+1 + Rˆt (6.41)
• Shares Euler equation:
vˆt = Et
{
λˆCt+t − λˆCt + β(1− δ)vˆt+1 +
(
1− β(1− δ))dˆt+1} (6.42)
• Capital Euler equation:
Qˆt = Et
{
λˆCt+t − λˆCt + β(1− δK)Qˆt+1 +
(
1− β(1− δK))rˆKt+1} (6.43)
• Lagrange multiplier assoiated with the household's budget onstraint:
λˆCt = λ1
(
Vˆt + χˆt − bβ Et
{
Vˆt+1 + χˆt+1
})− λ2 (λˆSt + Sˆt − bβ Et {Sˆt+1 + λˆSt+1})
+ λ3
(
Cˆt − bCˆt−1 − bβ Et
{
Cˆt+1 − bCˆt
})
, (6.44)
where
λ1 =
C(1− b)(1− β(1− γ))
(1− bβ)[(1− β(1− γ))C(1− b)− γψSLη]
λ2 =
γψSLη
(1− bβ)[(1− β(1− γ))C(1− b)− γψSLη]
λ3 =
γψSLη
(1− b)(1− bβ)[(1− β(1− γ))C(1− b)− γψSLη]
and the auxiliary variable
Vˆt = − C
C(1− b)− ψLηS
(
Cˆt − bCˆt−1
)
+
ψLηS
C(1− b)− ψLηS
(
ηLˆt + Sˆt
)
(6.45)
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• Dynamis of St
Sˆt = (1− γ)Sˆt−1 + γ
1− bCˆt −
γb
1− bCˆt−1 (6.46)
• Lagrange multiplier assoiated with St:
λˆSt = β(1− γ) Et
{
λˆSt+1 + Sˆt+1 − Sˆt
}
+
(
1− β(1− γ)) (ηLˆt + Vˆt + χˆt) (6.47)
• Labor supply:
wˆt = µˆ
w
t + Vˆt + θLˆt + Sˆt − λˆCt + χˆt (6.48)
• Optimal priing equation:
ρˆt = µˆ
p
t + mˆct (6.49)
• Prie mark-up:
µˆpt = −ξNˆt , (6.50)
where ξ = 1− 1
µp
in the translog model and ξ = 0 in the CES models.
• Relative prie:
ρˆt = ωNˆt , (6.51)
where ω = 1
2
(µp − 1) in the translog model, ω = 1
2
(µp − 1) in the CES-TrVE model
and ω = 0 in the CES-NoVE model.
• Fator demand equation:
wˆt = Yˆ
C
t − LˆCt − µˆpt (6.52)
rˆKt = Yˆ
C
t − (Kˆt−1 + uˆt)− µˆpt (6.53)
• Total prot inome:
Dˆt ≡ Nˆt + dˆt = 1
µp − 1 µˆ
p
t + Yˆ
C
t (6.54)
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• Firm entry:
NˆE,t =
β
1 + β
Et NˆE,t+1 +
1
1 + β
NˆE,t−1 +
1
(1 + β)κE
(
vˆt − (wˆt − zˆt + fˆE,t)
)
(6.55)
• Investment in new rms:
IˆE,t = wˆt − zˆt + fˆE,t + NˆE,t (6.56)
• Firm dynamis:
Nˆt = (1− δ)Nˆt−1 + δNˆE,t−1 (6.57)
• Investment in physial apital:
Iˆt =
β
1 + β
Et Iˆt+1 +
1
1 + β
Iˆt−1 +
1
κ(1 + β)
Qˆt + uˆ
I
t (6.58)
• Capital aumulation equation:
Kˆt = (1− δK)Kˆt−1 + δK Iˆt − rK uˆt + δKκ(1 + β)uˆIt (6.59)
• Capital utilization:
uˆt =
δ1
δ2
(
rˆKt − Qˆt
)
(6.60)
• Total investment:
Tˆ It =
I
TI
Iˆt +
vNE
TI
IˆE,t (6.61)
• Labor in entry:
LˆEt = fˆE,t + NˆE,t − zˆt (6.62)
• Aggregate prodution funtion:
Yˆ Ct = ρˆt + α
(
zˆt + Lˆ
C
t
)
+ (1− α)(uˆt + Kˆt−1) (6.63)
• Gross domesti produt:
Yˆt =
Y C
Y
Yˆ Ct +
vNE
Y
(
wˆt − zˆt + fˆE,t + NˆE,t
)
(6.64)
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• Goods market learing:
Yˆ Ct =
C
Y C
Cˆt +
I
Y C
Iˆt +
G
Y C
Gˆt (6.65)
• Resoure onstraint:
Yˆt =
wL
Y
(
wˆt + Lˆt
)
+
Nd
Y
(
Nˆt + dˆt
)
+
rKK
Y
(
rˆKt + Kˆt−1 + uˆt
)
(6.66)
Shok proesses
• Labor produtivity:
zˆt = ρz zˆt−1 + ε
z
t (6.67)
• Entry osts:
fˆE,t = ρfE fˆE,t−1 + ε
fE
t (6.68)
• Investment-spei tehnology:
uˆIt = ρI uˆ
I
t−1 + ε
I
t (6.69)
• Wage mark-up:
µˆwt = ρµµˆ
w
t−1 + ε
µ
t + νε
µ
t−1 (6.70)
• Government spending:
Gˆt = ρGGˆt−1 + ε
G
t (6.71)
6.B Appendix: Data
Table 6.8: Data soure
Series ID Desription Soure
GDPC96 Real gross domesti produt BEA
PCND Personal onsumption expenditures: non-durable goods BEA
PCESV Personal onsumption expenditures: servies BEA
PCDG Personal onsumption expenditures: durable goods BEA
FPI Fixed private investment BEA
CBI Change in private inventories BEA
PRS85006033 Non-farm business hours worked index (2005=100) BLS
PRS85006103 Non-farm business hourly ompensation index (2005=100) BLS
CES0500000008 Average hourly earnings of prodution BLS
NBI New business inorporations SCB from BEA
CNP160V Civilian noninstitutional population BLS
GDPDEF Gross domesti produt: impliit prie deator BEA
CPATAX Corporate prots after tax with IVA and CCAdj BEA
BEA: U.S. Bureau of Eonomi Analysis, BLS: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistis, SCB: Survey of Current Businesses.
Data series on prots are used in the sensitivity analysis.
Table 6.9: Constrution of data series
Time Series Constrution Desription
dl(GDPt) = dl
(
GDPC96t
CNP160Vt
)
growth rate of real per apita GDP
dl(CONSt) = dl
(
PCNDt + PCESVt
CNP160Vt ×GDPDEFt
)
growth rate of real per apita onsumption
dl(INVt) = dl
(
FPIt + PCDGt + CBIt
CNP160Vt ×GDPDEFt
)
growth rate of real per apita investment
dl(WAGE1t) = dl
(
PRS85006103t
GDPDEFt
)
growth rate of rst measure of real wage
dl(WAGE2t) = dl
(
CES0500000008t
GDPDEFt
)
growth rate of seond measure real wage
l(HOURSt) = l
(
PRS85006033t
CNP160Vt
)
logarithm of per apita hours worked
dl(ENTRYt) = dl
(
NBIt
CNP160Vt
)
growth rate of per apita new rms
dl(PROFITSt) = dl
(
CPATAXt
CNP160Vt ×GDPDEFt
)
growth rate of real per apita prots
dl(MARKUPt) = dl
(
GDPC96t ×GDPDEFt
PRS85006103t× PRS85006033t
)
growth rate of inverse labor share
Note: The funtion l and dl stand for 100 times the demeaned logarithm and the demeaned log-dierene, respetively. Data series
on prots and mark-ups are used in the sensitivity analysis.
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Table 6.10: Results from the Bayesian estimation of the Translog model: Robustness heks
Posterior distribution
Baseline Baseline Baseline + Prot data Baseline + Markup data
Full sample Sub sample Full sample Full sample
Parameters Mean [5% , 95%℄ Mean [5% , 95%℄ Mean [5% , 95%℄ Mean [5% , 95%℄
Strutural parameters
Labor share in prodution α 0.85 [0.81 , 0.90℄ 0.91 [0.86 , 0.96℄ 0.85 [0.81 , 0.90℄ 0.86 [0.81 , 0.90℄
Labor utility θ 3.64 [1.92 , 5.80℄ 4.14 [2.18 , 6.57℄ 3.62 [1.90 , 5.77℄ 3.60 [1.90 , 5.77℄
Wealth elast. labor supply γ 0.79 [0.63 , 0.93℄ 0.78 [0.59 , 0.93℄ 0.80 [0.63 , 0.93℄ 0.79 [0.63 , 0.93℄
Consumption habit b 0.76 [0.71 , 0.80℄ 0.77 [0.71 , 0.82℄ 0.75 [0.70 , 0.80℄ 0.75 [0.70 , 0.80℄
Investment adj. ost κI 3.82 [2.59 , 5.28℄ 3.81 [2.47 , 5.38℄ 3.83 [2.60 , 5.30℄ 3.93 [2.68 , 5.40℄
Inv. elast. of apital util.
δ2
δ1
0.55 [0.33 , 0.89℄ 0.53 [0.32 , 0.84℄ 0.55 [0.33 , 0.90℄ 0.53 [0.33 , 0.85℄
Prie mark-up µp 1.26 [1.16 , 1.36℄ 1.43 [1.31 , 1.55℄ 1.26 [1.16 , 1.36℄ 1.26 [1.17 , 1.36℄
Entry adj. ost κE 1.50 [1.09 , 1.99℄ 1.46 [1.01 , 2.00℄ 1.49 [1.08 , 1.98℄ 1.49 [1.07 , 1.97℄
Autoorrelation of shok proesses
Labor produtivity ρz 0.96 [0.94 , 0.98℄ 0.98 [0.97 , 0.99℄ 0.96 [0.94 , 0.98℄ 0.96 [0.94 , 0.98℄
Wage mark-up ρµ 0.97 [0.95 , 0.98℄ 0.95 [0.93 , 0.97℄ 0.97 [0.95 , 0.98℄ 0.97 [0.95 , 0.98℄
Invest. spe. teh. ρI 0.24 [0.12 , 0.38℄ 0.19 [0.07 , 0.33℄ 0.25 [0.12 , 0.38℄ 0.24 [0.12 , 0.38℄
Gov. spending ρG 0.92 [0.88 , 0.94℄ 0.91 [0.87 , 0.95℄ 0.91 [0.88 , 0.94℄ 0.92 [0.88 , 0.95℄
Entry ost ρfE 0.95 [0.91 , 0.98℄ 0.98 [0.96 , 0.99℄ 0.95 [0.91 , 0.98℄ 0.95 [0.91 , 0.98℄
Standard deviation of innovations
Labor prod. σεz 0.80 [0.70 , 0.90℄ 0.74 [0.65 , 0.85℄ 0.79 [0.70 , 0.90℄ 0.80 [0.70 , 0.90℄
Wage mark-up σεµ 4.30 [3.00 , 5.95℄ 4.98 [3.36 , 6.98℄ 4.28 [2.99 , 5.92℄ 4.28 [2.98 , 5.93℄
Invest. spe. teh. σεI 3.99 [2.39 , 6.54℄ 12.00 [4.91 , 26.14℄ 4.02 [2.39 , 6.69℄ 4.01 [2.42 , 6.50℄
Preferene σεχ 1.46 [1.07 , 1.91℄ 1.64 [1.17 , 2.20℄ 1.45 [1.07 , 1.90℄ 1.45 [1.07 , 1.88℄
Gov. spending σεG 1.87 [1.71 , 2.03℄ 1.78 [1.61 , 1.96℄ 1.87 [1.72 , 2.03℄ 1.87 [1.72 , 2.03℄
Entry ost σεfE 2.43 [1.96 , 2.97℄ 2.58 [2.12 , 3.08℄ 2.44 [1.97 , 2.99℄ 2.42 [1.95 , 2.97℄
Moving average parameter and loading oeient
Wage mark-up shok ν 0.41 [0.26 , 0.56℄ 0.27 [0.08 , 0.45℄ 0.41 [0.26 , 0.56℄ 0.41 [0.26 , 0.56℄
Loading oeient λ 0.13 [0.06 , 0.19℄ 0.13 [0.04 , 0.22℄ 0.13 [0.06 , 0.19℄ 0.13 [0.06 , 0.19℄
Note: Using a Random Walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm, we generate 2 hains of 2 Mio. parameter draws eah. For eah hain, we disard the rst 1 Mio. draws and
use the remaining draws to ompute the posterior mean and perentiles. In our baseline estimation, the data sample ranges from 1964:Q1 to 2012:Q2 (full data sample)
and the data set onsists of data series on GDP, onsumption, investment, hours worked, rm entry, and two wage measures. In the sub sample estimation, the data
sample only ranges until 1998:Q3. In all estimations, we use the prior distributions of the baseline estimation given in table 6.4.
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Table 6.11: Standard deviations, relative volatilities and ampliation indiators using
estimated parameters from the subsample estimation
Volatility Ampliation Corr
Translog CES-TrVE CES-NoVE Total CE VE (X,N)
Std of GDP relative to . . . shok X = Y r
labor prod.
1.0382 0.9402 0.9304 11.6% 10.4% 1.1 % 0.95
[1.0066, 1.0556℄ [0.9065, 0.9580℄ [0.9058, 0.9483℄ [9.3%, 13.2%℄ [8.6%, 12.7%℄ [-0.5%, 1.8%℄
wage mark-up
0.1628 0.1470 0.1456 11.9% 10.8% 1.0 % 0.89
[0.1067, 0.2308℄ [0.0957, 0.2096℄ [0.0956, 0.2088℄ [9.4%, 13.4%℄ [8.9%, 12.9%℄ [-0.5%, 1.8%℄
inv. spe. teh.
0.1031 0.1104 0.1113 -7.4% -6.7% -0.8 % -0.59
[0.0315, 0.1821℄ [0.0337, 0.1941℄ [0.0336, 0.1966℄ [-8.2%, -5.1%℄ [-7.6%, -5.1%℄ [-1.4%, 0.5%℄
preferene
0.0594 0.0593 0.0594 -0.0% 0.2% -0.2 % 0.08
[0.0437, 0.0691℄ [0.0460, 0.0684℄ [0.0453, 0.0687℄ [-5.3%, 2.5%℄ [-7.0%, 2.5%℄ [-0.7%, 2.1%℄
gov. spending
0.0648 0.0678 0.0681 -4.8% -4.4% -0.5 % -0.22
[0.0533, 0.0781℄ [0.0572, 0.0812℄ [0.0574, 0.0812℄ [-8.2%, -2.7%℄ [-8.2%, -2.4%℄ [-0.8%, 0.3%℄
Absolute std of GDP
All ve shoks
0.0541 0.0495 0.0491 10.3% 9.3% 0.9 % 0.52
[0.0442, 0.0786℄ [0.0403, 0.0715℄ [0.0402, 0.0714℄ [8.7%, 12.1%℄ [8.1%, 11.7%℄ [-0.5%, 1.6%℄
Std of onsumption relative to . . . shok X = Cr
labor prod.
1.3014 1.0971 1.0287 26.5% 18.6% 6.7 % 0.99
[1.1901, 1.4355℄ [0.9802, 1.2366℄ [0.9186, 1.1631℄ [21.3%, 32.3%℄ [14.7%, 23.3%℄ [5.5%, 7.8%℄
wage mark-up
0.1766 0.1416 0.1322 33.5% 24.7% 7.1 % 0.98
[0.1164, 0.2545℄ [0.0895, 0.2056℄ [0.0835, 0.1935℄ [26.3%, 42.8%℄ [18.9%, 32.6%℄ [5.8%, 8.3%℄
inv. spe. teh.
0.1359 0.1469 0.1501 -9.5% -7.5% -2.2 % -0.59
[0.0394, 0.2378℄ [0.0431, 0.2554℄ [0.0436, 0.2625℄ [-12.5%, -6.5%℄ [-10.6%, -5.4%℄ [-3.0%, -0.6%℄
preferene
0.2893 0.2961 0.2949 -1.9% -2.3% 0.4 % -0.14
[0.2497, 0.3227℄ [0.2575, 0.3299℄ [0.2560, 0.3293℄ [-2.8%, -1.3%℄ [-3.2%, -1.8%℄ [0.1%, 0.7%℄
gov. spending
0.1407 0.1201 0.1160 21.3% 17.1% 3.6 % 0.96
[0.1124, 0.1747℄ [0.0909, 0.1559℄ [0.0875, 0.1517℄ [13.7%, 31.0%℄ [10.9%, 25.6%℄ [2.4%, 4.5%℄
Absolute std of onsumption
All ve shoks
0.0651 0.0553 0.0524 24.4% 17.7% 5.6 % 0.60
[0.0517, 0.1043℄ [0.0428, 0.0897℄ [0.0405, 0.0846℄ [20.8%, 30.6%℄ [14.6%, 22.6%℄ [5.0%, 7.0%℄
Std of total investment relative to . . . shok X = TIr
labor prod.
1.5248 1.7096 1.6826 -9.4% -10.8% 1.6 % 0.71
[1.0374, 1.8562℄ [1.2268, 2.0340℄ [1.2207, 1.9967℄ [-16.5%, -5.1%℄ [-16.5%, -7.5%℄ [ -0.2%, 2.7%℄
wage mark-up
0.3509 0.3778 0.3703 -5.2% -7.1% 2.0 % 0.58
[0.2230, 0.4958℄ [0.2448, 0.5403℄ [0.2416, 0.5326℄ [-10.6%, -2.2%℄ [-11.2%, -4.9%℄ [0.5%, 3.1%℄
inv. spe. teh.
0.5215 0.5113 0.5130 1.6% 2.0% -0.3 % -0.08
[0.1654, 0.9305℄ [0.1614, 0.9157℄ [0.1612, 0.9202℄ [0.6%, 3.2%℄ [1.2%, 3.1%℄ [ -0.7%, 0.2%℄
preferene
0.5774 0.5880 0.5809 -0.6% -1.8% 1.2 % 0.28
[0.4818, 0.6933℄ [0.4911, 0.7084℄ [0.4844, 0.7035℄ [ -1.8%, 0.4%℄ [ -2.6%, -1.1%℄ [0.7%, 1.7%℄
gov. spending
0.2818 0.2941 0.2889 -2.5% -4.2% 1.8 % 0.45
[0.1916, 0.3266℄ [0.2051, 0.3395℄ [0.2026, 0.3341℄ [ -6.7%, -0.1%℄ [ -7.5%, -2.4%℄ [0.7%, 2.5%℄
Absolute std of total investment
All ve shoks
0.1140 0.1208 0.1193 -4.5% -5.6% 1.2 % 0.25
[0.0950, 0.1240℄ [0.1026, 0.1330℄ [0.1018, 0.1314℄ [-10.1%, -2.6%℄ [-10.3%, -4.5%℄ [0.2%, 2.2%℄
Note: Volatilities and ampliation measures are omputed by simulating the model at the posterior mean reported in table 6.10.
Figures in brakets give the orresponding fth and ninety fth perentiles. To ompute these perentiles, we use the last 50,000
parameter draws (25,000 of eah hain). For eah parameter draw, we simulate the models and ompute the volatility and ampliation
measures. The ontemporaneous orrelation in the last olumn is based on simulated data from the translog model at the posterior
mean.
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Table 6.12: Standard deviations, relative volatilities and ampliation indiators using
estimated parameters from the estimation with mark-up data
Volatility Ampliation Corr
Translog CES-TrVE CES-NoVE Total CE VE (X,N)
Std of GDP relative to . . . shok X = Y r
labor prod.
1.0019 0.9334 0.9175 9.2% 7.3% 1.7 % 0.92
[0.9509, 1.0304℄ [0.8930, 0.9614℄ [0.8786, 0.9451℄ [6.7%, 10.9%℄ [5.0%, 9.1%℄ [1.2%, 2.1%℄
wage mark-up
0.1824 0.1700 0.1671 9.1% 7.3% 1.7 % 0.93
[0.1285, 0.2592℄ [0.1193, 0.2434℄ [0.1174, 0.2395℄ [6.6%, 10.9%℄ [4.9%, 9.1%℄ [1.2%, 2.1%℄
inv. spe. teh.
0.2106 0.2220 0.2254 -6.6% -5.1% -1.5 % -0.55
[0.1332, 0.3322℄ [0.1413, 0.3450℄ [0.1431, 0.3506℄ [-8.1%, -4.4%℄ [-6.7%, -3.1%℄ [-1.8%, -1.1%℄
preferene
0.0747 0.0734 0.0736 1.6% 1.9% -0.3 % 0.13
[0.0595, 0.0919℄ [0.0584, 0.0907℄ [0.0585, 0.0909℄ [-0.1%, 3.5%℄ [0.6%, 3.3%℄ [-0.8%, 0.4%℄
gov. spending
0.0632 0.0645 0.0649 -2.7% -2.1% -0.6 % -0.17
[0.0526, 0.0751℄ [0.0541, 0.0764℄ [0.0543, 0.0768℄ [-5.1%, -0.3%℄ [-4.3%, -0.2%℄ [-1.0%, -0.1%℄
Absolute std of GDP
All ve shoks
0.0519 0.0486 0.0478 8.6% 6.8% 1.6 % 0.56
[0.0437, 0.0679℄ [0.0408, 0.0641℄ [0.0402, 0.0630℄ [6.3%, 10.1%℄ [4.7%, 8.4%℄ [1.1%, 2.0%℄
Std of onsumption relative to . . . shok X = Cr
labor prod.
1.0768 0.9320 0.8872 21.4% 15.5% 5.0 % 0.97
[0.9221, 1.2289℄ [0.8005, 1.0771℄ [0.7642, 1.0270℄ [14.6%, 26.5%℄ [10.5%, 19.4%℄ [3.6%, 6.1%℄
wage mark-up
0.2012 0.1750 0.1668 20.6% 14.9% 5.0 % 0.97
[0.1411, 0.2914℄ [0.1216, 0.2583℄ [0.1153, 0.2473℄ [13.4%, 26.9%℄ [9.4%, 19.8%℄ [3.5%, 6.1%℄
inv. spe. teh.
0.2732 0.2889 0.2968 -8.0% -5.4% -2.7 % -0.50
[0.1723, 0.4240℄ [0.1846, 0.4422℄ [0.1896, 0.4527℄ [ -10.5%, -5.2%℄ [-7.6%, -3.2%℄ [-3.4%, -1.9%℄
preferene
0.2922 0.2970 0.2957 -1.2% -1.6% 0.5 % -0.15
[0.2663, 0.3216℄ [0.2705, 0.3269℄ [0.2689, 0.3259℄ [-1.8%, -0.5%℄ [-2.2%, -1.0%℄ [0.3%, 0.7%℄
gov. spending
0.1448 0.1312 0.1281 13.0% 10.4% 2.4 % 0.95
[0.1215, 0.1717℄ [0.1087, 0.1594℄ [0.1060, 0.1563℄ [7.7%, 17.6%℄ [6.1%, 14.2%℄ [1.5%, 3.1%℄
Absolute std of onsumption
All ve shoks
0.0576 0.0505 0.0484 18.9% 13.9% 4.4 % 0.55
[0.0467, 0.0799℄ [0.0406, 0.0716℄ [0.0390, 0.0688℄ [13.0%, 23.3%℄ [9.3%, 17.2%℄ [3.3%, 5.4%℄
Std of total investment relative to . . . shok X = TIr
labor prod.
2.1944 2.3274 2.2571 -2.8% -5.7% 3.1 % 0.66
[1.7275, 2.5336℄ [1.8844, 2.6394℄ [1.8347, 2.5570℄ [-7.2%, 0.8%℄ [-9.4%, -2.7%℄ [2.2%, 3.9%℄
wage mark-up
0.3768 0.4017 0.3899 -3.3% -6.2% 3.0 % 0.68
[0.2592, 0.5395℄ [0.2768, 0.5752℄ [0.2693, 0.5575℄ [-6.5%, -0.5%℄ [-8.7%, -3.8%℄ [2.3%, 3.8%℄
inv. spe. teh.
1.2283 1.2074 1.2152 1.1% 1.7% -0.7 % -0.11
[0.7792, 1.9548℄ [0.7665, 1.9230℄ [0.7707, 1.9378℄ [-0.0%, 2.2%℄ [0.8%, 2.7%℄ [-1.0%, -0.4%℄
preferene
0.6002 0.6115 0.6025 -0.4% -1.9% 1.5 % 0.34
[0.5326, 0.6911℄ [0.5415, 0.7046℄ [0.5325, 0.6955℄ [-1.6%, 0.9%℄ [-2.8%, -0.7%℄ [1.1%, 1.9%℄
gov. spending
0.3123 0.3219 0.3143 -0.6% -3.0% 2.4 % 0.52
[0.2444, 0.3601℄ [0.2540, 0.3687℄ [0.2481, 0.3608℄ [-2.9%, 1.5%℄ [-4.9%, -1.1%℄ [1.9%, 3.0%℄
Absolute std of total investment
All ve shoks
0.1201 0.1261 0.1231 -2.4% -4.7% 2.4 % 0.43
[0.1074, 0.1359℄ [0.1128, 0.1425℄ [0.1103, 0.1389℄ [-5.1%, -0.1%℄ [-6.9%, -2.9%℄ [1.8%, 3.1%℄
Note: Volatilities and ampliation measures are omputed by simulating the model at the posterior mean reported in table 6.10.
Figures in brakets give the orresponding fth and ninety fth perentiles. To ompute these perentiles, we use the last 50,000
parameter draws (25,000 of eah hain). For eah parameter draw, we simulate the models and ompute the volatility and ampliation
measures. The ontemporaneous orrelation in the last olumn is based on simulated data from the translog model at the posterior
mean.
6. Endogenous rm entry in an estimated model of the U.S. business yle 146
Table 6.13: Standard deviations, relative volatilities and ampliation indiators using
estimated parameters from the estimation with prot data
Volatility Ampliation Corr
Translog CES-TrVE CES-NoVE Total CE VE (X,N)
Std of GDP relative to . . . shok X = Y r
labor prod.
1.0056 0.9341 0.9183 9.5% 7.7% 1.7 % 0.92
[0.9570, 1.0335℄ [0.8962, 0.9618℄ [0.8823, 0.9454℄ [6.8%, 11.1%℄ [5.2%, 9.6%℄ [0.7%, 2.1%℄
wage mark-up
0.1763 0.1639 0.1611 9.4% 7.6% 1.7 % 0.93
[0.1235, 0.2540℄ [0.1144, 0.2386℄ [0.1126, 0.2347℄ [6.7%, 11.1%℄ [5.0%, 9.7%℄ [0.6%, 2.1%℄
inv. spe. teh.
0.2002 0.2115 0.2148 -6.8% -5.4% -1.5 % -0.56
[0.0922, 0.3267℄ [0.0985, 0.3405℄ [0.0990, 0.3462℄ [-8.0%, -4.4%℄ [-6.8%, -3.1%℄ [-1.8%, -0.5%℄
preferene
0.0721 0.0707 0.0708 1.8% 2.0% -0.2 % 0.14
[0.0536, 0.0898℄ [0.0534, 0.0886℄ [0.0535, 0.0888℄ [-1.1%, 4.0%℄ [-0.9%, 3.6%℄ [-0.7%, 0.6%℄
gov. spending
0.0625 0.0639 0.0643 -2.7% -2.1% -0.6 % -0.15
[0.0529, 0.0751℄ [0.0543, 0.0764℄ [0.0546, 0.0768℄ [-5.5%, -0.2%℄ [-4.9%, -0.2%℄ [-0.9%, 0.0%℄
Absolute std of GDP
All ve shoks
0.0522 0.0488 0.0480 8.8% 7.1% 1.6 % 0.56
[0.0439, 0.0677℄ [0.0410, 0.0637℄ [0.0405, 0.0627℄ [6.4%, 10.3%℄ [4.8%, 9.0%℄ [0.6%, 2.0%℄
Std of onsumption relative to . . . shok X = Cr
labor prod.
1.0918 0.9411 0.8943 22.1% 16.0% 5.2 % 0.97
[0.9330, 1.2668℄ [0.8091, 1.0997℄ [0.7717, 1.0451℄ [14.9%, 27.8%℄ [10.7%, 20.5%℄ [3.7%, 6.3%℄
wage mark-up
0.1954 0.1692 0.1609 21.4% 15.5% 5.2 % 0.98
[0.1347, 0.2881℄ [0.1153, 0.2539℄ [0.1091, 0.2435℄ [13.6%, 29.6%℄ [9.6%, 22.2%℄ [3.6%, 6.3%℄
inv. spe. teh.
0.2589 0.2744 0.2820 -8.2% -5.7% -2.7 % -0.50
[0.1227, 0.4158℄ [0.1322, 0.4347℄ [0.1351, 0.4453℄ [-11.1%, -5.5%℄ [-8.3%, -3.4%℄ [-3.5%, -1.9%℄
preferene
0.2901 0.2950 0.2935 -1.2% -1.6% 0.5 % -0.15
[0.2613, 0.3195℄ [0.2666, 0.3245℄ [0.2650, 0.3233℄ [-2.1%, -0.5%℄ [-2.5%, -1.0%℄ [0.3%, 0.7%℄
gov. spending
0.1457 0.1313 0.1281 13.7% 10.9% 2.5 % 0.95
[0.1218, 0.1704℄ [0.1082, 0.1569℄ [0.1053, 0.1536℄ [8.0%, 19.6%℄ [6.3%, 16.0%℄ [1.6%, 3.2%℄
Absolute std of onsumption
All ve shoks
0.0583 0.0510 0.0488 19.5% 14.3% 4.6 % 0.55
[0.0473, 0.0802℄ [0.0411, 0.0717℄ [0.0393, 0.0687℄ [13.1%, 25.2%℄ [9.4%, 18.9%℄ [3.3%, 5.6%℄
Std of total investment relative to . . . shok X = TIr
labor prod.
2.1574 2.2925 2.2257 -3.1% -5.9% 3.0 % 0.66
[1.5919, 2.5244℄ [1.7766, 2.6176℄ [1.7411, 2.5355℄ [-10.2%, 0.9%℄ [-11.5%, -2.6%℄ [1.5%, 3.9%℄
wage mark-up
0.3603 0.3846 0.3736 -3.6% -6.3% 2.9 % 0.67
[0.2492, 0.5185℄ [0.2682, 0.5539℄ [0.2615, 0.5382℄ [-8.2%, -0.3%℄ [-9.8%, -3.7%℄ [1.6%, 3.8%℄
inv. spe. teh.
1.1486 1.1295 1.1368 1.0% 1.7% -0.7 % -0.12
[0.5220, 1.9399℄ [0.5081, 1.9112℄ [0.5092, 1.9255℄ [-0.1%, 2.4%℄ [0.7%, 2.8%℄ [-1.0%, -0.3%℄
preferene
0.5978 0.6084 0.5995 -0.3% -1.8% 1.5 % 0.33
[0.5321, 0.6903℄ [0.5405, 0.7032℄ [0.5315, 0.6949℄ [-1.5%, 1.0%℄ [-2.7%, -0.7%℄ [1.0%, 1.9%℄
gov. spending
0.3141 0.3237 0.3162 -0.7% -3.0% 2.4 % 0.51
[0.2426, 0.3660℄ [0.2535, 0.3737℄ [0.2483, 0.3657℄ [-4.0%, 1.6%℄ [-5.6%, -0.9%℄ [1.6%, 2.9%℄
Absolute std of total investment
All ve shoks
0.1200 0.1259 0.1231 -2.5% -4.8% 2.3 % 0.43
[0.1066, 0.1345℄ [0.1128, 0.1412℄ [0.1105, 0.1379℄ [-6.8%, 0.0%℄ [-7.9%, -2.8%℄ [1.2%, 3.1%℄
Note: Volatilities and ampliation measures are omputed by simulating the model at the posterior mean reported in table 6.10.
Figures in brakets give the orresponding fth and ninety fth perentiles. To ompute these perentiles, we use the last 50,000
parameter draws (25,000 of eah hain). For eah parameter draw, we simulate the models and ompute the volatility and ampliation
measures. The ontemporaneous orrelation in the last olumn is based on simulated data from the translog model at the posterior
mean.
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Table 6.14: Results from the Bayesian estimation of the Translog and the CES models
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Translog CES-TrVE CES-NoVE
Parameters Type Mean STD Mean [5% , 95%℄ Mean [5% , 95%℄ Mean [5% , 95%℄
Strutural parameters
Labor share in prodution α Beta 0.7 0.2 0.85 [0.81 , 0.90℄ 0.85 [0.83 , 0.88℄ 0.85 [0.83 , 0.88℄
Labor utility θ Gamma 2.0 1.0 3.64 [1.92 , 5.80℄ 3.83 [2.11 , 5.95℄ 3.91 [2.17 , 6.06℄
Wealth elast. labor supply γ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.79 [0.63 , 0.93℄ 0.79 [0.63 , 0.93℄ 0.79 [0.62 , 0.93℄
Consumption habit b Beta 0.5 0.2 0.76 [0.71 , 0.80℄ 0.75 [0.70 , 0.80℄ 0.74 [0.69 , 0.79℄
Investment adj. ost κI Gamma 4.0 1.0 3.82 [2.59 , 5.28℄ 3.70 [2.53 , 5.09℄ 3.61 [2.44 , 4.99℄
Inv. elast. of apital util.
δ2
δ1
Igamma 1.0 1.0 0.55 [0.33 , 0.89℄ 0.55 [0.34 , 0.89℄ 0.56 [0.34 , 0.90℄
Prie mark-up µp Gamma 1.3 0.2 1.26 [1.16 , 1.36℄    
Entry adj. ost κE Gamma 4.0 1.0 1.50 [1.09 , 1.99℄ 1.56 [1.13 , 2.06℄ 1.52 [1.09 , 2.02℄
Autoorrelation of shok proesses
Labor produtivity ρz Beta 0.5 0.2 0.96 [0.94 , 0.98℄ 0.96 [0.94 , 0.98℄ 0.96 [0.94 , 0.98℄
Wage mark-up ρµ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.97 [0.95 , 0.98℄ 0.97 [0.95 , 0.98℄ 0.97 [0.95 , 0.98℄
Invest. spe. teh. ρI Beta 0.5 0.2 0.24 [0.12 , 0.38℄ 0.23 [0.11 , 0.36℄ 0.22 [0.10 , 0.35℄
Gov. spending ρG Beta 0.5 0.2 0.92 [0.88 , 0.94℄ 0.92 [0.88 , 0.95℄ 0.92 [0.89 , 0.95℄
Entry ost ρfE Beta 0.5 0.2 0.95 [0.91 , 0.98℄ 0.94 [0.89 , 0.98℄ 0.94 [0.89 , 0.98℄
Standard deviation of innovations
Labor prod. σεz Igamma 2.0 1 0.80 [0.70 , 0.90℄ 0.79 [0.71 , 0.89℄ 0.80 [0.72 , 0.89℄
Wage mark-up σεµ Igamma 2.0 1 4.30 [3.00 , 5.95℄ 4.39 [3.12 , 5.96℄ 4.43 [3.14 , 6.01℄
Invest. spe. teh. σεI Igamma 2.0 1 3.99 [2.39 , 6.54℄ 3.91 [3.21 , 4.69℄ 3.94 [3.25 , 4.71℄
Preferene σεχ Igamma 2.0 1 1.46 [1.07 , 1.91℄ 1.42 [1.06 , 1.85℄ 1.36 [1.01 , 1.75℄
Gov. spending σεG Igamma 2.0 1 1.87 [1.71 , 2.03℄ 1.87 [1.72 , 2.03℄ 1.87 [1.72 , 2.04℄
Entry ost σεfE Igamma 2.0 1 2.43 [1.96 , 2.97℄ 2.04 [1.57 , 2.55℄ 1.98 [1.53 , 2.49℄
Moving average parameter and loading oeient
Wage mark-up shok ν Normal 0.0 0.2 0.41 [0.26 , 0.56℄ 0.42 [0.27 , 0.56℄ 0.42 [0.27 , 0.56℄
Loading oeient λ Normal 1.0 2.0 0.13 [0.06 , 0.19℄ 0.13 [0.06 , 0.19℄ 0.13 [0.06 , 0.19℄
Note: Using a Random Walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm, we generate 2 hains of 2 Mio. parameter draws eah. For eah hain, we disard the rst 1 Mio.
draws and use the remaining draws to ompute the posterior mean and perentiles. To estimate the CES models, we alibrate the steady state prie mark-up at
the posterior mean of the translog estimation. The data set ranges from 1964:Q1 to 2012:Q2 and onsists of data series on GDP, onsumption, investment, hours
worked, rm entry, and two wage measures.
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Table 6.15: Standard deviations, relative volatilities and ampliation indiators using
estimated translog and CES models
Volatility Ampliation Corr
Translog CES-TrVE CES-NoVE Total CE VE (X,N)
Std of GDP relative to . . . shok X = Y r
labor prod. 1.0006 0.9365 0.9202 8.7% 6.8% 1.8 % 0.92
wage mark-up 0.1811 0.1628 0.1599 13.2% 11.3% 1.8 % 0.93
inv. spe. teh. 0.2166 0.2078 0.2111 2.6% 4.3% -1.6 % -0.55
preferene 0.0749 0.0766 0.0768 -2.4% -2.3% -0.2 % 0.14
gov. spending 0.0627 0.0608 0.0611 2.6% 3.2% -0.6 % -0.16
Std of onsumption relative to . . . shok X = Cr
labor prod. 1.0705 0.9396 0.8939 19.8% 13.9% 5.1 % 0.97
wage mark-up 0.1995 0.1731 0.1649 21.0% 15.2% 5.0 % 0.97
inv. spe. teh. 0.2797 0.2695 0.2769 1.0% 3.8% -2.7 % -0.49
preferene 0.2915 0.3023 0.3010 -3.2% -3.6% 0.4 % -0.15
gov. spending 0.1461 0.1384 0.1352 8.1% 5.6% 2.4 % 0.95
Std of total investment relative to . . . shok X = TIr
labor prod. 2.2082 2.2929 2.2256 -0.8% -3.7% 3.0 % 0.67
wage mark-up 0.3743 0.3580 0.3480 7.6% 4.6% 2.9 % 0.68
inv. spe. teh. 1.2574 1.1249 1.1317 11.1% 11.8% -0.6 % -0.12
preferene 0.5985 0.6090 0.6005 -0.3% -1.7% 1.4 % 0.34
gov. spending 0.3138 0.3152 0.3080 1.9% -0.4% 2.3 % 0.52
Note: Volatilities and ampliation measures are omputed at the respetive posterior mean given in table 6.14.
Note that we are not able to give the probability bands for our ampliation measures in the above speiation.
This would require to know the joint posterior distribution under the translog and the CES models. The on-
temporaneous orrelation in the last olumn is based on simulated data from the translog model at the posterior
mean.
Chapter 7
Summary and outlook
The main ontribution of this thesis to the existing theoretial and empirial literature
on New Keynesian Maroeonomis are as follows: First, we link the lag polynomial as-
soiated with news shoks to the lass of ylotomi polynomials. By doing so, we are
able to analytially show that the roots of the lag polynomial are all equal in modulus
and are independent of the length of the antiipation horizon. Hene, the destabilizing
eets of news shoks are not related to the problem of nonfundamentalness. Seond,
we study the volatility impliations of news shoks under optimal monetary poliy and
boundedly rational expetations. We nd that the (volatility) eets of news shoks on
the eonomy and, thus, their importane for business yle utuations depend on the
assumption of forward-looking rational expetations. Under boundedly rational expe-
tations, news shoks may generate less volatility than unantiipated shoks of the same
form. Third, we introdue partially antiipated monetary poliy shoks for whih the pub-
li has imperfet information about the shok proess. We nd that this type of shok
may lead to a lower volatility than fully antiipated shoks of the same form. Fourth, we
integrate a money and redit market into a baseline New Keynesian model based on a
money-and-redit-in-the-utility approah. This framework enables us to study hanges in
the monetary base and in the renaning rate. It gives impliitly rise to a redit hannel
as an additional transmission mehanism of monetary shoks in whih the (urrent and
future) bond and loan rate diretly aet urrent goods demand. Finally, we estimate
a medium-sale real business yle model with endogenous rm entry for the U.S. eon-
omy in order to quantify the ampliation mehanism assoiated with rm entry. The
ampliation mehanism works through the ompetition and the variety eet. Both
eets are statistially signiant and substantially amplify the volatility in output and
onsumption.
This thesis forms the basis for several possible diretions of future researh. The fol-
lowing two avenues seem partiularly promising and are already in working proess: First,
over the last years entral banks around the globe have made an eort to explain and
ommuniate their future poliy intentions. Sine interest rates are at the zero lower
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bound, entral banks are fored to use unonventional instruments to stimulate the eon-
omy. In light of this, it would be interesting to study the dynami eets of antiipated
disturbanes in the monetary base. Based on this thesis, a possible way would be to use a
dynami version of the New Keynesian model with money and redit markets developed in
hapter 5 and extend it with news shoks. Seond, another researh idea in the ontext of
antiipated monetary poliy is to extend the analysis of hapter 4 and study the optimal
ommuniation strategy of the entral bank. In partiular, what is the optimal anti-
ipation length of monetary poliy shoks as response to antiipated and unantiipated
disturbanes?
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